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Summary 
The thesis attempts to analyse both theoretically 
and empirically the relationship between firm performance 
and organizational structure. The chosen measure of 
performance is profit. To this end Chapter Two reviews 
the work of Williamson (103, 104, 109) and others on the 
classification of the structure of large firms. Hypotheses 
concerning superiority are considered. However, it may be 
that the structures considered in Chapter Two, are only 
appropriate to stable environments. Hence Chapter Three 
develops a simple model of optimal decentralization under 
differing environmental conditions and considers existing 
organizational structures that may be most appropriate to 
the highly unstable environment of research and develop-
ment. 
Chapter Four reports empirical analysis involving the 
use of organizational structure as an independent (dummy) 
variable. The sample consists of 82 companies in five 
industries where the environment is considered stable. 
Hence the classification scheme of Williamson and Bhargava 
(109) seems to be appropriate. Equations are presented 
using both .price-cost margins and a rate of return on capital 
as the measure of profitability. The organizational dummy 
is highly significant in all cases, seemingly indicating that 
organizational structure matters in determining performance. 
However little evidence is found of specification bias in 
previous studies which excluded the organizational dummy. 
Possible important omissions f~om the equations are reviewed. 
A comparison is made of the variations in the results 
between those equations using price-cost margins as the 
dependent variable and those using a rate of return. No 
conclusions are drawn about superiority. 
In order to exclude non-divisionalized enterprise 
which cause problems in Chapter Four, . Chapter Five consi-
ders a sample of 36 conglomerates. However, although 
positive, the organizational dummy failed in general to 
reach statistical significance. Possible explanations 
are considered which, if correct, may require public policy 
to be essentially ad hoc in nature. 
CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION 
If observed interfirm variations in profitability 
reflect differences in economic efficiency they need 
explanation. Studies in this field have focused on a large 
number of explanatory variables; for instance, firm size; 
Hall and Weiss (32) Samue1s and Smyth (82) Steckler (93); 
firm growth; Singh and Whittington (90) Parker (73); dive~-
sification Gort (29); owner versus manager control Kamerschen 
(38) Radice (79); managerial taste Williamson (106). Hence 
both variables determining the profit-maximizing level of 
profit and managerial varilables have attracted attention. 
However to our knowledge there has been no empirical work 
which explicitly includes the organizational form of the firm 
. 
as an explanatory variable. Hence the efficacy of internal 
control devices bas been ignored as a possible explanation of 
differences in profit performance. This can be entirely 
\ justified by the neoclasSical assumption that all firms are 
'o:ptima11y' organized in this respect. However the observa-
tion by Wi11iamson and Bhargava (109) of the simultaneous 
existen~e of several different types of organizational form 
in the U.S. and their arguments concerning expected efficiency 
differences, may bring this assumption into question. This 
will be particularly so if large numbers of firms are under-
going change in their organizational form. Wi11iamson (103, 
Chapter 3) in considering American experience, has reported 
a rather long period for the diffusion of a new organizational 
form, but it would seem that most of the activity was con-
centrated in a period of approximately a decade ~Vi11iamson 
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and Bhargava (109 P.142»). Moreover, if differences in 
organizational form do matter in determining profitability, 
this may be helpful in deciding the exact nature of the 
J 
managerial inadequacies which have been used to explain 
inter-firm differences in profit performance. [Liebenstein 
(47) Dunning (23)]. 
In attempting to estimate the effects of organization 
form on firm performance, this thesis depends heavily on the 
classification scheme of Williamson and Bhargava (109). 
Therefore chapter two considers the literature that led to 
its development and to the, a priori, expectations about the 
relative efficiency of the various forms. 
The pioneering work of Williamson (103) on organizational 
structure appears to take a view of organizations that 
emphasizes the importance of central management and superior-
subordinate relationships. Ultimate authority is vested fairly 
firmly with top management who mayor may not wish to delegate 
some decisions to lower levels of the organization. Hence, 
as chapter two shows, divisional performance depends crucially 
upon the efficacy of the control mechanisms imposed by central 
management. Moreover central management will have to make 
important and far reaching decisions as to whether to 
(voluntarily) delegate decision-making authority, the defini-
tion of divisional tasks and responsibilities and the nature 
of the long-term corporate plan. 
Williamsott' (103, P .19-21) considers the possible effici-
ency advantages in the fields of communication and response 
to sudden change available when organizations place emphasiS 
on superior-subordinate relationships. For these to be 
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forthcoming requires ~hat only minimal amounts of interaction 
between peers is necessary for successful completion of the 
organizational task. This, in turn, implies rather specialized, 
easily defined job tasks which are technically and information-
ally separable. In these circumstances the only communication 
channels necessary for successful completion of the organiza-
. . ." tional task are the hierarchical ones between superior and sub- " .~. 
ordinate. In terms of the organ:i,zationa1 form, these condition.:; 
allow separate divisions to be formed, which impinge on each 
other ~nly to the extent· of the need for rules to stop intra-
firm competition (see P. 10). 
Given these views as to the nature of organizations, the 
Williamson model of hierarchical decision-making, which is 
reflected in the analysis of organizational form, argues the 
importance of the span of control (109, Chapter 3) in deter-
mining subordinate compliance with organizational goals. As 
the supervisor's available time with each subordinate decreases, 
\ 
so does compliance, leading to a preference for small spans 
on control loss grounds. 
~ Thus it would seem that the Williamson view of organiza-
tion is essentially "bureaucratic" in the Weber sense (100). 
Glueck and Dennis (28) have stylized the characteristics of 
the bureaucracti~ model as:- clear authority relationships 
embodying the concept of unity of control; small spans of 
control; narrow job specification; tight control mechanisms; 
an emphasis on hierarchical superior-subordinate relationships 
and standard operating procedures~lJecision-making concentra-
ted at the top. Evidence in the literature (Burns and Stalker (l~ 
Morse and Lorsch (64) Leavitt (45» may point to the superi- , 
ority of this type of ol'ganization only under "stable" 
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environments. Since no firm will face the completely certain 
environment of economic theory, stable environments will be 
taken to be those where the 
• • • circumstances [to which the firm must adjust] are " 
predictable in the sense that although they occur with 
stoCha.stic regularity, precise advance knowledge of this is 
unavailable ... (that is) customers come and go ... labour 
and materials procurement is -subject to the usual vagaries 
not to mention minor shifts in demand and similar disturbances 
of a transitory nature" ·(my underlining). (Willi~son I03,P.24) 
Not all environments may be stable so chapter three 
considers the performance of bureaucratic organizations under 
"uncertain" conditions, where the firm faces an environment 
involving a high degree of risk or uncertainty [for definition 
of these terms see Knight (40 P.19)]. In organizational terms 
this will mean that many occurrences cannot be handled by 
p~eviously defined standard operating procedures and that 
\ 
well-defined search procedures are not available in advance 
(P.25). Research and development may operate under such 
conditions so Chapter 3 also considers organizational forms 
that may provide superior efficiency when new products (or 
other innovations) are of overriding importance in determining 
performance. (2) However the analysis may have application for 
large firms facing an uncertain environment from whatever 
reason. 
Chapter 4, attempts to explain vari~tions in profitability 
observed in a sample of 82 large industrial companies. All 
firms seemed to be facing a stable environment. Therefore. a 
model is developed wheie organizational form, as classified by 
- 4 -
Williamson and Bhargava, is included among the explanatory 
varIables. Results are presented for several specifications 
of the model, the dependent variable and the organizational 
form variable. These may provide evidence as to the impor-
tance of organizational form in determining profitability. 
In addition, interest will be focused on whether the 
exclusio~ of this variable from earlier work has resulted in 
serious specification bias. Such bias may be expected when 
included variables are correlated with other excluded vari-
ables which are significant in determining profitability 
LJor explanation see Johnston (37)}. 
Chapter 5, considers a sample of conglomerate firms. 
These where chosen in order to obtain additional evidence 
as to the importance of organizational form in determining 
profitability, in a situation where two particular problems 
encountered in Chapter 4 are mitigated. Thus the use of 
conglomerates allows an unequivocal expectation, on the basis 
of the Williamson and Bhargava arguments, concerning the 
optimality or not of the organizational form used by all 
firms in the sample and may reduce problems associated with 
variations in firm profit due to differences in product-market 
structure. 
Chapter 6 ,draws some conclusions, .relates them to the 
existing literature, and points to possible scope for work in 
the future. 
- 5 -
. . 
~morns 
(1) Standard operating procedures are a set of rules that · 
determine legitimate individual action as a result of stimulus. 
Their use allows a reduction in communication bet~een superior 
and subordinate. It will be easiest to tabulate efficient 
procedures if the stimuli to which individuals are subject are 
few and not subject to change. 
(2) The M-form (see Chapter 2) may not be appropriate for 
technical advance. The latter may be promoted primarily by 
small firms which, later, when steady-state efficiency is 
essential will be taken over by M-form companies. (See 
Wl11iamson 103, P.157) 
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CHAPTER 11 - THE MULTIDIVISIONAL FORM 
The study and explanation of variation in economic perfor-
,# 
mance is fundamental to economics, yet typically matters of 
internal efficiency have received little attention, especially 
in empirical work. Indeed it is usual to assume that the man-
agement of each company has achieved maximum possible internal 
efficiency, so that differences in profit performance can be 
explained by reference to the size and growth of the organiza-
tion or by the market conditions in which the firm finds itself. 
Such an approach is open to four criticisms: Firstly, 
management may have discretion over the use of some of the firm's 
resources, "and use it to employ superfluous factors of production 
see Williamson, (I06)~I) Secondly, the quality of factors of 
production available to the firm may differ. These skill 
differences may not be reflected in payment, due to the activi-
ties of the trade unions, or "due to the inability to assess the 
individuals' capability. Thirdly, individuals do not have the 
unbounded calculative ability, time or knowledge of neoclassical 
"." 
theory's economie men, but perhaps are better characterized [see 
Simon(88, Chp~ V)] as (I) not knowing the complete consequences 
of their actions (2) not having nor in a position to afford a 
complete knowledge of all alternatives (3) not being able to rank 
all alterna.tives in terms of performance and therefore likely to 
be a satisficers not maximizers. Fourthly, empirical investiga-
tion has found significant differences in technical efficiency 
. 
[.For theory see Farrell (25). For examples see Liebenstein (47)}. 
One might conclude that t~ese differences in efficiency 
found by Liebenstein (47) were the result of managerial discre-
tion or th~ quality of the factors of proGuction used, but equally 
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they could be due to the use by firms of dtfferent types of 
. organizational structure where the .latter refers to the nature 
and form of the various sub-units within the firm, their 
responsibilities and their relationship with any co-ordinating 
body and the form of the lines of communication within the 
organization. (2) Innovation is rarely instantaneous(3) so it 
is unlikely that if a snapshot of the economy is taken, all 
firms will be using an equally appropriate organizational 
structure. 
The classification of organizational structure used in 
this thesis is provided by the work of Williamson (103) and 
Williamson and Bhargava (109), building on the pioneering work 
of Chandler· (16). It is crucially dependent · on the nature of 
the sub-units and the relationships between them. Chandler 
documented a type of organizational structure pioneered by 
Genera..l Motors (et alia) in the U.S.A. in the 1920's, but not 
generally in use until after World War 11. This was called 
the multidivisional form (M-form). In this structure the 
company is divided into a central .office, consisting only of 
top level management aided by specialists in particular areas, 
and the various divisions, each producing one product or a group 
of closely related products. The divisions are self-sufficient 
with respect to the production and selling of their product, and 
have full responsibility for day-to-day decision-making •. The 
central office is then free to concentrate on long term planning 
and the monitoring and control of the actions of the divisions. 
This is in contrast to the traditional organizational 
structure, where departmentalization is on the basis of function 
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(i.e. sales, production, finance, marketing etc.,). Typically 
in such a firm the top executives of the functional departments 
meet to decide the company's top level managerial decisions. 
This organizational type is called U-form. 
The development of the M-form was seen by Chandler (16) 
and later Williamson (103), as a response to the increasing 
size and diversity of products in the largest firms. Hence 
the M-form was not seen as superio~ for all sized firms, all 
levels of diversification or, indeed, all technologies. (4) 
In order to perform at maximum efficiency the M-form should 
have two important characteristics according to Williamson (103, 
P.120); Firstly, there must be a separation of day-to-day from 
strategic (long-term) decision-making. Thus the routine day-
to-day decision-making in the M-form must be delegated fully 
to the divisional level, so reducing the load on central 
.management and making response to local change (referring to 
(single) product demand and costs) both quick and efficient. 
Secondly, central management must retain responsibility for both 
long-term planning, which should be done free from product bias~5) 
and the control of the divisions. In these tasks .management 
will be able to call on experts to give specialist advice. 
The natu~e of the controls employed by central management 
will be crucial. Thus in the M-form, divisional management are 
made fully profit-responsible and are subject to four types of 
scrutiny and modification from head office. Williamson and 
Bhargava (109) have argued that these "strategic controls" will 
provide the organization with efficiency advantages. 
(a) Internal audits. The auditing of divisional perform-
ance will be a continuous process.,.../enabling central management 
- 9 ~ 
to have up-to-date information about what is happening and to 
. 
make any modifications thought necessary. Typically, several 
performance indica~ors as well as profit will be used, so pre-
venting divisional management from inflating short-term profit, 
and hence its own rewards, at the expense of long-term 
viability. This rigorous auditing of performance aims to keep 
anti-organizational behaviour on the part of the divisional 
management to a minim~. 
(b) externality control. The actions of one subsidiary 
will affect the performance of another if there is ~nterdepend­
ence between pr~ducts. It will be the job of the central office 
\ 
to minimize or maximize these externalities depending on 
whether their effect on organizational performance is negative 
or positiye. This it will do by a series of rules defining 
acceptable divisional actions and, in the last resort, by arbi-
tration of divisional disputes . 
. The amount of co-ordination necessary due to the existence 
of externalities will depend upon the product mix of the \ 
company; it will be greater, ceteris paribus, the greater the 
number of transactions between divisions and the greater the 
absolute cross-elasticities(6) between the products of the 
separate divisions. 
(c) Manipulation of the incentive machinery. Economizing 
on pecuniary rewards by partial substitution of non-pecuniary 
rewards is a characteristic of all firms fWilliamson and 
Bhargava (109)]. The ffrm gains advantages over the market 
which cannot confer non-pecuniary rewards very efficiently. 
The M-form will attempt to use all the rewards and penalties 
at its disposal, so that central management can affect the 
reward-system in the divisions without getting involved in their 
- 10 -
running. It can do this by its attitude in allocating rewards 
and penalties to:top divisional management. 
(d) Cash flow allocation. It is basic to the M-form where 
,~ 
strategic planning is undertaken by central management, that 
cash flows are not necessarily returned to areas within the 
" firms from which they came. Instead they are allocated to 
areas of highest yield. In this way the M-form works as an 
internal ~apital market. Compared with the (external) capital 
market, it has alleged advantages in the form of cheaper moni-
toring of performance and'the ability to make discrete or 
marginal changes in the project in a continuous manner.(7) 
However, compared with the external market, project choice is 
restricted 'since it is limited to areas within which the firm 
already works, or to which diversification is considered, 
practical. 
x x x x x 
Analysis of the comparat'i ve efficiency of the U-form and 
I 
,M-form requires considerat~on of two cases [Wi11iamson and 
Bhargava (109)]. 
(a) the M-form compared with a similarly sized U-form. 
(b) the M-form compared with a series ofU-form indepen-
" 
dents corresponding in size to the M-form's divisions. 
Both cases are considered in static terms~ that is with 
given technology, and under the assumption that production is 
technically separable. 
Case (a) 
For a number of reasons, as the U-form grows and diversi-
fies, control problems may becpme ' increasing1y serious 
(Williamson 103, P.llO). Firstly, top management may have 
increasing difficulty in understanding th~ different aspects 
. ' 
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of the company's activities and in finding time to make the day-
to-day and strategic decisions required of it; if this is true, 
top managements' ability to control will be increasingly 
impaired.~dditiona1Iy, as the number of hierarchies increases 
the response to day-to-day changes in the environment may be 
slowed because information about these changes will be increas-
ingly removed from decision-making , capacity. The M-form reduces 
the top-managements' decision-making load and obtains a quick 
response to change in the routine (day-to-day) environment by 
creating divisions, each producing one product or a small group 
of closely related products~8)to which day-to-day decision-
making can be delegated. Central management can then concentrate 
on the long-term planning; thus freed from the restrictions of 
day-to-day decision-making central management may be able to make 
more rational long-term plans. Secondly, there may be increas-
ing_problems with sub-goal pursuit~9) In a small unit, sub-goal 
pursuit is mitigated by short-lines of communication and control, 
and the feeling of association with the organization that may be 
felt by its members. But, as the firm with the U-form structure 
grows bigger, significant increases in sub-goal pursuit may be 
expected. This occurs due to the difficulty involved in spocify-
ing adequate criteria for success~10)- important since these are 
used as a yardstick for distribution of rewards and penalties 
within the organization - and because top-level decision-making 
is in the hands of personnel with full-time functional responsi-
bi1ities.(11) Individuals, so intimately involved with a parti-
cular part of the organization, might be expected to favour thi~ 
area in their decision-making activities~12) 
Sub-goal pursuit may be both "deliberate", typically pay-
ments for excess factors and excess leisure, and "unconcious", 
- 12 _ 
the maximization by individuals of the output or size of their 
particular functional department.(13) This occurs because the ' 
departmental goals, in terms of sales, production etc., cannot 
so easily~e equated, in the U-form, with the presumed overall 
organizational goal of profit. 
Sub-goal pursuit in the M-form will be the consequence of 
goal pursuit on the part of three groups:- divisional management, 
central management and the spe9ia1!st (elite) staff. 
Due to the effect of strategic controls, divisional manage-
ment will be encouraged, under threat of loss of rewards, to 
follow corporate goals as determined by central management. 
Under these conditions the discretionary resources available to 
divisional management may be small. The- elite staff may have 
bias towards goals like professional or academic excellence, but 
due to their small numbers and proximity to central management 
.the effect on organizational goals is likely to be small 
(Williamson 103, P.126). 
Williamson (103) has suggested that, due to their close 
. 
. 
association with the firm's success, central management in the 
M-form will emphasize profit-maximising objectives~14) However, 
while it seems unlikely that the central management has any 
incentive to ~nflate the payments to other members of the 
organization, it may be that the top management of an M-form is 
just as prone -to objectives other than profit-maximization as 
managements in other structures, if the situation allows. That 
is, if shareholders are unable fully to enforce their property 
rights, -management may use the discret ion over resources that 
this implies to increase its own welfare at the expense of 
profit performance. This action, contrary to the presumed pre-
-ferences of shareholders, may take the form of excessive sales 
- 13--
[aaumol (9)}, ~xcessive growth [Marris (57)1, or employment of 
excess factors of production !Williamson (106»). 
Nevertheless, even if this is so, if it can be assumed 
that shareholders maximize the rewards from property rights 
enforcement, a switch from the U-form to M-form structure may 
be of benefit tQ both the owners and managers of the company. 
Hence under this assumption shareholders will enforce their 
property rights only up to the point where the marginal co~t 
of enforcement equals the marginal benefit. Under conditions 
of non-perfect comp.etition in product . markets and a capital 
market working with imperfect information, this will imply some 
discretion for management since marginal enforcement costs will 
be non-zero. Moreover these costs might be expected to increase 
with the amount of enforcement undertaken, as the more obvious 
sources of information and courses of action are exhausted. 
If therefore the potential profit available to shareholders, if 
property rights were fully enforced, rises due to the lower' sub-
goal pursuit, better decision-making response (above), and the 
capital market advantages (see below) of the M-form, then (with 
a positiv~marginalcost of enforcement) the benefits of this 
marginal profit will be split between shareholders, in the form 
of increased reported profits, and management, in the form of 
increased discretion.(15) Additionally, by strengthening the 
market's view of the . company, the extra profit may allow manage:-
ment to fulfil its long-run borrowing requirement more easily. 
Thirdly, to the extent that profit and loss figures are 
more costly to produce in a functionally departmentalized 
company, due to the responsibility for products residing with 
several differell~ sub-units all with a good deal of autonomy 
and with different control procedures, the U-form will be at a 
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disadvantage in deciding on the performanc3 of individual 
. products. Hence the selection of ljiuccessful products for 
expansion or loss-making products for elimination is made 
mOre onero\1s. Problems of this kind may be expected to grow 
in importance as firm size and diversification increases. 
However, in the M-form internal audits on the basis of profit 
allow decisions about future production levels to be taken on 
the basis of greater informatiQn. . 
While the advantages of the M-form structure seems over-
whelming, there are various reasons why, on the one hand, the 
U-form remains the natural type of structure for the small 
, 
single-product firm {see Chandler (16), Williamson (103 Chp.l0)] 
and why on ·the other.U-forms of quite large size can be 
expected. 
Firstly, the M-form may mean an increase in expense in 
certa~n specialist functional tasks, since some duplication is 
required as between the elite staff at headquarters and the 
functional departments wit.hin the divisions. 
" 
Secondly, in order to ·keep the idea of profit responsibi-
li ty on the basis of products, maxilnum economies of scale in 
the various functional departments may not be obtained, as these 
departments will be split up among the divisions in the M-form. 
However there is an alternative, if such losses are very large, 
, of forming a separate division performing the function in ques-
tion and operated as a cost centre.(16) 
Thirdly, the M-form structure involves a decoupling exer-
cise, separating the various products into divisions. This 
will involve increases in informational aI&d co-ordinational 
costs if the products are highly interconnected either technol-
ogically or in terms of cross-elasticitien. In the limit 
.-
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provided by technically inseparable products, very large units 
operated functionally may be necessary since the costs involved 
in any decoupling exercise will override the advantages provided 
by the M-form. (17) 
J 
x x x x x x 
Case (b)(above) throws light on factors leading to 
increased firm size, -and the limits to any such increases. In 
particular, it shows how the M-form firstly may allow more 
vertical integration than the U-form under similar conditions 
and secondly, encourages the growth of the conglomerate-type of 
company which operates in various widely differing product-
areas. (IS) 
Consider an M-form structure compared with a series of 
U-form independents, each the size of a division, with respect 
to verticallntegration. . It is assumed that the cost of 
running each division is the same as the corresponding U-form 
- (19) independent. 
Wi1liamson (107, 10S) has analysed the advantages of in-
ternal organization in the · _field of vertical integration. 
Assuming .technology is fixed and uniformly available, he argued 
that all exchanges of technically ~eparable products should be 
analysed in terms of a comparison of the costs incurred by the 
market and intra-organizational methods. 
Using this approac~ if it can be assumed that managers 
maximize potential profit which subsequently will be divided 
between discretionary resources and reported profit, then 
marginal costs and benefits will determine the amount of verti-
cal integration urdertaken. On the one hand, vertical integra-
tion may reduce the costs of exchange when one or ~ore of 
Williamsons /los, P.114 - 227](20)causes of market failure are 
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important. On the other hand, to the extp.nt that greater size 
means an increase in anti-organiz~tional behaviour, vertical 
integration will involve additional costs. Therefore the 
M-form, i~ it mitigates these cost increases and assuming that 
benefits are unaffected, will allow, ceteris paribus, more 
vertical integration in the economy • 
. . 
In the case of the conglomerate, which operates in widely-
diversified industries with little connection between them, 
the advantages (if any) of the M-form over the U-form indepen-
dents will be in the allocation of cash flow to areas of 
greatest yield. These advantages of the "internal capital 
market" weroe specifieCt above. They will be compounded if the 
U-form independents have a definite bias towards internal 
deployment of funds. 
However, the M-form remains only a way of mitigating the 
control problems of the large firm. As the firm grows, decision 
making problems associated with management overload, and sub-
goal pursuit, resultant from inadequate supervision, may re-
emerge so that beyond a certain size, dependent on the complex-
(21) . ' ity of the control process, the net advantages from more 
internal organization will again be lower than those from the 
use of markets (external organization). It may be that there 
are some firms in the economy which have more divisions than 
1s optimal for present managerial and informational technology. 
x x x x x 
The basic classification including only M-forms and U-
forms(22)has been extended by Williamson and Bhargava (109). 
This was necessary, because apparently there are d1vis1onalized 
companies which cannot be expected to perform as efficiently as 
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the M-form. Among these are those companies, which, while 
having the general characteristic~ of the M-form - that is a 
central office and seve~al individually viable subsidiaries -
fail to show ~either the necessary separation of long-term and 
day-to-day decision-making or sufficiently vigorous controls 
of divisional managements' activities.(23) 
Hence the M-form is that structure where central manage-
ment is involved both in the day-to-day decision-making as 
well as long-term planning. Such involvement will mean that 
the firm will not be abl~ to get the advantages afforded by 
the M-form in relieving the managerial capacity problem. It 
00 
is expected that because of this ' 0 long-term decision-making 
will suffer unduly, since short-term factors will tend to 
gain prominence because of their immediacy. Since the responsi-
o bility for day-to-day decision-making is shared between central 
and ~ivisional management, full responsibility for actions can-
not easily be attributed to the separate groups; therefore 
organizational rewards and penalties may be misallocated,1 and 
sub-goal pursuit will be greater than in the M-form. However. 
o • 
rigorous internal auditing maybe present in the M-form. 
Conversely, the H-form gives too much discretion to divi-
sional management, because at least one of the strategic 
controls associated with the M-form is not present. 0 This 
implies that discretionarY 'payments may be excessive and that 
there may be wasteful competition between subsidiaries whose 
activities have not been adequately co-ordinated by central 
management. (From now on this characteristic of the organiza-
tions will be called "product overlap".) Additionally, few 
internal capital market advantages will be gained; indeed in 
extreme cases the company may well allocate funds to serious 
- 18 
loss-making activities. This is often due to pressure from 
divisional management who (usually) in the H-form have a con-
siderable say in decisions optimally reserved for central 
management. Hence, just as in the U-form, the form of deci-
sion-making may be biased by the individuals particular 
loyalty to one part of the firm. 
The X-form is somewhat specialized. It relates to that 
structure where there is a mixture of control characteristics. 
That is, one part of the company may be under functional , con-
trol, others under M-form or H-form type control (etc.). 
Williamson and Bhargava (109) have suggested one rather 
specialized instance where the X-form can be seen as a rational 
response to the firm's situation':- a large monopolisticU-form 
wants to restrict investment into its original product line, 
but has found profitable opportunities elsewhere. These new 
activities may be given divisional standing while the original 
unit continues as a U-form. ' Only if the U-form can be split 
to advantage will a full-bodied M-form be justified. Neverthe-
less, on the basis of observation of companies, in practice 
most X-forms seem to be only transitional in nature and thcre-
fore the optimality of this form on the basis of organizational 
costs and b~nefits must be doubted in many cases (as Williamson 
, and Bhargava themselves note). 
I The M-classification is the one allocated to a company 
which is in the process of changing its organizational struc-
ture to M-form. Such a change will involve reorganizational 
costs in terms of redefining individuals' job task, bringing 
in new operating procedures, and overcoming resistance to 
change. Hence an M-form in period of transition cannot be 
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expected to ~erform with as :low costs as the long-established 
_M-form. 
x x x x x 
It would seem that the 'classification of Williamson and 
Bhargava provides a method of identifying different organiza-
tional structures that may both affect performance significan-
tly and are suitable for inclusion in regression analysis. 
However, there are weaknesses in this approach. 
Firstly, no account is taken of the effect of special 
managerial skills available to some firms; these may be 
especially important if they are located at the top of the 
_organization. Hence the quality of 1ead~rship may affect the 
success of the organization significantly. This may be 
especially so where displacement mechanisms for poor execu-
tives are weak. 
Secondly, it is assumed that organizational structure 
either does not affect-the level of internal efficiency within 
the sub-units or that sub-units in anU-form or H-form are 
-less internally efficient that those - in an M-form. This is 
not a strong assumption since, if divisional management has 
excess discretion, some of it is likely to be passed on to 
lower level staff. Nevertheless, there is the possibility 
that variations in the internal efficiency of sUb-units could, 
in a few cases, compensate for, rather than exaggerate, dif-
ferences in the efficiency of co-ordination between sub-units 
(as displayed by organizational structure). However, on 
balance, sllch a situation is not expected with any regularity. 
Thirdly, the Wi11iamson and Bhargava (109) classification 
is not exhaustive, as they themselves recognize. For example, 
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Channon (17, P.15) has reported another type of organizational 
structure. This he called the "GJlID". Here two types of 
responsibility are superimposed upon each other. So, for 
example, ~he firm could be divided by function and by product 
at the same time. It seems that this structure is found most 
widely in very large firms and m~y, therefore, be a response 
to the limits to firm size, even with the M-form, discussed 
earlier. (24) 
Fourthly, the costs and hence profits of an organization 
will depend on the amount of trade union and government inter-
ference in its activities. This may not be uniform in its 
effect either between industries or with respect to firm size. 
Lastly, firm performance will depend not only on the 
amount of discretion available to management, but also how it 
is used. If sufficiently potent rewards are offered, manage-
ment.may report the maximum possible profit. Yet the nature 
and extent of these rewards, like bonus and stock option 
schemes, is not necessarily linked to organizational structure 
in any direct or predictable manner. Superior performance .may 
therefore be due to better methods of rewarding staff.(25) 
x x x x x 
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FOOTNOTES 
(1) "Discretionary resources" are those that Williamson 
(106) recognized could be used by management in their 
interests rather than those of shareholders, without job loss 
threat. They exist because shareholders will be unable due 
to cost, foenforce fully their property rights (see laier). 
Since perfect competition in product or capital-
markets will force profit-maximization on management the exis-
tence of discretionary resources implies an assumption of non-
competitive mark~ts." 
(2) All these factors may be important and affect the 
efficiency of the organization. ~he task in defining structure 
will be to break the organization into sUb-uriits, to define 
the responsibilities of each ~! these sub-units and to decide 
the nature and extent of the communication channels within the 
firm. 
. 
(~) The fact that s~veral organizational structures may 
coexist is verified by Chandler (16) and Williamson and 
Bhargava (109). It would seem unlikely that all of these were 
of equal efficiency. 
(4) Williamson (103, P.163) "recognized that the U-form 
might be optimal for quite large firms using technically 
inseparable production techniques or making products where 
- technological links are strong • 
(5) Decisions about expansion or contraction may be 
hampered if decision-makers are biased towards certain products 
or specialisms. One way such bias may occur is if management 
rewards are linked to success of particular ~ub-unit (either 
a division or a "function"). 
(6) Both supply an~.Aemand cross-elasticities. 
(7) The capital market may find it difficult to enforce 
discreet or marginal changes in the project once finance has 
been provided. Hence all decisions must be made before th~ 
project starts, when all necessary information may not b~ 
available. aowever within a firm, various changes to a pro-ject can be made on the basis of information from the audit-
ing process. [Williamson (103, P.156) Williamson (l08,P.l13») 
(8) Hence the knowledge "required of divisional managers 
is -limited to that concerning a few products. 
(9) Sub-goal pursuit is defined here as actions not in 
line with organizational goals as defined by top management. 
(10) The total organizational goal of profit may not be 
operational within the U-form. Individuals, because they are 
unable to perceive the overall profit goal in the context of 
their job task, may substitute departmental goals in terms of 
sales, production etc. Since it may be difficult to spec~fy 
these departmental goals in a way that allows integration 
with the overall organizational goal, much: individual eff.~t 
may not contribute to profit. Dcarborn and Simon (23) have' . 
analysed this phenomena at greater length. 
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(ll) ' Willipmson (103, P.lll) believes that the large 
U-form may mi~igate its capacity problem by the involvement 
of departmental management in central decision-making. Yet 
there seems to be no fundamental reason why this should happen; 
recruitment of additional management personnel may be possible 
from outside. 
(12) see footnote (5) 
(13) "unconscious" sub-goal pursuit is considered in 
footnote (10-). 
(14) Assuming that recruitment to the main board involves 
rejection of (any) old divisional loyalties. 
(15) Without any increased threat of loss o~ position. 
(16) For a fuller discussion of the question of cost 
centres see Williamson and Bhargava (109). 
(17) The provision on a continuing basis of a system of 
rules to stop one division profiting at the expense of another, 
and arbitration in cases of disputes may be a formidable task 
when products are highly connect~d. . 
(18) M-forms operating in one product area, and division-
alized by geography, will not be considered due to complica-
tions from the effects of monopoly power. Hence such ~n M-
form will have monopoly power advantages over the U-form 
independents. 
(19) This, if anything, may be disadvantageous to the 
M-form because it ignores the possible reduction in discretion-
ary payments due to central management pressure. 
(20) The causes of market failure relate both to the 
characteristics of human beings (e.g. their bounded rationa-
lity) and to the nature of the environment (e.g. the degree 
of uncertainty). For full discussion see especially 
Williamson (107). 
(21) The complexity of control may be seen as depending 
upon the interconnectedness of the products which affects 
the amount of co-ordination required (see text) and the degree 
.of diversification which determines the breadth of knowledge 
required. 
(22) A U-form includes any company diversified by less 
than 33%. That is, in the Williamson and Bhargava (109) 
classification, a separate division is allowed with the U-form 
structure as long as its importance is small in terms of the 
company 'as a whole. 
(23) Here we are anticipating the analysis in Chapter 4 
where U- and H-forms are both designated sub-optimal and 
expected to perform less well than the M-form. 
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(24) This would partly explain the difficulty experienced 
in 1973 in classifying some of the very largest firms in the 
Times 1000. Several seem to have .the superimposition of res-
ponsibilities found in the grid system. 
(25) For the possible motivational effects of stock 
option schemes and bonus schemes, see L1ewe11en (51). 
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CHAP'fER III '- ' ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE IN AN UNCERTAIN 
ENVIHONMENT 
The classification of structure introduced in the last 
chapter showed that the optimal organizational form may de-
pend upon the si~e and diversification of the firm, the 
techniques available for rec~ivi~g and transmitting informa-
tion, the the separability or otherwise of technology. How-
ever, as will be shown later, this analysis assumed a stable 
environment with minimal uncertainty. 
Th~ degree of , uncertainty in the environment in the 
Knight ~ense (40, P.19) might be seen as comprising two con-
cepts discussed by Perrow (76, P:75-6):-
(1) whether search is analysable or not: that is, 
whether there are known ways of solving any problems received. 
If all that is required to standardize a new situation is in~ 
cremental adapt ions to existing programs then search is analy-
sable and the environment is considered, other things being 
\ 
equal, to be less uncertain. 
(2) The variability of stimuli presented to the indivi-
dual. If the number of stimuli leading to search is small 
because most can be handled efficiently by existing proced-
ures, then the environment is stable. However the variability 
of stimuli may be so great that almost all tasks will lead to 
searcb b9haviour. 
~ FewEx~eptions Many Exceptions 
~ 
"'.c:: 1j 
~ 
.... W~T"II 
" 
tfaFF:: ., 
, 
, . 
aAfTSHMS"HtP 
, 
~1fi"14~ " 
HAH"t~tX~ 
/ 
" CONlItU""~ 
J'~CCC:~II(~ 
~A':S"' ~ii F;~H5 
" I' , 
/ 
, 
, £t.Jc;,.NcEI:.IIC;-
p~jO Tlti'£5 , 
, 
f!'H~'N cEi!,Wi 
It'~n ~"Ol"ttt-. r), 
FIGURE 1: THE NATURE OF THE 
ENVIRON~mNT ASSOCIATED 
WITH DIFFERENT TASKS 
- 25 -
From Perrow [76,P.83J 
Organizational Analyses 
-While no organization faces a completely stable environ-
ment~l)there wpuld seem to be a s~gnificant difference in the 
uncertainty faced by those firms or sub-units engaged in 
acti vi tie's involving unanalysable search and many exceptions 
from those dealing with analysable search and few exceptions. 
Therefore, the effect of these different environments on the 
organization will be considered.' 
Of ~articular interest, will' be possible differences in 
organizational response found in the "stable" functions -
marketing, sales, production - 'whose routine task is only 
slowly. changing and research and development, which faces a 
highly uncertain environment [see Perrow (76, P.83), Nelson 
(69)1. It will be argued that dOifferences in organizational 
response will lead to particularly severe problems of communi-
cation between those functions concerned with the routine, 
wher~ the particular interest will be in steady-state effic-
iency, and the research function, where rapid response to 
change is crucial.(2) It will be further argued that if the 
~elationship between sub-units applicable to stable enviro~­
ments is used throughout the organization, development of new 
products and processes will be impaired. Bencethe relation-
ship between sub-units, the organizational structure, may 
\ 
depend on whether steady-state efficiency or new product 
development 'is of greater importance. Therefore, two more 
types of organizational structure, for large firms, are consi-
dered. 
x . x x x x 
In Chapter l, it was noted t .hat the bureaucrat ic model 
of organizational decision-making had several identifying 
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characteristics (Qlueck and Dennis 28); clear authority 
relationships embodying the conce~t of the unity of command: 
small spans of control: narrow job specification: tight con-
trol mechanisms: an emphasis on hierarchical superior-
subordinate relationships and standard operating procedures; 
decision-making concentrated at the top. 
Under conditions of stability in the environment and 
independence between subordinates~ the use of narrow job 
definition(3)with little contact between peers, and decision-
making concentrated at the superior level, may allow certain 
economies in the operation of the organization. Firstly, an 
economy in 'communication: by placing co-ordination in the 
hands of the supervisor, the number of two-way communication 
channels is reduced from !(X2_X) in the situation where the 
subordinates act as a peer group, all interacting with each 
other, to X, where X is the number of subordinates. [see 
Williamson (103, P.20»). Such an economy in communication will 
only be a pure gain if the quality of decision-making is unim-
paired. This is most likely to be so in a stable environment 
where information can be assessed with regard to a constant 
frame of reference. On the other hand if variety in the envir-
onment is high, more information may be required by the super-
visor, who is not directly associated with the work, if a 
rational assessment is to be made~ 
Secondly, the use of the superior-subordinate relation-
ship may allow the supervisor, if necessary, to alter all sub-
ordinate tasks simultaneously in an optimal manner which can 
prevent the instability that can be the result of individuals 
in a peer group sequentially responding to other members' 
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adaption to change in the environment. [Williamson (103.P.20)] 
Thirdly, the minimization of · contact between subordinates 
divides the task performed by the organization into quasi-
.' independent domains. Hence disturbances from the environment 
will be limited in their ability to pass as a chain reaction 
throughout the organization, and will be restricted largely 
to the area of direct impact L'Villiamson (103, P. 20)] . ~ 
bureaucrz.cy therefore may have high resistenceto shock: 
however, this will be dysfunctional if the organization, for 
its success, must be highly responsive to the environmental 
change. 
f ~ 
The responsiveness to change within the bureaucracy will 
be further reduced by the use of standard operating proce-
dures. These may provide a low cost method of decision-making 
but being an amalgamation of past experience their adapt ion 
to new situations may be slow so tending to constrain new 
situations to old decision-rules. In addition, situations 
not covered by organizational rules 'may be ignored.(4) 
If environmental change inc·reases, standard operating. 
procedures will be able to deal with a lower percentage of 
decisions which, with an unchanged distribution of decision-
making authority within the organization, implies a larger 
upward flow of information. 
Fourthly,narrow job definition allows the combination 
of the advantages of specialization of labour with high 
accountability for the individual [:See Thompson (98, P.3»). 
Hence subordinates, by. concentration on a small set of 
tasks, may increase their pro~uctivity through learning by 
doing, while at the same time be subject to low cost perform-
ance audits. Auditing cost will depend, inter alia, on the 
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number of legitimate actions allowed under an individual's 
contract. The more there are, the greater will be the possi-
bilities for anti-organizational behaviour(5)due to the 
increasing costs involved in sorting out those actions contrary 
to organizational interests from the rest. Liebenstein (48). 
x x x x x 
The fraction of work done by a subordinate that contri-
butes to the objectives of his sU'gervisor ("compliance") 
will be dependent on the number of subordinates ("the span of 
control") if more subordinates means less time with each. 
However, for a given span of control, compliance will also be 
dep~ndent upon the efficiency of information transfer, insofar 
as this affects the quality of supervisors' decision-making 
and the degree to which subordinates carry out the supervi-
sors' orders. 
Decentralization - the process of delegating more 
decision-making to subordinates - will mitigate the problems 
associated with the upward flow of information and downward 
movement of orders, but orily at the expense of greater oppor-
tunities for anti-organizational behaviour (see above). 
The amount of decentralization may depend, at least in 
part, on five factors:-
(1) the level of change in the environment (m). The 
greater the level of change, ceteris paribus, the lower the 
proportion of decisions that can be handled by established 
operating procedures, so that greater upward flows of informa-
tion are required within the organization. 
(2) The state of informational technology (t). Improve-
ments here (e.g. computers) will allow larger amounts of 
information to be processed with the same level of distortion. 
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.. .. .. . 
(3) ~he difficulty of information transmission (e): some 
types of information may' be 'more 'readily reduced to key points, 
which are intelligible t'o the r~ceiver, than oj;hers. Hence it 
may be that unchanging environment will help the process of 
condensing information into a me~ningful precis. 
(4) the congruence between individual and organizational 
goals. (i) 
(5) the cost, for given (i) of identifying, monitoring 
, and rewarding individual performance (Z). In some organiza-
tions it may be less costly to motivate individuals towards 
organizational goals, because of , the greater ease in isolating 
\ 
and modifying anti-organizational behaviour. 
Benefits to increasing subordinates' discretion (x) will 
, be a function of (t), (e) and (m), while costs will be depen-
dent on (i) an'd (z). ( 6 ) 
The expected partials ' are:' 
dxke > 0 dxAim > 0 dx)U > 0 
I 
. 
dX)Iz <0 
Since early application of the most advantageous uses of dis-
c~etion can be expected, the level of discretion, and the 
marginal ben~fi~s from it, are assumed to be negatively related. 
" If the marginal ~osts ar~ a non~negative function of the level 
of such discretion, a diagram iike fig'ure 2 can be drawn. (7) 
Assuming that the amount of delegation bf decision-making is 
decided on the basis of maximum net benefits, the optimal le~el 
of x w~ll be that where the marginal cost and benefits of dis-
cretion are equ~ted. In figure 2 this is at level x.(S) 
No~ the effects of changes in (m) (t) (e) (i) and (Z) can 
be considered under ceteris paribus assumpti.ons, taking 
'-' 
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organizations of similar size and fixed span of control. If 
the level of environment change (m) or difficulty in informa- · 
tion transmission (e) increases or there is a deterioration in 
the state of informational technology (t) then the marginal 
benefi ts curve will shift outwards from MBI to MB2 (figure 3) 
and that will indicate a higher optimal level of discretion 
for subordinates. Similarly, a reductionin the costs of moni-
toring and rewarding individual performance (z) or an increase 
in the congruence (i) between individual and organizational 
goals will lower the marg1nal cost curve (figure 4), again 
indicating more discretion to subordi~ates.(9) 
In this context, consider the M-form which is departmen-
talized by profit centre , and therefore may be more efficient 
than the U-form at specifying realistic targets in line with 
orga.nizational goals to its sub-units. (see Chapter 2). . If 
·thi3 is so, a more rational distribution of organizational 
rewards and penalties is possible and the costs of obtaining 
subordinate actions in line with organizational goals 10weredS 10 ) 
This.would allow more of t"he benefits of subordinate discre-
tion(x) to be reaped (figure 4). If, however, informationa.1 
tecanology were to improve, then a return to greater centrali-
zation cou1~ be expected~ll) Such a tendency has been noted 
for General Motors in the U.S.A. by Wi1liamson and Bhargava 
(100). 
Given our assumption of fixed spans of control and com-
paring similarly sized firms, relative levels of "internal 
efficiency" - the cost of running the organization - can be 
ascertained by reference to the value at which the marginal 
costs and benefits of discretion are equated on the 
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Y-axis. Low values indicate superior internal efficiency 
Hence in figure 3 (page 31) a shift in the MB curve to MB2 
results in more discretion for subordinates but lower internal 
efficiency. Consideration of the nature of these benefits 
will show that this must be so. An increase in the benefits 
to discretion may have resulted from an increase in difficulty 
of information transmission for given levels of informational 
technology, an increase in the level of change in the environ-
ment or (unlikely) a reduction in the state of informational 
technology. All these imply higher overall costs and hence 
lower internal efficiency. At the same time, we have moved 
along the MC curve indicating greater co~ts involved in 
personnel control. 
The relationship between internal efficiency and the 
span of control is not explored here in detail. Sufficient to . 
' n~te that losses of subordinate cpmpliance may be countered by 
smaller spans of control but only at the cost of more admini-
strative personnel. 
. 
A similar analysis to that above can be applied to figure 
4, ,page 31. A reduction in the costs of controlling subordi-
nates [through either a reduction in (i) or (~)] will lead to 
. (12) 
more discretion and also greater internal efficiency. 
In . the circumstances, the cost-minimizing decision may 
be to use some of the benefits of improved internal efficiency 
to increase the span of control within the organlzation and 
hence reduce the number of personnel required. 
x x x x 'X 
The presence of interdependence between individuals in. 
the organization will complicate the analysis. Thompson [97, 
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P.5·3;-5} recognizes three types: - pooled, which corresponds to 
our independence assumption earlier, since ~ndividuals are 
only interdependent to the extent that unless each performs 
adequatel~ the total · organization is jeopardized, sequential 
where the output of A becomes the input of B' but not vice 
versa, and reciprocal where the output of A becomes an input 
of 3 and vice versa. Sequential interdependence will increase 
the decision load of the supervisor over and above that 
necessary for pooled interdependence for the same span of con-
trol, since the interactions between subordinates must be 
controlled and monitored. Reciprocal interdependence means 
that communication between subordinates will be necessary. 
If all information is constrained to go through the supervisor, 
then informational diseconomies may be expected from hierarchi-
cal working, since the supervisor will just ,constitute' an extra 
step in communication channels. Information instead of going 
from A to B goes from Ato the supervisor to B. Hence the 
bureaucratic model may be most appropriate to situations where 
interdependence is not reciprocal. With'respect to the 
. optimali ty of the bureaucratic organizational response, the 
work of Morse and Lorsch (64) may be important. As part of a 
study of four sub-units, they looked at two container produc-
ing units in the same big company. One had been designated 
by oanagement as a high performer; the other as a low perfor-
mer. Interviews were carried out with about forty managers in 
each unit to ascertain 'the characteristics of the formal prac-
tices of the organization and to see the subjective perceptions 
of the individuals involved. 
The making of containers by automated means, the task of 
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both units, is a highly repetit.ive task which would certainly 
be described as routine manufacturing. At the high performing 
container plant, there was a high degree of structuring of 
formal practices; in terms of perceptions, people at the plant 
saw themselves in a highly formal structure, with low influence 
over decisions because of the concentration of authority, with 
low job choice vis-a-vis supervisors and with top management 
dominant. In the low performer, there was a more egalitarian 
distribution of influence, a perception of a high degree of 
influence and a participative 'type of supervision. 
However the other two units studied by Morse and Lorsch 
wer~ R & 'D establishments ·, again in the same firm, and again 
one a high performer, one a low performer. In this case the 
bureaucratic structure corresponded to the low performer~13) 
The characteristics of the high performing R & D depart-
.ment were similar to those of the "democratic" organizational 
model as described by Glueckand Dennis (28):- lateral communi-
cation emphasized over vertical, decisions the result of con-
sultation rather than command; job taskS set as a realistic 
division of the total task facing ·the concern but . with no rigid 
delimitation of responsibility; jobs changeable and often 
changed as th~ result group interaction in the light of chang-
ing circumstances; individual control procedures based on peer 
commitment and status (i.e. self-generated rewards); and the 
centre of control and authority shifting according to the part-
icular requirements of the project. 
If the optimal organizational response in the case of 
research and development is democratic, as the Morse and Lorsch 
evidence suggests, then this may be the result of a combination 
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of uncertainty 1n the environment and interdependence between 
peers. 
That uncertainty occur~ in R & D, has already been noted. 
If the supervisor-subordinate relationship is retained to an 
extent found in bureaucracy, the effect will be to increase 
the necessary flow of information~l4) Moreover, information 
transmission may be hindered if greater difficulty is encoun-
tered in condensing information into key points. This is 
likely since with a greater variety of stimuli affecting the 
organization much more background information maY,be required 
for a rational judgement. Additionally uncertainty may 
require the individual job task to be redefined frequently as 
circumstances change. 
Interdependence between individuals can be expected 
within the research function for several reasons. Firstly, a 
major source of informational inputs for the scientist are 
his colleagues working in the same or related disciplines. 
See Knight (4), NSF (67), Nelson (70). Specifically AlIen (2) 
reports M.I.T. findings that the increased use of organiza-
tional colleagues for information is strongly related to 
scientific and technical perfo'rmance; , high performers were 
those who used other colleagues for information most frequently. 
Pelz and Andrews (74) after a similar study, concluded that 
the causation was from communication to performance because 
"large amounts of colleague contact tended to go with high 
performance, even when (we) looked at scientists who themselves 
were the p.L'imary instigators of contacts." (P. 47) 
Secondly, Klein (39) and Marshall and Meckling (58), (15) 
in emphasizing the uncertainty in the development of weapon 
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systems, see ~he optimal response as one of multiple lines of 
development (i.e. different solutions to the same problem 
explored in parallel) since it would seem from e~pirical evi-
dence ~ha~ information about the outcome of a project can be 
obtained at' small cost. Hence unencourag1ng approaches to 
the research problem can be identified and dropped without 
excessive increases in overall cost. However, this requires 
that there be a continual exchange of information between groups 
in order that inferior solutions be eliminated as soon as 
possible. 
Thirdly, the need for lateral . communication does notre~ 
main within the boundaries of the researcp and development 
department; co-ordination between the commercial (i.e. involv-
ing the stable functions) and the technical aspects of a 
project is needed in order to eliminate non-profitable projects 
as soon as possible, (see NSF (67). This may be particularly 
so since the cost of a project will typically escalate as it 
reaches each successive stage in its development (see Booz 12) . 
. 
In addition many profitable research and development projects 
originate as ideas in the "stable" functions [see Hamberg (33)J 
so that failure to recognize these may lead to sub-optimal 
performance. 
Fourthly, peer-group decision-making may be necessary to 
. specify the job task of each individual. This becomes more 
likely as the uncertainty and size of the technical advance 
associated with the project increase, since it is supervisors' 
inability to assess some information passed to them in cases 
where technical information and specialist knowledge are con-
centrated at the work-bench level, that causes the interdepen-
dence of subordinates.(17) \ 
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The democratic form may mitigate the problems associated 
with high uncertainty in the environment and interdependence 
between subordinates. The emphasis on lateral communication 
and flexible areas of responsibility allows a reduction in 
information flows, authority to be located with those having 
specialist knowledge, and the individual job task to be rede-
fined quickly on the basis of mutual discussion between peers~18) 
In addition, the democratic form will have cost advantages 
in the motivation of research personnel due to its superiority 
in the award of status to individuals. This is important 
because status was found by MCDougall(54)to be more important 
to research' personnel ' (including researchers) than to admini-
strators (.in the stable functions), and is a low cost method 
of reward. 
The democratic form has advantages over the bureaucracy 
in the endowment of status; the status of an individual can 
be increased through peer approval of the job done, yet 
because status is not embodied in position as in the bureau-
cracy, an increase in one '~individual' s status will not 
necessarily mean a loss for another.. Hence there may be, 
ceteris paribus, lower resistance .from non-involved personnel 
to status-generating new projects. Conversely, in the bureau-
cracy, those with the greatest amount of status -top management -
will have an. interest in maintaining the status quo; change 
may be discouraged, since successful change may require a 
redistribution of status and prestige. 
In addition, the emphasis of the democratic model on 
lateral communication, both internally and externally, will 
enable peer approval to be more easily accumulated. Hence the 
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open nature o.f. the democx-atic form enables easy communication 
with outsiders and therefore, the accumulation of status. 
Typically researchers are associated with their work in 
a way uncommon in the bureaucracy. In an organization based 
fundamentally on the superior-subordinate relationship and a 
closed response ~o the environment, success accrues only to 
the organization as a whole. If 'any individuals benefit from 
outside approval it will be tbe top level decision-makers. 
This need not be so in the "democratic" firm with its more 
diverse communication channels. Coupled with the ~ikelihood 
that both the researcher and the research organization will 
have a goal of successful invention or deyelopment~19)thiS 
means that the congruence between individual and organizational 
goals in the research function can be expected to be higher 
than normal. 
In the terms of the previous model, .the level of decentra-' 
lization of decision-making . in the research function will be 
great. Firstly, because the benefits are large due to , the 
bigh level of uncertainty in the environment and peer inter-
dependenc~. Secondly, because of the lower costs to the orga-
nization of subordinate discretion, due to the easy motivation 
of subordinates through the use of status, and the above-
average congrue.nce between individual and organizational goals. 
Figure (5). ' .. 
The change in internal efficiency, whether positive or 
negative, will depend oh the size of the shift of the marginal 
cost and benefit" curve. Lower marginal costs, ceteris paribus, 
will lead to higher efficiency; higher marginal benefits to 
lower efficiency. 
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It i~ interesting to note that if there is a high level 
of uncertainty and peer interdependence (MB2 ) but no reduc-
tion in marginal costs, then although there will be decentra-
lization: it would riot be carried as far as the research 
function, and internal efficiency would unambiguously fall. 
x x x x x 
The organizational prob~em in the large firm is to 
obtain optimal mix of steady-state and research efficiency~20) 
This mix will be dependent on the nature of the environment. 
However, the difference in organizational . response as between 
the research function, on the one hand, ~nd the "stable" func-
tions on the other, will have certain implications. Firstly, 
. greater risk-avoidance than indicated by organizational goals 
may arise. Secondly, there may be problems in communication; 
it is critical that the common phenomenon of inter-departmental 
conflict be overcome if performance is to be maximized [see 
Lawrence and Lorsch (44 Chp. 2 and 3)}. 
. , 
That risk avoidance is incorporated in the goals of large 
firms ha~ been argued before [Monson and Downs (62) Williamson 
(103 P.l57»). This can be seen as a response ~o shareholders' 
dislike .of unstable rewards, or top managements' interest in 
the status quo. However, structure may lead to risk being 
avoided to an extent greater than indicated by organizational 
goals. Hamberg (33) has considered the origins of the problem; 
reporting other results (P.l03) he notes that a large number 
of research suggestions come from the stable functions; such 
suggestions, because they come as the result of the surveil-
lance of a stable and known environment, must involve little 
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risk, especially if the stable functions continue to work to 
their usual pay-off period of five years or less (see McGraw-
Hill survey quoted in Hamberg 33). Hence even research sug-
gestions may be reduced to a low-risk form. 
The integration of research and the stable functions is 
imperative for good performance. However the influence of 
the stable functions must not be such that the profitable 
projects of a long-term , nature or with a high degree of risk 
are ignored. This can happen when research is decentralized 
to the divisions. Top managements co-ordinating the functions 
will typically be trained in the stable functions, since the 
take-over by the techno-structure suggested by Galbraith (27 
p.70) has not, so far, been shown to be widespread. Such 
managers may bring with them their short-term biases and 
hierarchical decision-making techniques found appropriate in 
the stable functions, which will however tend to stifle 
research performance. The manager may extrapolate the stable 
environment onto research. 
"When one must choose ' between the hazy and uncertain high 
risk future associated with major innovative effort and the 
hard, tangible quantifiable future of exploiting present tech-
nological and commercial possibilities, the temptation is 
almost irresistible to press hard on the latter and postpone 
the former .~ . " if one is an administrative manager the 
necessity for choice may not even suggest itself." [Haggerty 
(31)]. 
The long term nature of the research into major new 
areas [see Hamberg (33, P.99») may be endangered by divisional 
management using research as a way of combatting immediate 
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divisional problems, especially in times of crisis. Parti-
cularly for the manager from the stable functions, short-term 
considerations may drive out those of a longer term nature. 
Divtsional managers may have limited horizons, leading 
to a tendency to reject ideas not useful in their own depart-
ments. 
"Wi thout some counteracti'ng force, even when good innova-
tive managers develop in a decentralized organization, their 
innovations are ordinarily restricted to the entity for which 
they have responsibility, or, at most, narrowly and obviously 
beyond it ... the exposure of one manager is restricted and 
he simply fails to see those larger opportunities to solve 
problems ... for the whole organization .•. " · Lliaggerty (3i)1. 
This divisional bias means that one advantage ascribed 
to the large diversified corporation [e.g. see Scherer (83, 
P. 36.2)} - many possible outlets for research discoveries -
will not be fully utilized, since each division Will act as 
a separate firm unwilling to investigate areas outside its 
usual scope of operation. " 
x x x x x 
Hence the problem is to minimize bias towards existing 
products and risk-avoidance over and above that dictated by 
organizational goals, subject to the constraint that minimum 
overall cost is required. 
Large firms typically require both "stable" and research 
functions, the mix differing from firm to firm according to 
the nature of their outPuts~2l) Yet as argued above, the 
organizational response to steady-state efficiency and the 
creative task may be completely different. The bureaucratic 
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system is productive on a regular and predictable short-run 
basis, which permits the separation of planning and control 
from execution. The creation of new ideas requires operation 
on a unpredictable longer-run basis. Partly consequent on 
this there may be differences in language, personnel charac-
teristics [for discussion of such differences see La Porte 
. , 
(42).7 and different motivational techniques [McDougall (54)]. 
Hence there may be benefits for efficiency in separating 
the two types of task, allowing each to be pursued in its 
preferr~d environment. Yet at the same time Lawrence and 
Lorsch (44) in reporting the relative success of several 
organizations point to the need for strong integrative mech-
anisms so that all functions can' work together towards 
organizational goals. Moreover Lawrence and Lorsch (44, P.47) 
. find that the integrative task becomes more difficult as 
differences in structure and the methods of personnel motiv-
ation increase. This might be expected in that individuals 
may have greater difficulty in relating to other work prac-
tices the further these are away from the standards they know. 
It would seem from what has been said above . that orgarAi-
zational structures should be judged by their ability to 
provide appr,opriate separation and integration of the sub-
units. With these two characteristics pulling in opposite 
directions, the balance between them should be made on the 
basis of minimum overall cost. 
Consider a functionally-divided unit with research and 
"stable" departments. Risk-avoidance and existing product 
bias will be high, but functional separation will allow all 
functions to work within the organizational structure and 
atmosphere that suits them best.. Because of this, steady-state 
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efficiency - that is producing known products at least cost 
per unit - will be high. The need for efficiency in research 
has not been allowed to tamper with the organizational struc-
turethat"is most applicable to stable conditions. 
However, technical efficiency will be poor. Co-ordination 
will be in the hands of top management whose communication 
load will be considerable since the need to integrate all the 
functions will requireinformaticn to pass upwards (to top 
management) and then downwards to its destination. This dis-
economy .in information processing results from the separation 
of reciprocally interdependent personnel. Failure to under-
stand information passed to it, or lack of time due to its 
heavy decision load, may result in top. management failing to 
make decisions after proper evaluation, and instead rubber 
stamping proposals from one or other of the functions. (Schon 
. ~4) quotes cases of this). ' 
In this unit individual projects will be difficult to 
cost because they involve transference from one function to 
another as they pass through their stages of development~22) 
Additionally, as projects are -transferred in a form where 
market profitability is uncertain, resistance to new projects 
on the part of the stable functions may occur if rewards are 
adversely affected by project failure. If a sizeable propor-
tion of projects are failures this may become a major constraint 
to the introduction of new products and processes~23) 
Thus the optimality of this functional arrangement depends 
on the relative importance of steady-state and research effic-
iency. 
Suppose the functional approach provides sub-optimal over-
all efficiency because of its failure to achieve research 
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efficiency. (This becomes more likely as the importance of 
Dew processes and products increases relative to the import-
ance of least-cost production with given technology). 
ConS1der then what Ansoff and Brandenburg (4) have 
called the Innovative form. Here the organization is split 
into two groups: currently profitable and established products 
are placed in the Current Business Group, while the establish-
ment of new products is given to the Innovational group who 
will remain responsible for such products until commercial 
feasibi~ity is established. The Innovational group will 
involve personnel from all functions allowing an integrated 
response to technical advance. 
Both groups can be operated in a manner most suited to 
the environment that faces them~24)using the democratic 
model for the uncertain environment of the Innovational group 
and the bureaucratic model for the Current Business group. 
The Innovational group allows a mitigation of the prob-
lems eDcounteredwith the divisionalized company: 
Firstly. since the Innovational group can be made fully 
profit and loss responsible, the development of new products 
will have greater accountability involving a lowering of the 
cost of motivation. No longer are new projects transferred 
from function to function making the responsibility for poor 
performance difficult to ascertain. 
Secondly·, because the Innovational group develops pro-
jects to the pOint where profitability is established - that 
is to the point of test marketing - resistance to the new 
projects from the parts of the company that will have to put 
the idea into full production may be lowered. There is little 
threat to rewards through project failure. 
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The transference of the project from the Innovational 
. 
to CUrrent business group can involve either just the tech-
nology or the personnel as well. The latter would enable 
a valuabl~ extension of experience and knowledge of the 
stable environment to the Innovational group personnel 
LAnsoff and Brandenburg (4)J and would further ease the 
transference of the project, since personal experience may 
be a valuable source of information in gaining adoption and 
continued use of an innovation [e.g. in the agricultural 
context see Ryan (81)J. 
Thirdly, the bias towards existing products can be 
reduced since the control of the Innovati.onal group is not 
in the hands of people with particular divisonal biases. 
Instead the whole field of the possible projects can be sur-
veyed and profitable opportunities selected. 
Fourthly, risk-avoidance can be lowered. The task of 
the Innovational group involves change; rewards may be obtained 
from successful change and there are not the possible losses 
of pecuniary and non-pecuniary rewards that limit administra-
tive managements acceptance of radical innovation. 
Some research capability will be left with the CUrrent 
·Business group. This will deal with the incremental project 
where risk is low and where closeness to the stable functions 
is advantageous, because information about Current market 
opportunities is more readily available~25) 
Williamson (103 P~157) has suggested that the typical 
product will be introduced to the market by the small firm, 
which will carry the product through its early stages of risk 
when its profitability is undetermined. When the environment 
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has stabilised and demand expanded, the attainment of steady-
state efficiency becomes more important. This will require 
divisionalization along M-form lines or merger to become part 
of an existing M-form. The acquiring M-fo~ in this situa-
tion has circumvented the risk involved in new products. 
The Innovative form, by providing a more efficient method of 
developing new products and to the extent that it lowers risk-
avoidance, will increase the efficiency of the large firm 1n 
this area. 
However the Innovative form will involve some loss of 
economies of scale if equipment that must be provided for both 
Innovational and CUrrent Business groups is subject to indi-
visibilities. There will also be some duplication of staff -
since certain tasks from all functions will have to be dupli-
cated in both Innovational and CUrrent Business groups - and 
loss of personnel specialization due to the reduction in the 
size of the functions. 
Nevertheless, even the Innovative form may not provide 
an efficient response to a" very rapidly changing environment 
where pr01uct life is so short that steady-state effic~ency 
is of negligible importance. Consider then the Adaptive 
form which may have lower resistance to change and greater 
capacity for new project planning than the Innovative form. 
"The firm's activities are arranged into two groups (I} 
a development group which is reponsible for strategic planning 
as well as the development and maintenance of the resources 
and skills of the firm and (2) a project group which is 
responsible for implementing strategic plans as well as for 
operating the resulting product market positions." Ansoff and 
Brandenburg (4). 
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Hence ' the development group has integrated teams com-
prising personnel from all functions devoted solely to the 
planning of new market positions, maintaining the pool of 
labour in·-each function ata satisfactory level, 'and provid-
ing training. On the other hand, the project group puts the 
plans of develop~ent grou~. into operation:- each new project 
will involve drawing on the required mix of personnel from 
the pool of labour maintained by the development group, under 
1-
a project manager. 
, Project groups will be able to maintain high interaction 
among members of the different functions, so allowing maximum 
integration of the research task; res,ista~ce to change is 
likely to be minimized since personnel will return to the 
labour pool at the end of each project, so owing little alle-
giance to anyone project. Individuals will gain wide· 
experience, allowing 'them to gain considerable informational 
inputs (but few of the .advantages of specialization of labour 
and learning by doing). 
\ 
Since the project gr~up sees the task through to the end, 
there will be no problems due to the transference of projects 
between organizational units ~nd also accountability on a 
profit and loss basis will be high. This, together with the 
large capacity for planning of a general nature provided by 
central management and of a specific nature provided by the 
development group, allows the Adaptive Form to be the organiza- , 
. 
tional structure that is most responsive to change and there-
fore appropriate to the uncertain environment. This form 
approximately simulates the theoretical life and death of one 
product firm as described by Mueller (65). As the result of 
- 49 -
. 
I 
planning, a project team is drawn together to investigate the 
. possibilities and produce any resu~ting new product. If the 
product is successful, demand will grow and more people will 
be drawn in from the pool of labour in the development group. 
This is analogous to the hew firm's drawing labour from the 
market. The group will similarly be charged for its use of 
labour inputs. Later, as product demand declines, personnel 
will gradually return to the labour pool, ready for another 
project. Eventually the whole pro.1ect group will be wound up. 
The Adaptive form for successful operation requires a 
short duration of project which severely restricts its appli-
cability. As the time" span of the project increases, emphasis 
will shift ·away from response to change (for which the Adaptive 
form is best suited) to a requirement for efficient use of 
existing technology; that is, least cost operation in a stable 
environment. This may require a more bureaucratic approach 
to organizational structure. . In addition, the longer the life 
of a project, the greater the loyalty of individuals t .o it, 
resulti~g in a reduction in the flexibility. that. is so. funda-
mental to this structure. 
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, FOOTNOTES 
. (1) As described on page 4 stable conditions are taken 
to those where ' 
"the circumstances (to which the firm must adjust) 
are predictable in the sense that although they occur with 
stoc' hn~tic -regularity precise advance knowledge of this is 
unavailable _ - _ ,( that is) customers 'come and go ... labour 
~nd materials procurement are subject to the usual vagaries 
." not to mention minor shifts in demand and similar distur-
bances of a transistory nature"(my underlining).,Williamson 
(103 P.24) 
(2) The stable functio'ns are all those except research 
and development. Although ,there will be differences in the 
amount 01 uncertainty facing each stable function it is argued 
here on the basi.s the work of Perrow (76), Nelson (69) "that 
the uncertainty encountered will be of a similar order and 
significantly less than that facing research and development. 
Minor variations in uncertainty may cause slight structur~l 
differences. Hence there may be ,minor structional differences 
between (say) "marketi~g" and "production" or between resea'rch 
organizations (depending on the size of technical advance 
attempted) . 
(3) A "narrow job definiti'On" means the individual can 
only legitimately undertake a few tasks: his opportunities 
for discretion are restricted. The e~act number of tasks 
allotted will depend upon the size of the unit, which deter-
mines, ceteris paribus, the degree of specializatiori of labbur 
possible [Stigler (5)] and the ability of the supervisor to 
specify the method of attaining organizational goals in a 
meaningful way .. Thus under stable conditions where the relation-
ship ,betw6en action and result ' is known with a ' high degree of 
certainty, the supervisor can relatively easily specify the 
necessary actions on the part of the subordinate to get the 
required result. This will not be so under uncertain conditions: 
if there is no known way of solving the problem or if alterna-
ti,-e approaches have to be tried anj tested, greater discretion 
maj' be required to allow the subordinate to complete the task. 
(4) 'For a discussion of ' th~Re and other points with res-
pect to standard operating procedures see Cyert and March 
.(21 P.IOl - 112). 
(5) Anti-organizational behaviour:- Actions by members of 
the organization against ' organizational goals. 
(6) (m), (e) and (t) determine the costs of information 
processing. To the extent that extr~ discretion allows a 
reduction in information processing, these will represent the 
benefits of decentralization. On the other hand, (Z) and (i) 
determine the costs to the organization of individual discre-
tion . 
(7) There would seem to be no obvious reason why marginal 
, costs shoulft decrease with an increase in the level of discretion 
(x). A positive function has been drawn but the analysis would 
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be unchanged with constant marginal costs. 
(8) Firms that do not decentralize to the level indica-, 
ted by the intersection of the marginal cost and benefit 
curves will perform syb-optimally. This is the expected 
situation for H- and M-forms. 
(9) The effects on both benefits and costs could be 
reversed to indicate a reduction in (x). 
(10) If individual motivation is dependent on the 
expected rewards, then an individual's actions will depend 
on this perception of the alternatives available, the per-
ceived results of the possible alternatives and the probabi-
lity of action being followed by reward (or penalty). [See 
for instance Liebenstein (48»)". Hence the M-form may allow 
a more rational distribution of rewards and penalties on the 
ba~is of true organizational goals (profit). , 
(11) Middle management has lost inf1uen6e according to 
Chester (18), and this may be partly the result of improved 
,informational techniques - computers, etc., - which have 
encroached on the dat~-co11ection role of these personnel. 
Top management has been less affected since they are at the 
end of the, inforrnat ional chain, while (top) divisional manage-
ment has been benefited from extra discretion. (For reasons 
for this extra discretion see analysis of M-form, chapter 2). 
(12) To show that internal efficiency is higher with 
cost function MC2 see figure 3, P.3l. 
With MCl optimum decentralization is Xl. Therefore 
the cost of motivating personnel (costs due to factors (i) 
and (z) s~e P.30 is equal to the area under the curve OABX. 
Similarly with MC2 costs of motivating personnel 
equalOCDX2 . The.MB curve, measures the.reduction in cost p'ossib1eby allow1ng subordinates more d1scretion. For a move-
ment from X~ to X2 the total reduction in cost from this 
service is Xl BDX2 . , 
••• minimum 
= OABX. +~ 
overall cost with MCl 
where Z is ' the unknown cost of informa-
tion transfer dependent on factors (m) 
(t) and (e) see P.30 . 
.. minimum overall cost with MC2 
= .OCDX2 ,+ (Z- Xl BDX2 ) 
Since OABX1> OCDX2 - X1BDX2m the equilibrium at D on MC implies higher internaI efliciency than the equilibrium2B on 
MCl · 
(13) Additional indirect evidence has been provided by 
the literature:-
Burns and Stalker (14) recognized two different types 
of managerial practice in their study of tw~nty small firms 
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which corresponded to two ends of a spectrum; "organic", 
which seems to have been more appropriate to unstable condi-
tions; and "mechanistic", which was superior in stable condi-
tions. Organic and mechanistic loosely correspond to 
"democratic" (see text) and "bureaucratic". Hence the impact 
of uncertainty in the environment was recognized. Firms were 
classified according to the "organicness" of their structure , 
but no attempt was made to investigate the optimal amount of 
separation of uncertain and stable tasks or the integrative 
mechanisms required. 
Lorsch (56 Chp. 3) found that research organizations 
bad broader spans of control, fewer hierarchical levels, 
longer time horizons for performance review, less specificity 
in the review of performance, and ' fewer and less comprehensive 
rules than organizational units working under more stable 
conditions. Additionally, Morse (63) reported that personnel 
motivation was greater when organizational structure fits the 
task in hand. Hence people working in an organization with 
democratic (bureaucratic) characteristics in a stable 
(uncertain) environment were poorly motivated. This he 
explains by the idea ~hat people need to feel a sense of com-
petence and such feelings are likely to be highest when 
organizational structure is appropriate. When people do feel 
competent, ' motivation, through job satisfaction, will increase. 
Leavitt (45) reports several experiments with communica-
tion chains set up in the laboratory. Five people were each 
given a cup with five different marbles in it: one marble was 
duplicated in all five cups. The people involved had to 
exchange written information until all had learnt the name of 
the marble which they all possessed. Three communication 
chains were constructed 
I 11 III 
For simple tasks, I corresponding to the hierarchy was 
most efficient; with II and III in that order. However rapid 
acceptance of change was most likely in Ill. If a member in I 
comes up with an idea and passes it on, it is likely to be 
disregarded on the basis that A was too busy, the idea was 
difficult to implement or because of resistance to change 
(that is unwillingness to change what is performing adequately). 
For marbles of unusual colour, for which there were no 
common names, III performed best in agreeing on a set of names 
in the quickest time; while I seemed to have the greatest dif-
ficulty in adapting to a novel job. 
(14) Because of uncertainty, with search unanalysable 
and the variety of stimuli greater, standard operating proce-
dures will be able to process less of the information. 
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(15) They believe their analysis is applicable to other 
uncertain situations, both military and civil. 
(16) Grater, Poens gen and Prankle (30) report that 
many failures in research and development performance are the 
result of the isolation of research from other corporate 
functions. 
(17) Schon (84) analyses how information and specialist 
knowledge in research projects may be concentrated at the 
work bench level. Even if the supervisor is a sCientist, his 
specialist knowledge may be insufficient to make rational 
judgements for some research tasks with any ease. 
This is in contrast to the bureaucracy where the concen-
tration of authority at the top is partly the result of an 
attempt to spread the special ability of ~op officials through-
out the organization. (See Jewkes, Sawers and Stillerman 
(36 P .. 110).) In this way, maximum use is made of scarce 
resourc~ This reflects the assumption in the bureaucracy 
that superiors have more technical knowledge about the prob-
lems in .hand (this cannot necessarily be assumed in research 
and. development). 
(18) That the researcher is given enough discretion to 
follow research problems to where they lead ·him, may be of 
importance in defining job task. If this is so, considerable 
discretion may be necessary. 
(19) For the research worker, success will / not only 
mean improved pecuniary prospects but also increases in status 
and prestige. This status and prestige can be specific to 
him, rather than the organization as a whole. 
(20) Although Jewkes Sawers and Stillerman (91) and 
Hamberg (36) have noted the importance of small firms in major 
research advances, in expenditure terms the large firm would 
seem to beat the centre of the research effort [jor survey 
see Scherer (83 P.352-363)]. Hence the optimality or not of 
organizations structures for research and development in 
large firms . may have important implicatio~for the growth of 
the economy. 
(21) Presumably the demand to undertake researchacti-
vities will depend on the (expected) profitability of such 
activities. Profitability will depend on both cost and demand 
considerations. The omnipotence of science is not such that 
only demand factors are important (see Rosenberg (80). 
(22) Research, development, test marketing and full 
production will all be handled by different departments. 
(23) A mitigation of the problems of the functionally 
departmentalized unit may be obtained by the use of "project 
management". A multi-functional group under a project manager 
is assembled to work on the innovative project. Such a group 
will be superimposed upon the existing functional structure and 
will be a type of liaison group, bringing together individuals 
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in different areas. While this will reduce the co-ordinational 
load of top management, conflict may occur because personnel 
have both project group and functional responsibilities causing 
problems of divided loyalties. (For an introduction to project 
management see, for instance, Dennis Lock Industrial Scheduling 
Techniques (52).) 
(25) The current Business Group may be operated either 
as a U-form or an M-form, according to the principles outlined 
in Chapter I. 
(26) In the limit where the Innovational group does not 
exist, due to lack of demand for technical advance, the firm 
would only have a Current Business Group, which presumably 
could be classified using the Williamson and Bhargava (109) 
scheme. 
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CHAPTER IV 
INTERNAL ORGANIZATION AND PROFIT : AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF 
LARGE U.K. COMPANIES 
In Chapter I lit was argued, following the work of Chand-
.~ . 
ler (16) Williamson (103) and Williamson and Bhargava (109), 
. that for the large diversified fi~ in a stable environment 
the M-form provides·a superior response to the problems of 
control loss than other organizational structures. If these 
arguments .are correct, then for a broad class of large firms, 
the adoption of the M-form may significantly affect their 
·efficiency. Assuming that.interfirm differences in efficiency 
. 
will be xeflected in profitability, it follows that organiza-
tional structure .may be expected. to account for some part of 
the observed interfirm differences in profi t·abili ty. Previous 
empirical studies on the causal effects on firm profitability 
would then be subject to specification bias. This may be 
seriOUS because organizational form is likely to be correlated 
with other included variables such as fi~ size and the degree 
of owner and manager-cont~ol. 
Since the ·va1idi ty of the·se ·theoretical inferences can 
only be ascertained by empirical evidence, results are repor-
ted in this chapter which attempt to isolate the effect~ ~f 
.interna1 organization on profitability in a cross-sectional 
analysis of eighty-two large U.K. companies in the period 
1968-71. To this end, Section 11 develops a model including 
organizational form; the sample data sources and measurement 
are all dealt with in Section Ill; empirical results follow 
in Section IV, while Secti.on V draws some conclusions, relates 
the findings to existing results and sounds several notes of 
caution. 
- 56 .,. 
, " 
... 
11 TlIE MODEL 
In order to cap~ure the factors that determine both the 
profit-maximizing level of ,profit and deviations suggested 
by other 'fuanagerial , and behavioural theories, the model 
assumes: 
(1) 
where f(Yi) denotes the, profit-maximizing level of profit for 
firm (i) and ' .Z, is a vecto~ of ' managtlrial and behavioural 
variables. In principle, the iJ?fluence of organizational form 
, , 
. operates through f(Y i ) s:i,nce it is, an aspect of firm level 
efficiency and ought to be captured in the production function. 
. . . . 
However in practice organizational form must be incorporated 
through zer%ne dummy var,iables' whose allegience to f(Yi) in 
the fi~al specification is not strong. 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
,Phillips (77) has noted that there are basically two 
options ~hen specifying profitability as the dependent variable. 
The price-cost margin (iT/R where R is the value of sales) 
and the rate of return. 'l'he latter may take several forms 
viz, the rate of return on stO~kholders ' equity err/E); on 
stockholders equity plus long-term d~bt (RLC~ and on assets. 
" Choice between these alternatives would seem to depend on 
, ' 
' the type of behaviour to be studied. Hence if the focus is 
on long~ter~i~dustrial equilibrium with exit and entry and 
. 
with existing firms expanding and contracting a~ the result 
of investment decisions, a rate of return seems to be the 
10gLcal choice, since it is the rate of return above or below 
competitive levels which acco~ding to theory prompts such long-
term equilibrating movements. 
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Theoretical arguments can be put forward for the various 
rate of return measures. For ~ given amount of capital, the ' 
return on capital irrespective of source will be. the determin-
ant of the efficiericy of invest.ment decisions. Yet presumably 
it is the 'rate of return on stocl~holdcrs equity which manag~-
. ment working in stocl~holders interest would se~k to maximize, 
because this will give 'the maximum return on their funds. [see 
Benishay (10) Co~anor and Wilson (19) Hall and Weiss (32)] 
This measure of profitability i.nvolves the extra decis~on as 
to the best method of· company finance. 
On the other hand, if short-term pricing behaviour is of 
prime interest and .there are constant returns, orthodox theory' 
seems to favour TfjR. For ·then 
11/R = PQ - cQ 
PQ . 
= P - c 
p = 
L (2) 
where Q is.physical output and L is the Lerner index of mono-
poly. (Cowling 2 '0). In addi tion~ we have what Cowling referS 
t6 as the Stigler (98) equilibrium. 
L '. = . f(H) 
1\ I' 
(3 ) 
where H is the Herfindhal measure of seller concentration 
(0 < H ~<1) . In this. case the price-cost margin emerges 
as the appropriate index of profit performance. 
In practice empirical models will frequently pick up both 
short and long-run effects'. Moreover as Ornstein (7 '2) has 
noted the returns to capital and on sales are related by the 
: identi ty 
rt/R R/E' (4) 
Two implications follow from this. The first is that where, 
as is often the case, a capital :intensity variable (such as 
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R/E) is inclu~ed in a profit margin equation to compensate 
for the fact that nlR is measures gross of capital charges 
(Benishay 10), the only difference in practice between a rate 
of return' and profit margin equation is that one element of 
'the variation explained in the former.moves to the right hand-
side in the latter. Secondly, in view of (4) it is entirely 
possible that previous studies have in fact explained the 
(1) 
variance in nlR even when TT/E has actually be used. 
Having noted the combination of short and long-term effects 
w~ich are likely to occur, no definitive resolution of these 
issues is attempted. Instead results are presented for three 
different dependent variables TTIR, TUE, ~nd RLC~2) This it is 
hoped will give a broader base to the conclusions that have 
been reached and allow a comparison with the maximum amount of 
other work. In addition the comp.arison of the rate of return 
and profit-margin equations leads to some insights which 
otherwise might have been missed. 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Of primary interest among the explanatory variables will 
be the organizational form dummy. On the arguments explored 
1n chapter two, the M-form should out-perform the other 
structures in a wide range of cases. Exception to this may 
occur however if, due to technological conditions~3)diviSiori-
a11zation can only be obtained at great cost (see P.15) or if 
the environment is unstable (see Chapter 3). In essence, 
this means, on the one 'hand, that even among large firms the 
U-form structure may be optimal in certain circumstances and, 
on the other, that empirical work using the Williamson and 
Bhargava classificational scheme may be limited to those firrr.s 
working in a st~ble environment. 
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Two types of dummy structure are presented for organiza-
tional for~. In tbd first, an optimal/non-optimal dichotomy 
is applied. Hence. following arguments in Chapter 2, M-forms 
are rated optimal, while Hand M-forms, due to their lack of 
strategic controls and separation of strategic from day-to-day 
. decision-making respectively, are placed in the· sub-optimal 
. category. U-forms are placed in one of these categories 
according to their operating ~nvironment. In the second s~ruc­
ture, individual types of organizational form are picked out, 
'allowing separate c'oefficients to be estimated for each. This 
allows a comparison of the performance of different types of 
sub-optimal form, albeit at the cost of disregarding some 
. . 
subtlety as to what constitutes optimality. 
Since change to optimal organizational structure may 
. . 
involve non-trivial transactions costs, a further dummy 
.variable is included to allow for the expected.divergence bet-
ween the, performance of long-established M-fo~ms and those 
known to be in transition from other forms. 
However even with org~nizational optimality, less than 
maximum profit may be earned by the firm, if the M-form, per 
'se, is i~sufficient to forpe profit-maximization on manage-
ment~4) Under these conditions, management may find scope for 
discretionary behaviour. This can be used to increase their 
own utility at·the expense of the presumed desire of share-
holders for maximum profit, in a way pred~cted by the various 
, managerial and behavioural theories [see Baumol (9), Cyert and 
March (21), Marris (57), Monsen a:nd Downs (62) Williamson (106).] 
Discretiona~y resources may exist as long as there is non-
perfect competition in product or takeover markets. If this 
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product and capital market discipline is weak~5)the availa-
bility of discretionary resources , to management will depend 
in part on shareholders ability to enforce their property 
rights. ' ~or the utility-maximizing shareholder, such enforce-
ment will only be worth while up until the point that the 
marginal cost equals the marginal benefit (which is assumed 
to be equal to the incremental addition to reported profit). 
The coSt3 involved will be of two' types: those involved in 
gathering sufficient information about the present position 
of the firm; and those incurred in voting out or modifying the 
performance of, incumbent management. In an uncertain world, 
the costs of gathering information are likely to be non-
trivial~6) Moreover, (marginal)' costs may rise as the more 
obvious sources of information are exhausted. However, short 
of voluntary disclosure of information by management, an 
involvement in the running of the company, or a change in the 
law, there would seem to be only modest scope for shareholders 
to reduce these informational costs. However, for a given 
legal environment, the costs of the displacement of manage~ 
ment may vary in a non-trivial manner according to the number 
of shareholders, lberle and Means (11), Florence (26)J since 
this will determine not only the costs of communication and 
co-ordination in any action against management, but also 
individuals"willingness to participate at all (small share-
holders may view the enforcement of property rights as a public 
good). Therefore if a small group of shareholders own a 
sufficiently large proportion of the voting stock(7) they may 
be able to lower significantly the amount of discretion avail-
able to management, and therefore increase reported profit as a 
proportion of the profit-maximizing leveJ. 
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However, even if discretionary resources do exist, 
management may choose to convert them into profit. Assuming 
it aims to maximize its own utility, management will follow 
a course of profit-maximization if its rewards are sufficiently 
dependent on profit. Hence Llewellen (51), while recognizing 
the existence of discretionary resources, has argued (for the 
U.s.) that it will be ~n managements' own best interests to 
maximize profits, rather than dis~ipate them in non-profit 
activities, due to the increasing proportion of the executive's 
compensa~ion package coming from stock related benefits and. 
to the increasing ownership of company stock by corporate 
management. These shareholdings are not, in general, important 
in a "control" or "ownership" sense, since, as a proportion of 
total equity they may be small but their performance may be 
crucial for managements' own wealth positions (Llewellen . 51). 
Moreover, Masson (59) repo~ts that firms where managements 
financial interests are more ·closely paralleled to those of 
shareholders through stock options, did out perform the others 
(in terms of stock returns·). (8) 
Therefore, in order to allow for the various influences 
above, two additional "managerial" variables are included. 
The owner-co~trol dummy, valued one for owner-controlled firms 
and zero otherwise, is similar to that previously used by 
Kamerschen (38) and Radice (79). It attempts to isolate those 
cases where, either shareholdings are highly concentrated so 
that enforcement costs are reduced, or managerial sharehold-
ings are sufficiently large so that managerial preferences may 
be expected to align with those of shareholders~9) If this 
variable had a significant effect on profit, this would throw 
some doubt on the sufficiency of·tne M-form for forcing profit-
maximization. 
-~ 
The continuous "managerial taste" variable measures the 
degree of representation of management at the board level. 
Following its previous use by Williamson (106), .this variable 
is an attempt to reflect managerial preferences. Hence board 
composition may be used "as a proxy measure of the extent to 
which management desires to operate the firm free from out-
side interference" (Williamson 106). While it is not the wish 
to interpret a low proportion of (executive) management on the 
board as a preference for outside interference, a high propor-
tion may be seen as a desire to run the company free from 
such interference. Since non-executive board members are 
largely 'representatives of financial institutions, large share-
holders or other individuals who'it is assumed, have little 
interest in non-profit activities for management, a high manage-
ment representation on the board may be interpreted as a 
preference for non-profit goals. 
Both firm size and firm. growth are inCluded in the model. 
Size is present to allow for the possible effects of scale 
. ' .( 10) h economies and d~seconomies, and. for t efact that the lower 
variability of profit amongst large fi~ms found in previous 
studies ~.g. Samuels and Smyth (82»), may be associated with 
lower mean p!ofit. Clearly these two effects are not easily 
separated in the results and their joint presence may in part 
explain the divergent findings on the size-profit relation-
ships in previous studies. Hence Eatwell (24 P.393 - 4) 
reports that:-
"The size distribution of rates of return has been indent-
ified variously as embodying a negative correlation of profit-
ability with size ... a positive correlation and to exhibit no 
significant relationship whatsoever 
" . .. . Moreover, since it 
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was argued that size was one of the main determinants of 
the optimality or not of the M-form compared with the U-form, 
a strong connection is expected, a priori, between organiza-
tional form and size. If this is confirmed and organizational 
form does matter in explaining profit performance, size is 
one of the variables most likely to suffer from specification 
bias. 
Growth, likewise, is present on two grounds. First j,t 
serves to allow for windfall gains from unanticipated growth. 
Secondly, when the rate of return is measured at the beginning 
of the year, there will be a bias in the profitability measure 
towards high rates for merging firms since some shareholders 
funds, not included in the denominator, will be contributing 
to profit for at least part of the year. This will result in 
higher profit rates for growing firms but its effect may be 
mitigated by the inclusion of the growth variable. When the 
rate of return is measured at the year end the effect of 
growth will be a downward bias in the profitability measure. 
This may also be reflected' in the coefficient of the growth 
variable in appropriate regressions. 
In some regressions, interaction terms are included 
between organizational form and size because of the a priori 
expectations of a relationship, and between owner-control and 
growth because of the possibility (widely discussed in the 
literature [e.g. Marris (57) Radice (79)J of a managerial 
preference for growth rather than profit. The effect, since 
organizational form and owner-control are dichotomous 
variables, is to introduce slope dummies which allow the size 
and growth coefficients to diverge for diffe~ently structured 
firms and owner versus manager-controlled firms respectively. 
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The variables so far exhaust the specification of 'Z'4:, 
and encroach on f(Yl'). However, further insight into f(Yi) 
is afforded by equation (2). Nevertheless, as Cowling (20) 
observes,- it is not possible to be too specific ~bout f(H) 
except that we know that it is conditional on buyer concentra-
tion and the probability of repeat purchasing. Since in the 
present analysis the unit of observation is the firm and (H) 
. 
and (ftp) are market 'struct.ural characteristics, our knowledge 
of the marl).et distribution of ;'firms' activities is limited, 
and marketst~ctural characteristics are not of primary 
. 
concern, industry dummies attempt to control for any remaining 
influences on f(~l'. .' 
The complete model explaining profit-margins in linear 
form, but omitting interactions terms is thus: 
where, 
TT'/R =A+ B,OF + B~ T + B.OC + BOoM'!' + B.S + B, G 
;_10 "",.$ 
+ .lBj r 'Ok + B.R/E + u 
.I., kU, 
OF = organizational form dummy (1 for optimal companies 
o otherwise, s~e P.60) 
, T " I: . organizational cha~ge, duminies (1 for companies 
in transition to M-form, 0 otherwi~e) 
OC = owner-control dummy (1 for owner-control, 0 
otherwise) 
UT I: Managerial taste (proportion of executive to 
.. total directors) 
I: 
co 
firm size 
firm growth 
industry dummies (electrical engineering, food, 
distribution, mechanical engineering) 
HIE a ratio of turnover td stockholders equity 
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When the dependent variable is "lE' R/E is dropped, and 
when RLC, the gearing variable(12~(the ratio of long-term debt 
to equity) is introduced. The industry dummy (for the alcoho-
lic drinks industry) is dropped in order to avoid singularity 
problems in estimation. Thus the various dummy coefficients 
measure deviations from our basic observations, a non-
optimally organized, non-transitional, manager-controlled firm, 
in the a}coholic drinks industry .. 
The model is subject to the usual limitations of the 
single equation approach. On theoretical grounds, and in the 
I 
light of Radices findings (79), a potentially serious simul-
taneity problem may exist with respect to firm growth, arising 
from a causal flow from profitability (in part via internal 
financing) to gro~th. Otherwise, however, it may be noted 
that much of the concern over causality and simultaneous 
equat.ion bias has surrounded market structure variables in 
industry level estimates ~hillips (77)J and therefore may be 
attenuated in the present case. Moreover, as Cowling (20) 
argues, it may be reasonable to view the system of equations 
in which performance, behaviour and structure are embedded as 
recursive, with lags sufficiently long to allow us to pull out 
individual equations for separate treatment. In any case, 
there has been recent confirmations that in this area as in 
others, OLS and TSLS estimates can turn out to describe 
essentially the same picture t9trickland and Weiss (96»). 
'. 
III - 'THE SAMPLE, DATA SOURCES AND MEASUREMENT 
OF VARIABLES 
The ,sample comprised 82 independent companies in five 
industries - food, alcoholic drinks, electrical engineering, 
, mechanical engineering and the distributive trades - for 
which organizational form data existed. All the compani~s 
selected appeared in the top 300 firms in the Times 1000 (or 
500). The period of study was 1968 - 71. 
The choice of industry was limited to those where, in 
the light of the arguments in chapters 2 and , 3, there was ~n ' 
a priori expectation for superior performance by the M-form 
organizat:i.onal structure. Hence" process-oriented industries, 
like steel, that may, involve technical inseparabilities on a 
large scale, were excluded. However, due to the wide defini-
tion of industry each involving several separate product 
markets, it was not pOSSible, to exclude U-forms completely 
from the sample. These (six) observations were placed into 
the optimal or non-optima~ category according to their size 
" . . .. 
and' diversification~13) Moreover, industries where new 
products were of overriding importance were also not considered, 
since in this case the conditions for the optima1ity of any of 
the Wi11iamson and Bhargava (109) organizational types may not 
be fulfilled (see Chapter 3). 
The sample was limited to firms in the top 300 companies 
in order to concentrate on large firms for which, as the data 
verifies (see Appendix I), the various types of multidivisiona1 
forms are likely to predominate, and where the U-form is less 
likely to perform optima1ly because of the possible problems 
incurred at large size. Subsidiary companies were excluded 
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because classification by organizational structure, no matter 
how large or complex the firm, is meaningless in that it 
fails to take account of the actions of top level decision-
makers whO have the ultimate responsibility and influence. 
The period 1968 - 71 was chosen for a number of reasons:-
(1) Coming after a number of years of extensive internal 
reorganization among companies, but with the diffusion of the 
M-form innovation incomplete, it provided a sample including 
considerable variation in organizational form. 
(2) Information on organizational structures tends to be 
released with a certain 1ag, so that choice of a period a few 
years prior' to that in which the analysis is carried out, 
enables more accurate classifications to be made. 
(3) The 1967 Companies Act required companies to reveal infor-
mation such as turnover and directors' shareho1dings which 
were not always available for previous years. 
(4) A four year period was thought to be sufficiently long 
for short-run influences on profit to be neutralized in the 
average for the period as ,'a whol~, but sufficiently short that 
most firms would have a stable organizational form over most 
of the period. 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
nlE was defined as the ratio of profit after interest and 
depreciation ' to the value of ordinary and preference shares 
plus the reserves attributable to them. RLC was measured as 
7T/E but with the addition of long-term loans to the denomina-
tor.(14) ryR was the ratio of profits to turnover~15) All 
three variables were four-year averages, measured alternatively 
with profits before and after tax. Alternative verions of n/E 
were constructed with equity valued at the beginning and end 
of each year~16) The source used for all financial data was 
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Extel. Profit data excludes extraordinary items, e.g. the 
sale of assets. 
ORGANIZATIONAL FORM AND ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE 
The classifications are presented in Appendix A. The source 
of the material was official company files held at Companies 
House .and files held at the London Graduate School of Business 
and the Manchester Business School~17) Where companies had 
more than one organizational form 'within the 1968 - 71 period, 
they were allocated the form held for the majority of the 
period. The organizational change dummy indentified only M~ 
form firms known to be in a transitional phase. 
OWNER CONTROL 
The procedure adopted followed the lead of earlier studies by 
Larner (43), Florence (26) and, especially, Radice (79). A 
firm was designated owner-controlled if either more than 15% 
of the stock was held by a (small) identifiable, cohesive group 
or more than 3% was held by managers~18) Shareholdings of 
-
insurance companies and unit trusts were ignored. The .sources 
used were Annual reports of compa.nies and their official share-
holders registers. 
MANAGERIAL TASTE 
Following Williamson (106), the variable was defined as the 
ratio of executive to all directors, information being taken 
from the occupational list of directors accompanying the share-
holder register and from the Directory of Directors. 
FIRM SIZE 
In the majority of cases where the "assets" measure is u~edJ 
firm size was the total value of long-term capital, measured at 
the beginning of the period to minimize feedbacks from profit 
- 69 -
. , 
to size. In the two cases where size is measured by turnover, 
this is taken for the first year of the period~19) 
FIRM GROWTH was the ratio of the difference between opening 
and closing size to opening size. 
GEARING AND CAPITAL INTENSITY were simply LIE and R/E 
respectively (where L is long-term loans). 
INDUSTRY DUMMIES 
Construction of the industry dummy structure was subject to 
the usual problems associated with allocating firms to 
industries on a principal-product basis. The industry defini-
tions were however broad, and some "industries" may be more 
het~rogeneous, in terms of single product markets, than others. 
Companies were distributed among the industries as follows:-
food 15; alcoholic drink 8; electrical engineering 12; 
mechanical engineering 28; distributive trades 19 . 
( 
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IV - EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
OLS estimates for 21 profit equations are reported in 
tables 2~7. The explanatory power of the regressions seems 
to be generally satisfactory, with one-third to one-half of 
the variation in. profitability being explained by the models 
employed, which also performed acceptably in terms of overall 
significance. A little surprisingly in view of our a priori 
suspicion of specification bias in previous studies, serious 
problems of multicolline~rity were not encountered: only one 
zero order correlation coefficient amongst the regressors was 
(barely) larger than 0.6. This was between the OF and T 
variables. 
Regressions in tables 2-6 use the optimal/non-optimal 
dichotomy for organizational form, while table 7 uses a more 
ambitious three-way classification which will be considered 
in detail later. All regresf)ions except those in table 3. have 
profits measured before tax, capital stock at the beginning 
, I 
of the period and firm size and, growth in terms of assets. 
.. . .• . . 
( 
This represents the most preferred specification of the 
variables as considered in Section Ill. However, in order to 
broaden the base of the results in our area where data is 
imperfect, table 3 presents results with year-end equity 
(regressions 4 & 6) profits after tax (regressions 5, 6, 7) 
and firm size and growth measured by sales (regressions 8 & 9). 
These provide results in all major respects· similar to those in 
the corresponding .,equations in Table 2. Note however the lower 
impact of growth with year-end equity and rate of return vari-
ables. This might be expected since profit ·rates will be over 
or under-estima~ed according to whether year-beginning or year-
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end equity is used. (see footnote 16). Moreover, the size of 
this distortion will vary directly with the level of growth. 
Unreported results used log size and growth with similar 
results to these reported in table 2. The industry dummies 
although included in all regressions were generally insignifi-
cant and appeared to contribute little to the estimation 
process. In order to save space they are not reported. 
Tables 2-6 show that the OF variable proved to be signi-
ficant in all the regressions using the optimal/non-optimal 
dichotomy. Conversely Managerial taste (MT) attracted a 
non-significant variable of wrong sign in all the equations 
estimated .. This may indicate that any relationship between 
board composition and profitability is considerably more com-
plex than our model allowed. 
In particular, unduly low executive representation may 
result in some efficiency loss and also the absolute numbers 
of executive and other directors may matter. In addition 
there could be interaction effects with organizational form. 
Whether refinements in thls measure warrant the effort or 
whether alternatives should be explored is not clear. 
In table 2 there are several discrepancies in the per-
formance of variables according to whether the rate of return 
or price-cost margins are used. However differences with 
respect to owner-control and size are resolved where the 
interaction terms are introduced (table 4). Nevertheless 
it is to these discrepancies between the performance of (some 
of) the independent variables that we turn to first. 
ALTERNATIVE DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
In table 2, there are differences regarding the signifi-
cance of the coefficients, between those regressions using a 
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rate of return as the dependent variable and those using price-
cost margins. Hence regressions land 2 using ~/E and RLe 
respectively as the measure of profit tell essentially the 
same story. The organization dummy (OF) is positive, signi-
ficant and very large indicating a difference of 6-8 percen-
tage points betwe7n the rates of return earned by optimally 
and non-optima1ly structured ~irms.(20) However as shown by 
. 
the organizational change dummy (T), which is negative and 
. 
significant at 10$, approximately half this gain available 
to the long-established M-form 1's lost by those companies in 
the process o~ transition to the optimal structure (M-forms). 
Therefore on this evidence, the transactions cost of change 
are non-tr.ivial, which is someth:f.ng orthodox theory is apt 
to forget. 
Equations 1 and 2 (Table 2) also indicate a positive 
and significant owner-control effect on profitability. Its 
presence seems to raise prof~ts by between 3 and 4 percentage 
points. While confidence in the effect of owner control 
would be increased by its ·."significance with price-cost margins 
(equation 3, table '2), it is important to note that it has a 
positive and significant effect, whatever the dependent 
variable if the interaction terms OF.S and CC.G are used 
(table 4). We return to the possible reasons for differences 
in performance of the owner-control dummy :f.n equations 1 and 
3 (table 2) later. 
Manager representation (MT) and size are both insignifi-
cant in 'equations 1 and 2, while growth is significant ~.t 10% 
qr better. This ma~ however, reflect simUltaneous bias ~nd 
the biasing effects of mergers when equity is measured at the 
beginning of the period. The quicker a company grows the 
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, 
greater will be the inflation of the rate of return variable, 
'as equity will fail to reflect thos~ shareholders' funds 
acquired during the year. 
Equation 3, for price-cost margins, also shows a large 
and significant effect for the OF variable. Optimal structure 
raises the price-cost margin by ju~t over 2 percentage points. 
Manager representation (MT) is'again of wrong sign and insigni-
, 
ficant. Compared with equations 1 and 2 we see that (T), G 
and OC all lose significance, although remaining of correct 
sign. Size becomes significant. 
In order to attempt an explanation of these differences 
we focus on equations I' and 3 representing our main dependent 
variables 7\/E and 7\/R. We note from an earlier argument that 
, 7\/E = (7\/RHR/E). Hence the possibility is that (T), (G) and 
(OC) are not major determinants of TqR, but happen to be 
corre1~ted with capital intensity (R/E). R/E reflects among 
other things, the methods of finance used by the company. 
Inspecting the simple correlation coefficients 
TABLE I - SIMPLE CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS RELATING 
TO THE USE OF PRICE-COST MARGINS 
7\/R R/E 
T 0.209 0.146 
QC 
-0.054 0.339 
G 0.086 0.069 
we see that QC shows a weak negative relationship with the price-
cost margin but is strongly and positively correlated with R/E. 
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The organizational change dummy (T) is negative in 
both equations 1 and 3. It therefore may be surprising at 
first sight to see a positive correlation between n/R and 
T. However firms in transition are all adopting the M-form 
structure and, as indicated by equation 1, earn profits 
approximately half-way between the pure M-form and sub-
optimally organized firms. Thus when the M-form aspect of 
transitional firms is taken into J\ccount, the partial corre-
lation with IT/R would be negative and this is reflected in 
the negative co-efficient in equation (3). However without 
the reinforcing effect of the negative correlation between 
R/E . and T, the organizational change dummy is unable to reach 
significance in equation 3. 
Growth (G) has a significant coefficient in equation 1 
but not equation 3. Hence it is the presence or not of the 
correlation between (G) and (R/E) which seems to decide 
whether (G) matters in determining the value of the dependent 
variable. 
It appears that comparison of equations land 3 has 
allowed further inSight into how some of the independent 
variables come to have their observed effects. 
The sig~ificance of firm size only in equations 3 is more 
difficult. · Fortunately even with n/E S becomes significant 
with OF.S and OC.G included (see table 4). Without the suppor-
ting evidence from rate of return variables, it seems unwarranted 
to attribute the significance of S in equation 3 to economies 
of scale. More likely it reflects the inclusion of the RIE 
regressor. Hence in equation 3, the positive and significant 
firm-size coefficient shows that more profit is made by large 
firms who keep the same capital intensity as their smaller 
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rivals. Interestingly, where capital intensity is not held 
constant, in equations (1 and 2) large firms do not earn 
significantly more profit. So on this evidence managements 
in large firms would seem to use more capital intensive 
technologies. This might be due to non-cost minimizing 
behaviour by management, to trade-union pressure on larger 
companies who then find it profitable to use hi'gher capitall 
, labour ratios than their smaller competitors, or just the 
use of higher gearing ratios. 
In order to continue. our "parallel" approach to the use 
of dependent variables, we will report results for both rr/E 
and.TQR in later sections. Several of the discrepancies in 
the performance of the independent variables will continue 
to occur, presumably for reasons similar to those considered 
above. However a greater measure of agreement is reached 
when interaction terms are used. (table 4). 
ALTERNATIVE ORGANIZATIONAL FORM SPECIFICATIONS 
Table 4 presents results for the ?fIE and n/R dependent 
variables with the interac'tion terms OF.S and OC.G. Organi-
zati,on form remains a positive and highly significant deter-
minant of profit. Moreover these regressions seem to vindi-
cate the,a p!iori case for the inclusion of the interaction 
variables,'in terms both of the performance of the particular 
variables concerned and also the improvement in overall 
significance and explanatory power. In addition the discrep-
ancies for owner control and size found for the regressions 
in table 1 according to the dependent variable used are 
largely resolved. 
With the OF.S term included we have separate estimations 
of the profitability-size relationship for optimal1y and sub-
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optimally org~nized firms. The results are:-
Optimally organized 
TT/R = 0.0979 + 0.00007S 
.~ ll/E -= 0.1816 0.000018 
Non-optimally organized 
n/B = 0.0663 + 0.000238 
It/E -= 0.0769 + 0.00038S 
Therefore one observes a highly significant positive re-
lationship between size and profit for non-optimally organized 
firms and no significant relationship (with even a very small 
negative coefficient in one case) for optimally organized 
firms. As will be remembered, the reason. for including (8) 
was to test for the effects of economies of scale. Most 
empirical studies whether of a statistical or an engineering 
nature, suggest an L-shaped relationship, with initial econo-
mies followed by negligible savings beyond a certain minimal 
optimum size. In this present sample the average firm size 
in the optimally organized group was twice that of the non-
optimally organized sUbse~·. (£102. 9m against £49 . 7m) . . The 
results in this area may suggest therefore that firm size 
economies do exist and that some firms in the sample were 
operating in the region of falling-costs: but that in general 
those firms which had optimal internal organization had also 
achieved minimum optimal size. 
The use of the OC.G interaction terms seem to provide 
a significant role for QC, whether the dependent variable is 
7r/E or T!ryR. Hence this variable is significant at 5% or 
better in regressions 10 and 11 (table 4). This positive 
influence on profit has an indicated magnitude of approxima-
tely half that of organizational form. 
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Although the G and OC x G coefficients are not signifi-
cant within the usual confidence limits the coefficient 
values tend to confirm the existence of slack within the non-
owner-controlled firm. Thus taking the G and interaction 
coefficients together, we find that while profit increases 
'with growth for the non-owner-controlled subset, the slope 
of the relationship is much less for owner-controlled firms 
and is in fact slightly negatiye (-0.0009) in the profit-
margin case. As we have already stressed the growth coeffi-
cient may be prone to (positive) simultaneous equation bias. 
If so we may suspect that the true G coefficient is less 
than the· . estimate reported in table 3. But the markedly 
different slopes for owner-controlled versus non-owner-
controlled groups remain of interest (see figure 1). 
In the light of Channon's (17 - Tables P.52-G3) wor~ 
and of information acquired since the original classification 
in 1973, alternative specifications of the organizational 
form variable are presented in tables 5 and G. Hence OF is 
the original classificati~n used in table 2, while OF 11, 
OF 11', OF III and OF IV, represent the modificat±ot)s,' which 
are explained in greater detail in the Appendix 1 (P.93). 
However, bri~flYJ OF 11, OF 11' AND OF Ill, attempt to 
incorporate Channon's classification into the present work 
and alter the treatment of three ' companies in mechanical 
engineering whose classification has been changed since Steer 
(92). Moreover OF 11, OF 11', OF Ill, OF IV, all incorporate 
changes in the treatment of U-forms. Hence in OF 11 and OF IV 
all U-forms are sub-optimal; in OF 11', they are left out 
completely; and in OF Ill, only two U-forms are classified 
optimal. This is an attempt to overcome the problem associated 
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with U-forms that there are no explicit criteria as to whether 
a particular U-fo~ structure can .be expected to perform in an 
optimal or sub-optimal manner. All versions of the organiza-
tional fotm variable generated coefficients significant at 5% 
or better and leave the results otherwise unaffected. But in 
terms of significance levels and of explanatory power, the 
original OF specification performs best. 
INDIVIDU~~ ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS 
Results are presented here for a three-way classification 
of organizational form. Thus the observations were separated 
into three (mutually exclusive) categories: M-form, H-form 
and (~ + U) ' form. While the use of the H-fo~ may represent 
-less than optimal centralization: the (M + U) category includes 
the highly centralized organizational forms and therefore may 
be said to represent over-centralization. A zer%ne dummy 
vari~ble was used to represent each category, although that 
for (M + U) was omitted to allow estimation. 
The equations (Nos. 20, 21) are reported in table 7. As 
expected in both equations' the optimally centralized firms 
were more profitable than either the over- or under-centralized 
counterparts. However in this three-way classification the 
differerices are only statistically significant with the rate 
of return as the dependent variable. 
Although possibly due entirely to random variations, the 
results do imply that overcentralization must be preferred to 
under-centralization. Hence low-performing companies may be 
particularly of the H-form type. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
A robust result has been reported, showing that the 
internal'organizational structure of the firms in our sample 
exerted a significant influence on profitability. However, 
conclusions must be drawn with caution for several reasons. 
Firstly, the model may be subject to bias through not 
introducing a measure for diversification.(2l) Firms were 
allocated to industries according to their dominant product, 
so leaving opportunity for significant variations in the 
degree to which firms had diversified into other industries. 
Moreover, even if a firm operated entirely within one of the 
industries as defined, there would still be scope for differ-
ences in diversification among individual product markets 
because of the broad definition of industry used. Yet to the 
extent that increased diversification allows a reduction in 
the risks of bankruptcy (see Scherer (83, P.lOl), Needham 
(68, P.128), firms may be able to increase their gearing 
ratios and pay lower interest rates on external finance. More-
over, both because the benefits of a switch from · U-form to 
M-form may increase, due to increases in control loss in the 
functional s~ructure, as the level of diversification grows 
and because the M-form structure and diversification may be 
linked through the medium of firm size, a positive correlation 
between the use of the M-form organizational structure and 
the level of diversification must be expected. 
Secondly, market structural factors may be distorting 
the results. Within each of our industrial categories there 
will be several product markets. Hence many of the firms will 
not be in direct competition, and there may exist differences 
in the market power or demand conditions facing firms within 
our industry categories which have a significant effect on 
profit. 
This'may be particularly important if Barron (7) is 
right in arguing that a major source of the variability in 
profit is due to the variance between industries.(22) There-
fore, the other variables may be, in part, picking up the 
effects of product-market characteristics. With respect to 
the organizational variable, this possible distortion of the 
results by industry-level structural phenomena will apply to 
all types of organizational structure, but may be of greatest 
importance in the case of those companies using the U-form 
structure. These firms, as would be expected, were predomin-
antly involved in producing one product, or a small group of 
closely related products, and this, given that firms in the 
sample are large by the standards of all firms, may imply some 
element of monopoly or market power in their operations.(23) 
The possibility of this is increased by the likelihood that 
the markets, in which at least the non-retaili~g U-forms 
" " 
" (24) 
operated, were not very large. 
Thirdly, in both equations using price-cost margins and 
a r "ate of re~urn, the coefficient on the organizational 
variable is large, representing somewhere between one-third 
and one-half of the average value of the dependent variable. 
It would seem unlikely that organizational structure, on its 
own, could so significantly affect a firm performance. Since 
the M-form innovation was undergoing diffusion in the U.K. in 
the period of the study, one possible explanation suggests 
itself. To the extent that early use of the M-form structure 
implies more skilful and resourceful management than is general 
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in the economy and, if this is not fully compensated by higher 
rewards, our M-form classification will pick up the effects, 
not only of organizational structure per se, but also of 
superior management skills. These presumably will be exhibi-
ted by better profit performance, gained by the minimization 
of costs through the use of the most efficient control mechan-
isms, and by better judgements concerning future events. 
Moreover ', if Llewellen (51) i~ correct in arguing that 
executive motivation through profit orientated rewards, like 
bonuses and stock options, can be significant in determining 
(profit) performance, then the effects of these may also be 
distorting the OF variable. A positive correlation between the 
use of M-form structure and profit-orientated rewards may be 
. expected for two reasons. On the one hand, continuous audit-
ing on a profit basis by the central office allows profit-
orientated rewards to be allocated more discerningly to 
personnel who further organization goals. Hence the motivational 
machinery will be improved. In other organizational structures 
below the top level of the hierarchy, profit rewards may either 
not be available or be dispe.rsed with lower efficiency. On 
the other hand, if the relationship between early use of the 
M-form and sup~rior managerial skills, discussed above, is 
correct, M-forms can be expected to use more and better profit-
. orientated rewards due to their management's greater ability on 
average to select the most efficient motivational methods. 
Thus while greater efficiency 1n personnel motivation is expected 
with the M-form structure, and remains one of the possible justi-
fications for its introduction, an improvement in the performance 
of firms using other types of organizational form might be possible 
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if stock option and bonus schemes were introduced or improved. 
Fourthly, our strongly positive result was obtained in a 
period when the M-form innovation was undergoing diffusion in 
the U.K. Only while the diff,usion process is taking place -
when some firms have introduced the new technology while others 
have not - would the results be expected. Hence, whether or 
not the omission of the organization form variable matters 
will depend on the country studied, the time period chosen, 
and the historical development of internal organization struc-
tures in the country and time in question. While the 1~60's 
and early 1970's were a period of substantial re-organization 
in the U.K. (see Steer 92), according to Wi11iamson and 
Bhargava (109, P.142) the change of organizational structures 
occurred ear1~er in the U.S. They found that the M-form first 
beca'm e of quantitative importance in the period 1945-50, was 
introduced as a defensive measure by many large firms in the 
period 1950-60, and flourished in its conglomerate variation 
in the 1960's. Interpretation of existing and future results 
should take into account such internationa.1 differences in the 
timing of 'the development. 
Fifthly, while unreported results indicate that omission 
. 
of the organizational form variable, when circumstances demand 
it, will reduce the explanatory power of the model, no evidence 
was found that would indicate serious specification bias in 
the coefficients estimated in studies where organizational form 
is wrongly excluded. Thus the largest zero-order correlation 
coefficient among our regressors was 0.60 and this was between 
the organizational form and transitional dummy variables. All 
other coefficients were less than 0.6. On this evidence, any 
initial suspicions concerning the mis-specification of previous 
; 
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profitability studies are not wholly confirmed. 
On other issues, the results do show that the performance 
of variables is liable to differ according to whether a rate 
of return cSr price-cost margin is used. In particular some 
variables will be significant with Tf/E and not "1f'/R because of 
a strong correlation only with the capital intensity element 
of the former. A similar phenomenon has been investigated with 
, 
the well-known results of Comanor and Wilson (19)~25) This may 
reflect differences in the time period to which the variables 
are best addressed (see Section 11). 
The evidence from the thesis on the exercise of discre-
tionary behaviour is mixed. Our managerial representation 
variable performed badly. But the owner-control dummy was 
always of correct sign. Moreover it was statistically signifi-
cant in all of the rate of return equations and in price~cost 
equations where the inter-action terms OF.S and OC.G were 
included. Owner-control would seem to increase firm perfor-
mance although the general applicability of this result is 
limited by the bias in the sample towards ' successful owner-
controlled firms. If owner-control does lead to higher profit 
this tends to belie Williamson's argument (103, P.125) that 
the M-form structure forces firms to profit-maximization. Even 
with the new organizational structures, investigation of the 
amount and use of the discretionary resources available to 
management would seem well placed. 
The combined perform"ance of the size variable (S) and the 
interaction term OF.S does provide some tentative evidence as 
to the existence of economies of scale. However with the 
possible distorting effects of monopoly power (see footnote 26), 
more results would be needed to confirm this. Interestingl~ 
.. 
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our analysis of size did confirm the larger average size of 
'M-form structured firms. This maY ,be taken as evidence for 
the arguments in Chapter two which considered that the M-form 
structure was a reaction by firms to increasing size and 
diversity. 
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APPENDIX 
THE CLASSIFICATION 
As noted in the text, the 82 firms in the sample were 
classified'by the six-way scheme put forward by Williamson 
and Bhargava (115). While the U-, M-, M'-, H and M-forms 
are represented in the sample, there are no X-forms. Most of 
the classifications appeared in Steer (92) but there have been 
several additions. These were yossible due to additional 
information not available in 1973. Moreover, the 1973classi-
fications were checked against any additional data, that had 
become available since that date . 
. U-forms 
There are six U-forms in our original classification:-
Automotive Products; British Sugar Corporation; Scottish and 
Newcastle; British Home Stores; Sainsbury; and International . 
. Whether these companies can be expected to perform in an 
optimal manner cannot be determined unambiguously from our 
analysis. It will depend upon their size and diversification . 
. British Sugar Corporation, '~Automotive Products and Scottish 
. , , 
and Newcastle, were considered to fulfil the requirements for 
the optimality of the U-form structure; that is, a small pre-
dominantly on,e product firm with low geographical spread. All 
three of these companies seemed to have a lower geographical 
or ·product spread than any other firm in their respective 
industries. In the caSe of British Home Stores, Sainsbury's 
and International Stores, while recognizing the advantages of 
centralized buying on the retail trade trurner (99, Chp. 9)J, 
the U-form structure seemed to provide too little discretion 
for individual siore managers in a trade where quick response 
to market trends is essential, made store-manager profit 
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responsibility more difficult to obtain and over-concentrated 
decision-making at the highest level of the hierarchy. There-
fore these companies are classified sub-optimal in our original 
classification. (i.e. the OF classification used in equations 
1-12). Alternatively, all the U-forms above are classified 
suboptimal (OF IV). 
CHANNON'S CLASSIFICATION 
Channon's work (17) covers the top 100 manufacturing 
enterprises in the U.K. for 1969. It does not separately recog-
nize the M-form, which it subsumed under the multidivisional 
structure. Of the 39 cases occurring in our classification 
and that 'of Channon, there are 27 agreements, and six cases 
, . 
of the M-form which he does not recognize~ Of the remaining 
cases, Unilever is classified as a grid-form 'by Channon, (a 
classification not available to us) while for Delta Metal and 
Hawker Siddeley, information not available to Channon may put 
his classification in doubt, so that we take our classification 
to be correct. However this leaves three cases where the 
correct classification is open to serious dispute:-
(1) Burtons; Channon, Functional 
OF M' 
(2) Thorn; Channon; H 
OF M' 
(3) Scottish and Newcastle; Channon; H 
OF u 
Partly in order to assess the effects of these discrepancies 
in organizational classification OF 11, qr 11' and OF III are 
introduced. In all three Burton is classified as a U-form; 
Thorn and Scottish and Newcastle as H-forms. 
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However, in addition to these classifications, Davy-Ashmore, 
Stone-Platt and Dowty are all classified optimal, with change, 
as compared with sub-optimal beforehand. This was done because 
the organizational form presented in OF (Appendix A) differs 
from that in Steer (92). In these three cases, information 
not available in 1973 made the likelihood of transition to 
M-form unlikely. It was noted in 1973, that some companies 
who were allocated the Ut-form classification may fail in 
the end to reach the true M-form structure possibly due to 
unforeseen resistance to change. All other classifications 
are unchanged. 
The difference between OF 11, OF 11' and OF III lies in 
the treatment of U-forms. So OF 11 has all U-forms sub-optimal, 
OF 11' leaves them out altogether so reducing the sample to 76, 
and OF 111 has British Sugar Corporation and Automotive Pro-
ducts optimal as in OF and the rest of the U-forms sub-
optimal. 
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FOOl'NO'rES 
(1) An example of this may be provided by re-estimating 
Comanor and Wilson's (19) model; replacing the dependent 
variables with price-cost margins as provided by Sherman and 
Tollison (86). When this is done [Cable (15») the capital 
requirements variable loses significance. 
'(2) Whil~ all measures will be affected by discrepancies 
in the profit data [see Parker (73) Samuels and Smythe (82) . 
8ingh and Whittington 90,(Appendix A)] they will tie liable to 
other data problems to differing degrees. For instance, asset 
revaluations will cause·a downward revision of rate of return 
variables. These may be undertaken. by some firms more often 
than others. So Whittington (102) notes that large firms ~ay 
revalue more often than small ones, and firms of above avc~age 
profitability more often than those of below-average profita-
bility. Moreoyer problems with the valuation of equity.may be 
, intensified by problems stemming from the differences in the 
treatment of intangibles between firms [Singh and Whi ttingtoll 
(90, P.220)]. Therefore while, as Hall and .Weiss (32) argue, 
IT/E. may be t~e m~st theoreticall~ acceptable rate of return 
variable in that 1t measures prof1t compared with what share-
holders are really interested in, i.e. their stake in the 
company, rr/K or R L C may provide a better guard against dis-
tortions in equity, since the lat~er becomes proportionately , 
less important in the denominator. Conversely, due to the 
nature bf the data, n/R is measured by profit over turnover, 
which includes some rental income and therefore only approxi-
mates to the theoret~cally specified price-cost margin. 
(3) Demand conditions, in the form of very large cross-
elasticities between products, may also prevent divisonaliza-
tion being the optimal response. 
(4) There must be some doubt as to the validity of claims 
that the M-form, per se, stops discretionary behaviour by 
~anagement (See Chp. 2). 
(5) We assume that the efficiency of the takeover mechanism 
is such that it is not, especially for large f .irms, the main 
consideration in deciding the availability of discretionary 
resources. In the literature the imperfect nature of the take-
over market, because of imperfect information and also trans-
action costs, is argued by Wil1i-amson (103, P.15) . ,Empirically 
Hindley (34) and Singh (89) have found that many inefficient 
firms survive.' Product mar~et discipline may therefore be weak, 
perhaps'especially for large firms [see Singh (89, P.l53).] 
(6) Indeed Alchian (1) has argued that information costs 
are management's most important weapon for obtaining discretion. 
(7) Most writers Ll3erle and Mealls (11), Florence (26), 
Radic~ (79)] agree , that ' some seemingly modest figure of 15% -
20% of the voting stock in the hands of small or indentifiable 
group is sufficient to influence significantly management ' 
,towards shareholders objectives. 
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(8) On the other hand, stock options may represent 
another way of removing resources from the company to share-
holders' detriment. From the point of view of management, 
they may be a low risk method of increasing their own utility 
if shareholders find difficulty in discerning their loss. 
This view,of stock options may become more likely if manage-
ment is protected from falls in share price, or if very large 
discounts are offered on the ruling price. Bonus schemes may 
be subject to similar imperfections. 
(9) Conversely, owner-control may be a double-edged sword. 
If management and ownership are synonomous there will be 
almost unlimited powers for discretion if so wished. Owner-
managers, protected from the takeover market and from threat 
of dismicsal, may choose to take this discretion in non-
profit forms. This might be particularly so if the marginal 
rate of tax is high. 
However, as we are to use only firms in the top 30.0 
by size Isee Section Ill] the bias in the sample must be 
towards successful owner-controlled firms. Radice (79) noted a 
similar bia~ in his s~ple. 
( 10) Whllethei ca'nnot be 'distinguished by our analysis I it 
would seem that economies and diseconomies of scale may come 
from three sources; average cost differences due to plant size; 
differences in (unit) financial costs; and the costs and . 
benefits of internal organization. The literature on these 
is extensive; e.g. Pratten and Dean (78), Bain (5), Williamson 
(108). Some of these scale effects may be better estimated by 
size relative to the market, so that with our absolute size 
measure (see Section Ill), they may be only imperfectly 
accounted for and therefore liable to have part of their effect 
through other (included) explanatory variables. 
(11) In equilibrium, s ,cale economies will not determine 
profit variation among firms of different size, but the size 
distribution of firms itself. Thus, only if not all firms 
have adjusted to optimal scale will profit variation be 
explained by scale effects. 
(12) While the introduction of the gearing variable is 
suggested by the well-known work of, inter alia, Modigliani 
and Miller (61), its inclusion is essential here because our 
data only allows profit data after interest on loans. 
(13) The ' Appendix to this chapter deals in greater detail 
on what basis the six U-forms were allocated to the optimal 
non-optimal categories. The literature (see chapter 2) give 
no a priori expectation as to the optimality of the U-form 
in particular cases. Moreover, in the Williamson and Bhargava 
(109) classication, U-forms may be diversified up to one third 
of their output. 
(14) Due to the nature of our data, with profit after 
interest, use of R L C required that LIE be introduced as an 
explanatory variable - see footnote 12. 
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(15) Extel only allowed turnover to be measured. Turn-
over equals sales plus rental income. 
(16) Profits were measured pre- and post-tax to give 
the results more breadth. Equations using year-beginning 
and year-end equity were run due to problems with each. 
Hence, while year-beginning equity reduces any feedback from 
profits to equity, since no adjustment could be made to the 
raw data, it will underestimate the true value of equity for 
. those companies which merged or issued new capital during the 
year. On the other hand, year-end equity may tend to under-
estimate, since not all the capital will have been available 
to the company for the whole year'. In addition, year-end 
equity could not be separated from retained profit. 
No adjustment was made for differences in the end dates 
of companies financial years. 
(17) The problemswith this type of data are described 
more fully in Steer (92) but briefly it was found that, due 
to less interest in the media, classification by organiza-
tional form. becomes mQre difficult as size decreased. 
(18) Marris (57 P.18) reports thataverageshareholdings 
among directors in the U.K. was approximately li% of the 
voting stock. If a doubling of this is required to remove 
the grosser effects of non-profit maximization by directors 
(P.76), then especially bearing in mind the large size of the 
firms in the sample, 3% would seem to be an appropriate 
critical figure. 
(19) Hypotheses on size effects (see footnote 10) relate 
to _size irrespective of the source of financing, hence the 
inclusion of loans in our size measure. Nevertheless since 
firms may revalue their equity with differing frequency 
(8ingh and Whittington - 90, P.2l4) and may use bank overdrafts 
in differing proportions (Eatwell 24), measuring size by turn-
over may provide a useful cross-check. 
" (20) The average values for 7T/E and ~R (regressions 1 
and 3) were approximately 17% and 6% respectively. 
(21) Calculation of an adequate diversification measure 
was beyond the scope of this thesis. Firm size has been 
found [Amey (3)] to be positively correlated to diversifica-
tion and the a priori expectation, on the basis of the argu-
ments in chapter 2, would be for a similar correlation with 
the use of the M-form structure. 
(22) If Barron (7) is correct there may be distortion 
of the results by unallowed-for industrial structure effects. 
These then, in part, will be picked up by th~ other variables. 
/ 
(23) Thus th~ problem with U-forms is not only that 
classification into the optimal/non-optimal categories is 
difficult but also the possibl~ correlation with unexplained 
industry-structure effects. A sample without U-forms would 
be advantageous. 
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(24) 'So Automotive Products produces specialized 
electrical equipment, British Sugar Corporation produces 
only sugar, and Scottish and Newcastle is more highly region-
alized than the other large brewers. 
(25) See footnote 1. 
, ~ 
(26) The size variable may be picking up inter-firm 
differences in market power eitherdue to a connection between 
absolute size and size relative to indivi.dua1 markets or 
because "agglomerated monopoly" (the number of dominant 
market positions held by one company) is more pronounced among 
the largest firms. 
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CHAPTER V 
INTERNAL ORGANIZATION AND PROFIT: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF 
SOME CONGLOMERATE COMPANIES 
Mergers involving companies in different product markets 
have become a common part of the modern economy. This has 
led, not only to diminished importance for (large) one product 
firms, but also to the development of companies which operate 
in several widely differing industries. These industrial 
holding companies or "conglomerates", may find that the 
possibilities for synergy and for the explOitation of market 
power are reduced as compared with large less-diversified 
firms. However to the extent that these reasons for merger 
are missing, work based on a sample of conglomerate companies 
would mitigate two '~roblems encountered in Chapter 4, when 
attempting to explain profit variation between one industry 
firms. Firstly, while the a priori expectation of profit 
performance was unambiguous for the M, M and H-forms, this 
was not so for the U-form. Thus, .the latter could be expected 
to perform optimally or not, depending on the technology, the 
diversification and the cross-elasticities between products 
of the firm. Although attempts were made to counter this 
problem, a more satisfactory solution may be provided by con-
glomerate firms. If synergistic effects are low and firms are 
highly diversified, the justification for the large-sized U-
forms is much reduced~l) In these circumstances, use of one 
of the mu1tidivisiona1 forms (M, M, H) may be expected. This 
is borne out by the data (see Appendix B). Secondly, potential 
problems arising from market power may be mitigated; if sub-
stantial differences in industry concent)·ation, the height of 
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entry barriers and changes in demand do exist between indus-
tries, these may be more significant in determining profit 
rates for one product companies, than for conglomerates whose 
activitieS are spread over several industries and who are 
therefore likely to be operating under differing conditions 
with respect to market power. If this is so for conglomera-
tes, profit figures may be free from the more extreme varia-
tions due to industrial-structure characteristics. 
In addition to these potential advantages for the estima-
tion of the effects of organizational form, the development 
of the conglomerate in the U.K. and U.S.A. means that 
explanation of differences in their economic performance is 
of interest in its own right. The identification of causes 
of success and failure may help in deciding public policy 
towards this type of company. 
To these ends, Section 2 examines some of the literature 
relevant to the model; Section 3 introduces the model; Section 
4 considers the sample, outlines the data sources and 
discusses the measurement of the variables; Section 5 presents 
the results; while Section 6 considers the conclusions and 
possible omissions from the model. 
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I I - THE L"I TERATURE 
Several (rational) reasons for the existence of 
conglomerate mergers appear in the literature;- [see for 
instance, Lintner (49), Melnik and Pollatschak (60) and 
Weston and Mansingkta (101»). 
(1) Tax advantages: a merger between firms may allow 
fuller use of tax losses and investment credits if these 
can be carried forward and the independent unit has no 
comparably large taxable income in sight. 
(2) Greater leverage possibilities/lower borrowing 
costs. Greater leverage may be possible in a conglomerate 
due to a reduction in risk (see (3) below). Hence diversi-
fication, by lowering the possibility of losses large enough 
to sustain bankruptcy, may allow greater debt ratios. 
(Lintner 49): 
Lower borrowing costs may result from economies of scale 
in security issue costs; lot size advantages in credit inves-
tigation under conditions 6f uncertainty~ or the greater 
marketability of stock. These lower borrowing costs may be 
used to re-finance the debt of the (smaller) company taken 
over. However this will only be possible in the case of sub-
sidiary companies; firms in which only a minority shareholding 
is held will -not benefit since they will remain fully autono-
mous for borrowing purposes [Melnik and Pollatschek (60»). 
(3) Reductions in Risk. Diversification by firms will 
allow reductions in risk for investors, since the conditions 
for risk minimization by shareholders are unlikely to be ful-
filled~2) How~ver the ability of the conglomerate to diversify 
will be limited by its requirement for wholly owned subsidiaries 
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for the debt-cost reasons specified in (2) above. Therefore, 
a very modest portfolio of stocks may allow the investor to 
obtain similar levels of risk. [Mueller (65)J. Moreover, 
according to Smith and Scheiner (91), the mutual fund is a 
more effective type of organization for obtaining a reduction 
in risk through diversification. Thus the advantages of the 
conglomerate, in this area may be modest. 
(4) Exploitation of Accounting Principles. Managers may 
be able to create an illusion of well-being above the true 
state of affairs by "exploiting the area of discretion within 
generally accepted accounting principles" , (Lintner 49). Hence 
the diversifying merger may allow the management to create an 
illusion ~f success. The possibilities for such action are 
' .' 
likely to be greatest when the turnover of subsidiaries is 
large and the accounts are liable to frequent change. 
(5) "PIE Magic". Perhaps because of (4) above or other 
reasons, the market may assign the PIE ratio of the high growth 
partner to the new enlarged company, rather than the weighted 
average of the two firms. '. This PIE "magic" will lead to 
higher security prices than justified. This phenomenon 
may particularly be a feature of boom-markets when confidence 
is high (Lintner 49). 
(6) Capital Market Advantages. Assuming a bias towards 
internal deployment of funds, diversification may allow greater 
benefits from the internal capital market (see P. 11). 
In addition to work on the reasons for the existence of 
conglomerate companies, the literature has considered their 
market rating. In particular, Scherer (83 P.l02) reports 
that conglomerates have been awarded low PIE ratios by the 
market. This he explains in three ways:-
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Firstly, as a reflection of the problems in managing 
conglomerates, . . referring presumably to difficulties in main-
taining control over a large number of unrelated product 
areas. Secondly, due to a lack of information about divisional 
activities leading to a reluctance to invest on the part of 
shareholders. Thirdly, because shareholders already have 
sufficient diversification for their purposes. 
While these factors undou.):>tedly have a part to play in 
explaining the low PIE ratios - indicating high risk -
accorded by the market to' conglomerates, ot.her exp1anation.s 
are possible. The high (LIE) ratios found in the Sanlpl~(3) 
may indicat"e t 'he use c·f excessively high gearing ratios. 
Alternatively, some conglomerates may, as a matter of corpor-
ate policy, concentrate on high risk profit opportunities. 
Thus, with only imperfect information available, companies 
who took over a large number of firms whose asset value had 
been severely discounted by the market or who habi tuall.y 
entered product fields where profitability had not yet been 
demonstrated, might be considered high risk investments by 
shareholders. The implication of ~his for the performance of 
the organizational form variable is considered in section 5. 
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I'll - THE MODEL _. 
The model is additive in form assuming 
n~ = F(Yi) + g(Zi) + u 
where F(Y,) denotes the profit-maximizing level of profit 
for firm (i) andZi is our vector of managerial variables. 
THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
The rate of return on stockholder's equity was chosen as the 
dependent variable, since of the rate of return variables 
this seems to be the most theoretically accepted. (See p.57). 
Price-cost margins were not generally available prior to 1967. 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES' 
These remain substantially the s~e as for the equations with 
eighty-two industrial companies. However organizational change 
and managerial taste are excluded for data reasons(4); in 
addi~ion, industry dummies are inappropriate. The literature 
reported in Section 2 suggests the possible importance in 
explaining profit rates of differences in debt-ratios and 
~egree to which the firms":assets. are represented by share-
holdings in other non-subsidiary companies (since these hold-
ings may reduce the companies debt capacity). While gearing 
may be measured in a similar way to Chapter 4, the best method 
of measuring any reduction in debt capacity th!-".o,ugh invest-
ments must be open to doubt. The value of investments in. 
other companies shares is one possibility, but a better 
explanation may be provided by consideration only of substarr-
!!!! shareholdings in other non-subsidiary companies. Invest-
ment in these "associated" companies (where the shal'eholding 
is between 20-50%) represents a substantial investment over 
which ~agerial control is limited but where risk may be 
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higher than for a series of small, widespread shareho1dings 
of the same total value. Consequently, companies investing 
heavily in associated companies may reduce their debt capacity 
with only limited advantages from risk reduction. 
Hence the independent variables are:-
Organizational Form. Vsing the Wil1iamson and Bhargava clas-
sification, the optimal/non-optimal dummy is used to test 
whether differences in organizational form matter in determin-
ing profit performance. Following the arguments of chapter two 
that the M-form may be expected to outperform both the H- and 
M-form, the dummy takes a value of "1" for M-forms and "0" 
otherwise. -To-the extent that synergistic effects are low in 
conglomerates, (any) differences in performance between 
organizational forms will be due, ceteris paribus, to varia-
tions in the efficiency of financial control and of the 
allocation of corporate funds to different products. In 
Chapter two (P.11), it was argued that the M-form would have 
advantages over all other (multidivisional) structures in these 
respects. 
Owner-contrOl. This (dummy) variable is included to estimate 
the possible effects on profitability of the concentration of 
share ownership (or Substantial managerial shareholdings) (see 
P.62). The dummy takes a value of "1" for "owner-controlled" 
firms, and "0" otherwise. 
Firm Size is included to allow for possible effects on profit-
ability from scale economies or diseconomies, or the lower 
mean profit in large companies, associated with lower varia-
bility in profit. (see P.63). These two possible effects can-
not be distinguished. 
Firm Growth is included to allow, firstly, for unanticipated 
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growth and, secondly, to mitigate the biasing effect of 
growth on profitability when the dependent variable is 
measured using year-beginning equity (see P.64). This may 
be of importance here since the growth rate of some companies 
has been considerable~5) 
Gearing. The ratio of long-term loans to stockholders' equity 
as an explanatory variable is suggested by several factors. 
The literature on conglomerate merger considered in Section 11; 
the well-known work of Modigliani and Miller (67) on the 
effects of gearing on risks; and the possibility that, at any 
one time, substantial differences in the cost of equity and 
loan capital exist to which firms have not fully adjusted. 
Hence the gearing variable may pickup several, perhaps counter-
vailing, effects on profitability which cannot be distinguished. 
Trade Investments. For reasons discussed above extensive 
shareholdings in associated companies may affect profit per for-
mance. Yet because a simple or linear relationship between 
such shareholdings and profits is not expected, this variable, 
admittedly at the cost of some loss of precision, is represented 
by a dummy taking a value of "1" for companies having "substan-
tial" shareholdings (see Section 4) as a proportion of total 
assets and "0" otherwise. 
Hence the model is:-
IT/E = a ++ B,OF + Baoe + B,)S + B.G ;" J B,·I./E + B"TI + u 
where rr/E the ratio of profit to shareholders equity 
OF = organizational form dummy 
QC = owner control dummy 
S = firm size 
G = firm growth 
' . 
. . 
LIE = (gearing) , the ratio of loans to shareholders equity , 
TI = trade investments dummy. 
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IV THE SAMPLE DATA' SOURCES' AND MEASUREMENT OF VARIABLES 
The top 400 companies in the Times 1000 for 1971 were 
examined and a srumple was drawn of 36 industrial conglOmerates~6) 
for which data was available. The use of companies in the size 
range 250 - 400 extended our data sources to the limit~7) 
Since many of the firms had grown quickly and no compensation 
was possible through the inclusion of firms of similar size in 
1964, which had not grown as rapidly~8) there is a bias in the 
sample towards successful high-growth companies. Data was 
collected for two four-year periods, 1964 - 67 and 1968 - 71. 
Four years was considered long enough to ~verage out the most 
extreme forms of profit variability and short enough so that 
most companies only employed one type of organizati9nal struc-
ture. 
However, as will be seen, only the results for the second 
period are reported. 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
The rate of return on 'stockholders equity (Tt/E) was defi-
ned as the ratio of profit after interest, tax and depreciation 
to the value of ordinary and preference shares, plus the reser-
ves attributable to them. Equity was calculated at the begin-
ning of each year. The variable was a four-year average of the 
period 1968 - 71. Profit excludes all extraordinary items. 
The source of all financial data was Extel. 
ORGANIZATIONAL FORM 
The Williamson and Bhargava (109) classification was used 
to classify firms by structure on the basis of source material 
found in annual reports, stockbroker reports, articles and 
official compa.ny files held at Companies House, the London 
- 108 -
Grad_uate Business School and Ma'n'chester BU'siness School. The 
, classification used for the study was based on the structure 
operated for the majority of the period~ 
Two c~assifications are presented. The first, 0 F I, has 
Sears and Tillings classified as M-form, and Jessel as M-form 
(see Appendix B1 0 F 11 reclassifies Sears and Tillings to H-
form and Jessel to M-form. This reclassification represents 
the difficulties the present a~thor has had in deciding the 
appropriate classification in these cases; the M-form classi-
fication hinges on the efficiency of the financial control 
exercised by head office. 
OWNER-CONTROL. Two definitions of owner-control are used:-
(1) At least 15% of the comp'any', s voting stock held by a 
small and cohesive group of shareholders 2!. 3% held by execu-
tive management. This was the definition used in Chapter 4. 
(2) While the necessary holding by shareholders remains 
as in (1), the management qualification for owner-control is 
increased to 10% of the company's stock. Since the conglomer-
,-
ate considered are of a smaller s~ze on average than our 
industrial firms~9) this stricter qualification for owner-
control may be necessary for the utility-maximizing actions 
of management to be ~identical with shareholders preferences. 
On econometric grounds 0 C 10% gave a better distribution 
between owner~control and management-control. Under definition 
, (1) only 12 firms were manager-controlled whereas under defini-
tion (2) this increased to 21. 
FIRM SIZE, was defined as value of stockholders equity plus 
long-term loans, measured at the beginning of the period, to 
minimize feed-backs from profit to size. 
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FIRM GROWTH, was the ratio of the difference between opening 
and closing size to opening size. 
GEARING waS long-te~ loans over shareholders equity. 
TRADE INVESTMENTS. A dummy variable was chosen to pick ~p 
the possible dichotomy between those firms having substantial 
·investments in "associated" companies and those without. Hence 
those companies whose investments in associated companies 
represented more than 20% of tqe ~ompanies'assets were allocated 
a value of "1". All other companies . w·ere given a value "0" for 
this variable. 
The value 20% is essentially arbitra~ybut it does repre-
sent a substantial proportion of ~he company's assets, especi-
ally in a sample of industrial coinpanies where holdings of 
other firms shares cannot predominate as a proportion of the 
firm's assets. The use of a dummy variable of this kind may 
. also provide advantages insofar that the relationship between 
trade investments and profit may be complex, the exact nature 
of which is not readily apparent from theoretical argument. 
\ 
. , 
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OLS estimatesoi the tl1rG\o~ profit equations are reported 
(lDG.8 ',1) haxG b(~ cn prescll t., ;d. Equ at ions for pO,l."iod 1 
(1964 - 67) sep~ratelYI and the two periods together. were 
found to be unsatisfactory. With respect to equations includ-
· illg data from both pe:riods, problp.ms arose due to the consider-
able difference~ in the average values for some of the explana-
tory variables:-
TAOLE 1 - AVERAGES ron SEVERAL nrr:oRTM"T VARtABLES I!>i 
DIFFERENT PEP.IODS OF · T:i~.lE ==---------.-: .. ~ 
----
. . 1964-67 . 1968-71 
Aver<"ge FS 12.~ 22.3 
11 G .• 2·.68 0.90 
" LIE 0.26 0.37 
11 
'(tIE 20.1 19.9 
Nt1mb13r of ~·I-forms 10 20 
. . 
Moreover growth was negatively correlated with timc~lO) 
. . 
wb~le the size. growth and gearing were positively correlatcd~ 
Since the rcsiduals grew bigger for observations in the second 
period, excessiv~ly small standgrd errors were to be expected 
. ' .. [Johnstoll (37 P. 216)] . TherefoJ;"e the data points to the need 
for separate esti~utic~. Ho~cvcr results from period 1 on its 
own. (while · favourable to the hyp.c:>thcsis of the superiori ty of 
the M-form) wer~ unreliable on sevr:ralcounts:-
(1) There arc on 1 y ten "opt lr" a l firms in period) d 
. un er 
the OFI cla~siiic~tion, ~nd ninp under OF 11. 
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(2) The r~s\ll ts were not robust and varied considerably 
depending on whether OF I or OF 2 was used. 
(3) Several of the firms were very small in 1964 and 
grew very quickly so that the bias towards rapidly growing 
successful firms was exacerbated~ll) 
(4) The coefficient on the constant was unacceptably 
high. Consequently only period 2 regressions are reported. 
Equations with log firm size were run and the results were 
similar. The choice for the linear form was on the basis of 
the lower value for the constant. 
Immediately apparent is that these regressions, as judged 
by the R2 and F statistics, provide a poor~r explanation of 
variations in profit between firms than those reported for 
"industrials" (p.S1-S6) and that no variable, except the 
constant, is significant in all three regressions. The OF vari-
able (just) fails to be significant in any of them. However 
where a definite presumption about expected signs was made 
these are confirmed. Moreover consistency of sign is obtained 
for all coefficients except , gearing. 
Equations 1 and 2 seem to tell essentially the same story. 
The only variables significant in determining stockholders 
rate of return (other than the constant) are owner-control 
and growth. A note of caution is warranted as to the effect 
of owner-control. 
The coefficient must be interpreted as the effect of a 
switch from management to owner-control under ceteris paribus 
conditions. Yet the correlation (+0.379) between OC and LIE 
suggests owner-controlled firms fund more of their capital 
projects thro~gh loan capital.(12) This may be a method by which 
voting control can most easily be retained. 
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TABLE a 
OLS ESTIM~TES: CONGLOMERATES N a 36 Period 1966~71 
.. 
I"(~\tation Constant , OFI I OF'II OC1Q% OC3~ FS FG Tt LIE -2 F . R 
i Depr'll;lf~!!.~ inble Tt /E i i 
I 
1 xxx 0.0112 0.062xx ~3x10-7 0.016xX x 0.25lt 2.98 I 0.162 -0.051 -0.020 (5.90) ( 1.52) (2.16) " . (0.76) (2.23) (1'.71) .(0.51) 
i 
i O.16!tXXX 0.061xx -lx10-7 0.016xX x 0.241 2.84 2 0.037 -0.056 . -0.023 I lS.36j (1.31) (2.09) . (0.22). (2.18) (1.91) (0.57) ,. 
I , r014O"'"'X 0.05~x . 0.046 "2x10-7 0.012 -O.OliO 0.002 0.206 2.58 (L29) (1.89) ( 1.59) (0.52) (1.66) (1.32) (0.06) 
I 
- - -- - -
Notes: xxx denotee significant at 1~ 
xx denotes significant at 5% t 
x denot~8 significant at 1~ 
I 
The significance of the firm growth coefficient may 
. reflect both the influence of growth on profitability per se, 
and also any distortion of the dependent variable due to the 
existence of differential growth rates between firms (see 
footnote 16, P.9S). 
The structure dummy coefficient (OF) has positive sign 
as expected, but just fails to reach significance at the 5 
. 
per cent Jevel. Its magnitude .indicates that a switch to an 
M-form structure will increase profitability by approximately 
one fifth of the average profitability for the sample as a 
whole~13)and therefore falls into a more plausible range for 
the effect of organizational form on profitability than the 
coefficients reported in Chapter 4. In short the results while 
showing a positive effect for structure on profitability do not 
fully confirm the statistical significance found in Chapter 4. 
In the context of a model where the R2 and F- test values are 
ConsIderably lower than for the equations reported in Chapter 4 
the -results do not seem, on face value, to be unfavourable to 
our hypothesis concerni~g the efficiency of th~ M-form stru~ture. 
However a note of caution "is necessary, Rapid growth among 
firms in the sample may exacerbate problems associated with 
differences in managerial skill .. Thus, in Chapter 4, it was 
argued that the OF variable may be picking up not only struc-
tural differences within the organization, but also differences 
1n the ability of management. These differences will presumably 
be exhibited partly through more efficient selection of growth 
opportunities. Many of the companies 1n the sample expanded 
rapidly by both internal and external methods. Therefore a 
large variation in performance might be expected between those 
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that made the "right" choices on the basis of the·out-turn of 
events, because of the superior foresight of their management, 
and those that did not. This would be totally independent of 
organizational. form but will inflate the performance of the 
M-form, if its early use in a period of change is associated 
with superior management. It may be therefore that the 
equations reported overstate the importance of organizational 
structure. 
The firm size coefficient is negative whichever way 
Sears, Tillings and Jessel are classified. This is important 
since both Sears and Tillings had opening sizes well in excess 
. (14) 
of tpe average. However, in neither regression did the 
effect of firm size reach significance. The (small) negative 
coefficient indicates that the profitability even of the large 
firm which maintains its growth rate and gearing ratio will be 
.below that of its smaller rivals~15) However the lower growth 
rate and higher gearing ratios of the large firms in the sample 
will result in further reductions in profitability~16) Never-
I 
theless, there is little e~idence on the basis of these regres-
sions for the existence of economies and diseconomies of scale. 
This perhaps is unsurprising since with the exception of Sears, 
the sample does not include any giant firms where the most 
pronounced effects might be expected. In particular, control 
loss problems associated with .large size may not become signi-
ficant until a size well in excess of any of the companies 
in this sample is reached. If the development of the "Grld,,(17) 
structure is taken to evidence of the disadvantages of the 
M-form at very large sizes, then at present it seems to be 
limited to companies whose size is greater than any in the 
present sample. 
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The trade investment dummy has a negative sign, as 
expected, and just fails to reach significance at the 5 per 
cent level. The equation indicates that companies having 
"substant:Lal" investments in associated companies suffered 
approximately a 5 per cent age point reduction in their profit. 
These holdings, therefore, may be a major source of poor 
performance. This may be the result not only of a reduction 
in debt capacity (with little corresponding reduction in risk); 
but also difficulties in maintaining effective control over 
the use of company assets. Thus these minority holdings may 
not 'provide scope for the strategic controls possible when full 
voting control is held, yet disposal through the market may not 
be a viable alternative as the share price may be unduly depres-
sed. Thus neither internal nor external mar~et control is 
available in full. 
The reported results give little importance to.gearing as 
a determinant of profit performance. In view of the several, 
possibly conflicting, factors that this variable is picking up, 
this may be unsurprising. 
The important differences in regression 3 compared with 
regressions 1 and 2 (table 1) in otherwise broadly similar 
results, refer to the significance of the QC variable and the 
sign of LIE. Owner-control is defined in the "3%" version in 
regression 3, so there are 24 owner-controlled firms, compared 
with 15 in the "10%" version of this variable. The effect of 
this is to make the QC coefficient insignificant, although still 
positive, and to throw additional doubt on the true importance 
of owner-control in determining profitability. Moreover, it 
seems that the importance of owner-control in determining 
profitability is less for conglomerates than for industrial 
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companies. 'I.'his is the implication of a comparison of 
regression 3 with those equations in Chapter 4 using the 3% 
definition of owner-control and the rate of return on stock-
holders equity. Three percent of the stock in the hands of 
corporate management may be insufficient, considering the 
smaller size (on average) of the conglomerates, to cause them 
to profit-~aximize. 
While the coefficient on the gearing variable (LIE) has 
a different sign in regression 3, it remains insignificant. 
Thus the ,interpretation of the results remain very much the 
same. 
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VI - CONCLUSIONS 
The regressions give only a moderate explanation of the 
variation of profitability among conglomerate firms. The R2 
.~ 
statistics are well below the levels found with the sample of 
one-industry companies and the F-test is only significant at 
the 5 percent level. The constant has a coefficient that 
represents (at least) two-thirds of average profitability. 
Nevertheless, the B2 and B4 coefficients were found to be 
significant in two out of the three regressions; however this 
may reflect factors of statistical rather than economic impor-
tance. The negative sign and near-significance of B6 indicated 
the possible importance in explaining per'formance of "sub-
stantial" shareholdings in associa.ted companies. Thus con-
glomerates may improve their profit performance if t~e~ 
concentrate on buying subsidiaries where voting control allows 
full managerial control to be exercised. Or alternatively, 
become a mutual fund where the widespread, but small, share-
holdings allow advantages . ,in the area of risk and the disposal 
of shares through the market (without an unduly depressing 
effect on the price). 
However our primary interest is the effect of organiza-
tional form on profit, as shown by Bl . This proved to be 
positive,but insignificant. There was some reason to believe 
that even this was an overstatement of its importance. Hence 
• 
organizational form appears to matter less in determining the 
profi t rates of conglomer~.tes than one-industry firms. Three 
possible explanations are suggested. Firstly, it may be that 
the superior performance of M-forms found in Chapter 4 was the 
result of strategic control in the area of externalities, which, 
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because of low interconnectedness between products, is of 
limited advantage to conglomerate~. This explanation implies 
that there are few efficiency advantages in the areas of 
financial"control or the allocation of corporate funds avail-
able from the use of the M-form. However considering the 
strong performance of the M-form compared with other multi-
divisional forms in Chapter 4 and the importance of financial 
control in defining the nature of ·the M-form structure, this 
is unlikely to be the sole eXPlanation~18) 
Secondly, the use of the Williamson and Bhargava classi-
fication may be inappropriate for our sample of conglomerates. 
On the one hand, the growth of many companies in the sample 
was very high even for 1968 - 71.· Hence table I shows an 
average growth of 90% over the period for conglomerates compared 
with 62% for the industrial sample in Chapter 4. Under these 
circumstances the organization may never be sufficiently stable 
for a highly structured organizational form to develop. Thus 
with rapid change, although an organizational form of the 
Williamson and Bhargava type may .seem to occur, activity may 
be focused more on the acquisition and disposal of subsidiaries 
and the re-definition of individual and divisional responsibi-
lities than the attainment of steady-state efficiency. The 
latter may be ruled out by the rapid expansion of the organi-
zation which may put a significant strain on the firm's 
managerial resources. [For further discussion see Penrose (75, 
Chp. 4).} 
On the other hand, some "conglomerates" may work in an 
uncertain environment, where, as argued in Chapter 3~19) the 
bureaucratic model of organization, on which the Williamson and 
Bhargava work is based, may be inappropr:i.ate. Hence, as 
considered in Section 11, some conglomerates may choose to 
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opera.te in such a way, with respect. to the nature and number 
of growth possibilities select~d, that while expecte~ profit 
. . (20) 
may be high, so are the risks 1nvolved. Conve~sely, for 
the one-iiidustry companies of C~a.pter 4, the combination of 
lower growth and concentra.tion on a few product areas, where 
spe~ialist knowledge is possessed, makes a stable environment 
more likely. 
Thirdly, for (some) cong~ome~ates the supply of suitable 
takeover victims may be of crucial importance in determining 
profita~ility. The specialist corporate skills(2l) of these 
' companies ma.y lie in the .identification and purchase of firms 
. 
whose share price allows a high discount on the true asset 
value. In .these circumstapces t.ile correct i.dentification, 
and the available supply, of such opportunities will be of 
overriding importance in determining profitability.(22) Thus 
organizational form, even if the Williamson and Bhargava 
classification is appropriate, may be of minor importance in 
determining profitability. Moreover, to the extent that the 
profitability of existing corporate skills is picked up in 
the model by the explanatory variables, the reported coeffi·· 
eients are liable to distortion. In particular, the organiza-
tional form dummy may be picking up the influence of these 
~special) torporate skills. However the sign of this distor-
. . 
ting effect is not immediately discernible. 
The results therefore do not confirm, except to the 
extent of t~e predicted positive sign, the hypotheSis of 
Chapter 2 or the results in Chapter 4 regarding the performance 
of M-forms. While this may be interpreted as a justification 
for neo-c1assical assumptions, in view of the results of 
Chapter 4, it perhaps points m~re strongly to thd need for more 
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appropriate organizational classifications. These may be 
considerably more complex than th~se of Williamson and 
Bhargava requiring more extensive information sources than 
used here; this is certainly true of the Innovational and 
Adaptive forms (see P.46). Therefore there may be limited 
opportunities for explaining variations in conglomerate 
profit rates with simple organizational variables. One of the 
advantages of the Williamson and Bhargava classifications dis-
cussed in Chapter 2 was its simplicity, allowing the use of 
readily available data sources. In addition, more complex 
models may be required because of the proportionately greater 
importance ·of differences between conglomerates in managerial 
and corporate skills. 
From the point of view of public policy the equations 
provide no cl~ar guide as to the nature of successful conglom-
erate companies. Neither firm size nor organizational form 
(as defined) were shown to matter in determining profit rates. 
Nevertheless some evidence pointed to the detrimental effect 
on corporate profit of substantial trade investments. It may 
therefore be that some kind of managerial control is neces-
sary to ensure adequate profitability in (industrial) 
conglomerates. 
The considerable differences in corporate strategy found 
in the sample (see, for instance footnotes 20 and 22) may 
have important implications for public policy . While some 
companies may aim for long-term steady-state efficiency others 
may be essentially speculative phenomena associated with boom 
markets. In the circumstances general presumptions as to the 
social costs and benefits of conglomer.ates may be impossible 
to obtain. Therefore public policy may have to be essentially 
ad hoc taking each case on its merits. 
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FOOTNOTES 
(1) Synergy refers to cost r~ductions made possible through 
the exploitation of the commercial and technical links between 
products. 
The importance of market power considerations may be redu-
ced because it is unlikely that all the conglomerate's 
subsidiaries will be operating under Similarly onerous market 
conditions. If this is so then industry-structure characteri-
. stics will have a smaller role to play in explaining variations 
in . the profit rate for conglomerates than for one-product firms 
where one may be a monopolis~ while another is producing under 
competitive conditions. . 
(2) If there are perfect ,capital markets - defining these 
as being where every inve~tor holds every share - or if 
indentical sub-sets of investors hold the stock of the merging 
firms, there will be no risk advantages from conglomerate 
merger. However either of these situations are unlikely. .(Levy 
and Sarnat (46), Lintner (49». 
(3) Th~ ~verage ~atio for LIE for the eighty-two indus-
trials was 23.2%. For the . conglomerates it was 31.5% in the 
period 1964-7l, and 36.7% for th~ period 1968-71. 
(4) Most of the conglomerates changed their amount of 
financial control very slowly and as this is the most important 
determinant of whether a structure is M-form or not, identifi-
cation of a period of organizational change would be liable to 
error. In addition modifications to the financial control 
mechanisms do not imply the same upheaval as the changes that 
occurred with the eighty-two industrial companies, where con-
siderable changes in personnel responsibilities and tasks were 
involved. Managerial Taste, which performed badly in Chapter 4, 
was difficult to calculate for the smaller companies of this 
sample. 
(5) See ·tableI - Page III . 
(6) The definition of conglomerate used for the selection 
of the sample was essentially arbitrary. Hence in order to 
include only those companies that operated in several, diverse 
industries, none of which dominated the firm's activities, a 
"conglomerate" was tal(en to be a firm which operated in at 
least three industries (defined in a similarly broad manner as 
in Chapter 4) of Which no one provided greater than 50% of the 
turnover. (Allocation of assets to different industries was 
not possible.) . 
Financial conglomerates were excluded since our organiza-
tional classification was developed for industrial companies. 
(7) Usi"ng our data sources classification increased in 
difficulty as the size of firm decreased (see footnote 17 P.9S) 
and Steer (~2). ' 
(8) The classification of organizational structure of these 
firms that remained well down the size list of firms was not 
- possible from our data sources. 
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(9) The average (asset) size for the conglomerates sample 
was, approximately, £18 millions in 1964 and £22 million in 
1968. This compares with average opening size for the eighty-
two industrial companies of approximately £76 million. 
(10) A time dummy taking the value "1" for the period 
1968 - 71 and "0" for 1964 - 7 was included in the analysis of 
the combined period. It was not significant. 
(11) For effects of growth on the dependent variable 
measured at the beginning of the period see footnote 16, 
Page 98. 
(12) The average gearing (LIE) for owner-controlled firms 
was 0.52 compared with 0.26 for m~nager-controlled firms . 
. 
(13) The average value of the pre-tax rate of return on 
equity measured at the beginning of the year was 20.1%. 
" (14) The opening size of Sears and Tillings was £178 million 
and £64 million respectively. This compares with a sample 
average of £22 million. Moreover the effect of using the OF 11 
classification - instead of OF I -. is to change the (zero order) 
correlation coefficient between OF and F S from 0.167 to -0.205 . 
. (15) This might be expected from the nature of the sample 
with many rapidly growing firms. 
(16) The (zero order) correlations between firm size and 
gearing (L/E) and between firm size and growth was 0.154 and 
-0.108 respectively. 
(17) Channon (17) uses the "grid" classification in his 
work. Its occurrence seems to be limited in the U.K. to the 
very largest firms. Channon (17 P.56) finds only one and in 
the data examined by Steer. (92) there seemed to be only two 
possibilities for this structure,bot~ among the top 10 firms 
in th~ U.~. by size. . . . 
(18) It seems unlikely that the superior performance of 
the M-form in Chapter 4, can be explained exclusively by non-
financial factors. If this were correct, the inferior perfor-
mance of the H-form would be the result solely of better 
externality control on the part of the M-form. That this one 
effect cou1d result in the magnitude and significance of the 
observed OF coefficient must be liable to considerable doubt. 
(19) See Page 35. 
(20) It would seem that at least three companies in the 
sample - Slater Walker, Jessel and Cope Allman - had a very 
rapid and large turnover of subsidiaries. In addition these 
companies tended to concentrate on taking over companies of 
low profitability, where the risks may be greatest. Under 
these conditions the organizational structure may be unstable. 
(2l) Indentical projects may not provide firms with similar 
profit opportunities; the profit available will depend "on the 
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specialist skills that have been developed within the 
organization." This will be true of conglomerates even though 
their skills may not be . . located in a particular product area. 
(22) Grovewood Securities provides an example of the 
importance of developed corporate skills. For a number of 
reasons examined by Hindley (35) owner-managers may wish to 
sellout. Grovewood allowed successful owner-managers to 
realize their assets and retain a managerial role, in return 
for a modest discount on the true value of the shares. It 
thereby provided an alternative to sale through the market 
which would have meant both a large fall in the share price 
when shares are closely held and greater difficulty in retain-
ing a managerial role. The profits of Grovewood will depend 
on the supply of these takeover possibilities. 
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CHAPTER VI - CONCLUSIONS 
The 'res'ul ts' point ,to' one 'asp'ect of the firm wllfcll 'matters 
in determining profit performance that has received little 
attention. On the basis of the regressions in Chapter 4, 
organizational form would seem to have been an important omis-
sion from previous empirical work. Moreover comparing chapters 
four and five the organizational forms used were of greater 
significance in determining profit performance for firms work-
ing in the seemingly more stable environments. Nevertheless 
even in chapter four, no considerable distorting effects on 
other independent variables were discerned. In general, the 
results seem to provide support for the work of Williamson (103) 
and Williamson and Bhargava (109). Hopefully this will provide 
a stimulus to further in~estigation. However any conclusions 
as to the importance of organizational form must remain tenta-
tive due to the nature of the results presented. In particular, 
the omission from our analysis of any measure of diversification 
may prove important. Secondly, the analysis might be usefully 
extended to periods when change in organizational structure was 
not widespread. In such circumstances the results might be 
. 
considerably less striking. Thirdly, without some apprppriate 
method of separating the effects of structure, per se, from 
managerial skill, the role of the latter in determining the 
results in both chapters four and five cannot be determined. 
This thesis has used and developed a relatively easy 
method of obtaining organizational form information. No doubt 
in the past difficulty in obtaining sufficient data has limited 
work in this field. Moreover the method makes only moderate 
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use of the subjective assessments of incumbent management, 
which may be subject to bias (Steer 92). On the other hand, 
some ( few) errors can be 'expected, some 'firms' cannot be 
classified, and the method is less applicable to small 
companies. (Steer 92). Work, perhaps with a limited sample 
but using in depth analysis of organizational form would con-
stitute a valuable addition to the literature. 
The scope for further work is considerable. Firstly, if 
organizational form, as classified by Williamson and Bhargava 
. (109) were to be confirmed as important in determining the 
performance of a large number of firms in the economy, further 
work may' be enlightening in those areas or sectors where this 
was not so. One example of this ,considered above was the 
sample of conglomerate companies. As conclu'ded in chapter 
five, this lack of significance for the organizational dummy 
might be due to several factors. However these seem to fall 
into one of two categories. Either the wrong classificational 
schemes have been employed for the environment within which 
these companies operate, or more fundamentally, the structure 
of the organization does not matter. The latter might be 
expected to occur if the importance of structure was over-
ridden by that of the quality of leadership, or if the study 
came too early in the development of conglomerate companies 
for steady-state or technical efficiency to matter. In this 
context Williamson (103, P.llS), reporting U.S. experience, 
notes that widespread use of the M-form structure came later 
for conglomerate than for industrial companies. 
Secondly, in the sample of chapter 4, the average size of 
the M-form structured firms was considerably in excess of their 
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non-optima11y structured counterparts. This would seem to 
provide support for the arguments of chapter two as to the 
greater benefits of theM-form in mitigating control ' loss as 
size increased. However one question left unanswered is 
whether there are limits to size over which the M-form performs 
sub-optima11y even in a stable environment? That this might 
be so is suggested by Channon's (17, P.56) perceived develop-
ment of the "grid" form. This may be a response to situations 
where the number of subsidiaries are too great to be controlled 
optima11y in the normal M-form manner. Instead two overlapping 
systems of control must be employed (see Appendix to Chapter 4). 
At "the moment the "grid" seems to be limited in the U.K. 
to firms of the very largest size~l) However if the hypothesis 
about the limits to M-form optimal operation were to be 
confirmed, and if firms continue to grow, the "grid" might be ex-
pected to make an increasingly important impact (assuming that 
there are no major improvements in control or information-
handling techniques)~2) 
Thirdly, chapter three argues that several factors that 
seem to be important in determining R & D success or failure 
may be linked to organizational structure. If this is correct 
two things ~ight be expected; firstly that firms using the 
appropriat'e structure would have greater success with R & D; 
and secondly that the relative advantages in the field of R & D 
would move more in favour of the large firm. Further empirical 
investigation would provide a useful addition to the literature. 
However regressiona1 analysis of the type used in Chapters 4 
and 5 may prove difficult. Unfortunately, most industries in 
the U.K. (e.g. pharmaceuticals) where technical performance 
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might be expected to be of crucial importance have few large 
companies, so making a worthwhile sample difficult to obtain. 
In addition the're ' care 'a 1 s'o' a large' 'number'of ' subsidiaries' 
whose par~nt companies' headquarters lie outside the U.K. 
These companies would have to be excluded from a purely U.K. 
sample since organizational classifications which do not con-
sider the role of the central office are meaningless. These 
factors combined to prevent empiri~al work on the Innovative 
and Adaptive forms in this thesis. 
The implications of the results for public policy are 
rather limited. Even if organizational structure does matter 
in determining performance. the government's role in promoting 
this type of efficiency may at best be indirect. This is due 
firstly to the sheer impracticality of the government forcing 
the use of optimal organizational structures within firms. Any 
attempt would probably increase firm efficiency less than its 
cost in terms of the manpower and resources used. Secondly 
there would inevitably be some rigidity in governmental attempts 
to encourage firms to use 'certain types of structure. This 
might lead to some of the subtleties of the firms' response to 
environment being ignored. For instance, government agencies 
might encourage the adoption of "standard" spans of control, 
or amounts .of delegation without regard for the fine-tuning of 
these to environment. [For examples of how firms may have 
subtle differences in structure see e.g. Burns and Stalker (15).J 
Thirdly, since it is unlikely that anyone type of structure is 
optimal for all time, and because there is an inevitable lae 
while the success or failure of a type of structure is deter-
mined, legislators might find themselves promoting obsolete 
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organizationa~ forms. 
In these circumstances all public policy can hope to do 
is to create 'condi tionsthatinduce 'the use 'of ' the most effi-
cient forms. This presumably points to policies for increas-
ing competition in both product and capital markets. Yet 
increased competition has proved notoriously difficult to 
obtain in the past. 
Our owner-control variable performed well up to expecta-
tions in chapter 4 and 5. With interaction terms introduced, 
the dummy had a significant and moderately large effect on 
profit even with price-cost margins as the dependent variable. 
Hence the results tend to justify the attention paid in the 
literature to owner-control [see ' e.g. Berle and Means (11) 
Radice (79»). The existence of managerial slack was supported 
not only by the performance of the OC variable itself, 'but 
also by the different slopes of the profit-growth re1ation-
ships for owner- and manager-controlled firms found in 
chapter 4. However both our samples were biased towards 
'successfu1 owner-controlled firms. This' was particularly so 
with the conglomerate companies used in chapter five. Many 
of them had grown very rapidly over the ten years of the study 
from small firms to among the top five hundred companies by 
size in the U.K. These must be considered successful companies; 
and under the circumstances that many were owner-controlled 
(as defined in chapter 5) is not surprising. It would there-
fore be unwise to generalize on the effects of owner-control. 
This may be particularly so when large shareholdings reside 
with management. In circumstances where there is a particular 
interest in pecuniary rewards (including capital gains) owner-
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managers might be expected to produce superior performance by 
using their power to improve efficiency. However the owner-
manager role "also allows' "considerable 'prot"e"ctlon" agairist the " 
threat of~takeover. This means that those who prefer to run 
their companies at a low level of economic efficiency -
presumably in order to get non-pecuniary benefits - will 
largely be free from fear of displacement. Therefore quite 
different results might be expected from a srumple of low-
performing owner-controlled firms. The nature of sample may 
go someway to explaining the conflicting results in this area. 
For instance, Kamerschen (38) failed to find any significant 
for owner-control even using a rate of return depen~ent 
variable. 
A disadvantage of our owner-control dummy is that it 
picks up two quite separate effects. There is, firstly, the 
possible reduction in managerial discretion due to the concen-
tration of shareholdings in a few hands and, secondly~ the 
voluntary pursuance by management of the wishes of shareholders 
in general because of the " importance of corporate performance 
to their remuneration. Moreover it could be that substantial 
managerial shareholdings are the result of share option schemes 
which do not attempt to motivate personnel. Instead they may 
represent a convenient method for management of appropriating 
company resources. (See footnote 8, Chapter 4.) 
Two further points of interest arose from the thesis. 
Firstly, different dependent variables may result in consider-
able differences in the results. In particular it was found 
that organizatio~al change (T), growth (G) and owner-control 
(QC) were only significant (wheri the interaction terms were 
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omi tted) the dependent variaole was 7\/E or Ri .. c. As 
will be recalled from section 2 chapter ~, price-cost margins 
and rates of ret'urn are bes't applied to different time periods. 
It may be'therefore that the th~ee variables above have little 
-effect on short-term decision-making. Secondly, in chapter 4, 
using the interaction terms there seemed to be evidence of 
economies of scale. If this is correct there are cost reduc-
tions available to quite large firms (that is within the top 
300 by size) tQrough increased output. This will be difficult 
to reconcile with a ' desire for more 'industrial competition. 
In conclusion, if this thesis has shown anything, it is a 
need of mor"e inter-disciplinary study between economics and 
organizational theory. The results argue stro~gly ~gainst the 
view of orthodox econ~mic theory that internal organization 
need not be considered when explainfng firm performance. More-
over _they seem to confirm a meaningful role for "general" 
classifi~ations like those of . Williamson and Bhargava (109) 
and Channon (17) which forget some of the subtleties of the 
organizational response. However this is not to argue that 
organization form will be important in all circumstances 
relating . to firm performance or that the organizational forms 
used represent a v.ery precise descript ion of the firms' mana-
gerial structures. In fact they may disguise considerable 
differences in. the ' lev~l of efficiency. 
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FOOTNOTES 
(1) See Appendix Chapter 4. The only companies that the 
present author has·.come-·.acrossthat maybe. "gr,id." . . forms are 
Unilever, B.P., and I.C.I~ '. 
. (2) The "grid" essentially is a response to subsid.aries 
getting out of control. Therefore as would be expected this 
involves some centralization of decision-making. If however 
there was some major improvement in control or information 
handling techniques the costs of decentralization (in terms 
of non-organizational behaviour) would decrease and re-
centralization of decision-making would be less necessary 
(see Chapter 3). 
(3) "Substantial" shareholding here being those that rep-
resent a significant part of managerial wealth. However, they 
may not constitute a large percentage of total corporate stock. 
.. "" .. 
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APPENDIX 'A' 
. ~ 
B.LC.C. 
A CLASSIFICATION OF 82 LARGE U.K. COMPANIES 
FOR THE PERIOD 1967 - 71 
ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING 
Although there is little independent evidence, it would 
seem that this divisiona1ized company has had sufficient 
separation of day to day and strategic planning and adequate 
central controls since 1963 (see A.R's). 
M-form classification 
CHLORIDE ELECTRICAL STORAGE 
Divisiona1ization was started in 1971/2 (see A.R.). 
Before, there was an H-form structure, with insufficient 
control of the subsidiaries. 
DECCA 
This company has not undergone organizational change for 
a considerable period. It is divisiona1ized by product, but 
the essential M-form controls do not seem to be present, due 
to a lack of capacity at the centre. However due to the 
personal interest of the top management, a complete delegation 
of power is not to be expected. 
H-form 
E.M.I. 
E.M.I. has long had a divisional structure but only since 
1969 (when a new chief executive was appointed) was there any 
real delegation of responsibility. 
The 1960's were characterized by a personalized manager-
ial approach (see Greenwe1l), which 'resulted in over-involvement 
by the centre in the divisions activities. Central staff was 
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large and heavily involved in direct services to particular 
subsidiaries (see L.S.E. paper 1964). 
Up to early 1970 'classified i-form 
EVER READY 
Reorganization into a divisional structure came to Ever 
Ready in 1968; the years 1968 - 71 can therefore be seen as 
years of change resulting in a multidivisional structure. 
/ M-form 
FERRANTI 
Ferranti's have always been a family firm. Indeed the 
personal control has been highly personalized and idiosyn-
cratic (see McCathy's 29.6.73). While several aspects might 
indicate a holding-company, on balance the strong centralized 
. -
and personalized leadership in the company, means ,an M-form 
classification. 
G.E. C. 
After the very large mergers with A.E.I. and English 
Electric, this company was quickly divisionalized with a 
minimum of product overlap', and a lean H.Q. staff. (See M.T. 
1970, Greenwell). 
Divisional management remains relatively free to make its 
own decisions, but only within the budgetary requirements 
imposed from the centre. (Greenwell). 
'M-form 
JOSE PH LUCAS 
a 
"The company couples~centralized group with the decenta-
lized operation of subsidiaries under local boards. The 
products groups in the company are responsible for the units 
under their control and management is performance responsible." 
M.T. 1966. 
This company has all the M-form attributes 
. 
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PLESSEY 
A crisis in the boardroom in 1962 led to a major upheaval 
at Plessey's and a new management structurewh1chemphasizes 
decentral~zation but at the same time maintained strong 
central control. Plessey, therefore, moved towards an M-form 
structure but whether this has ever been attained is not 
certain because of the problems over the optimal divisionali-
zation of the company and reports of excess intervention in 
some areas. 
;* 
The company can best be described as an M-form. 
REYROLLE PARSONS 
Although efforts have been made since the merger to 
integrate the two constituent companies, it would be too 
optimistic to say that there has been more than limited suc-
cess. Although there has been divisionalization at Reyrolle 
Parsons and some swapping of divisions, the essential differ-
ence between Reyrolle and Parsons personnel is still kept. 
Indeed in 1969 the group replaced a single managing director 
by one from Reyrolle and one from Parsons. 
H-form 
THORN ELECTRICAL INDUSTRIES 
Thorn, .which has been built up to its present size in no 
small degree by its present chairman Sir Jules Thorn, is one 
of the country's makers of electrical appliances. 
Unfortunately for such an important company, definition 
of organizational structure has proved difficult. Channon 
(17) has classified this company H-form, for most of the 
1960's, presumably reflecting a lack of head office control of 
the subsidiaries. 
In. some way .the .ev.idence for the 1960' s supports this 
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view. Although divisional reporting is used in 1960, it is 
difficult to see how the divisions could have much organiza-
tional importance." " Indee"d it was not " until 1966 that a more 
rational approach to the domestic appliances side (for 
example) of the business was instigated with the appointment 
of a chairman and managing director for the (new) Thorn 
Domestic Appliances Cols who was also to co-ordinate Thorn 
Domestic Appliances subsidiaries. 
However against this view of the company there is evi-
dence from Laurie Milbank (1971)on the influence of Jules Thorn. 
"Sir Jules Thorn has guided the group from nothing to its 
present (1971) annual turnover of £300m. He has chosen 
Mr. Jack Strowger to take over as managing director. 
"The group has been so successful using its old methods 
of discipline and strong guidance from the top, that it will 
require exceptional care to maintaj.n the group's forward 
momentum using a new blend of leadership by example coupled 
with greater decentralization of responsibility," (my under-
"lining) 
"The spirit of Thorn's success will be carried on with 
little change although the methods of achieving management 
success may bend further towards modern thinking," 
A single divisional managing director now bears responsi-
bility for the control, administration, and budget achievement 
of each production group (from 1967), 
Overall financial" control is retained by the main board . 
. 
Budgets are agreed with each divisional head and their cash 
requirements considered. Each division is made to pay for 
its share of working capital and its share of capitalexpendi-
ture. 
~-form up to 1967 
M'-form from 1967-70 
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SMITH INDUSTRIES 
. 
Laing and Cruickshank's description of this company 
corresponds to the M-form; a combination of decentralized 
decision-making and strong strategic controls. This develop-
ment was the logical conclusion to a process of decentraliza-
tion that was started several years before. (see Rowe Rudd 
Laurie Milbank.) 
1967 - 70 M'-form 
1970 - onwards M-form 
.. 
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FOOD 
ASSOCIATED BISCUITS 
"The .. three (constituent) companies operated fairly 
independently until a few years ago when a skeleton head-
quarters was established at Reading to co-ordinate activities. 
(However) from 1969 there will be a fully integrated group 
headquarters, at Reading, which will deal with policy and 
financial matters affecting the group as a whole" (Lawrence, 
Keen and Gardner 1968). 
However since it is unlikely that this was fully opera-
tional until the 1970's, this company is classified H-form 
for the study. 
ASSOCIATED BRITISH FOODS 
Although this company is characterized by overlapping 
. . 
directorships, each division has considerable autonomy within 
the framework of the profit centre ideal. Indeed at this 
company subsidiaries will buy from outside if the other pa~ts 
.of the company cannot provide the intermediate products at 
competitive prices. 
There is little doubt that this company is an M-form 
structure, since the whole tenure of the evidence points away 
from a holding company form, the only other possibility. 
Some of the divisions of A.B.F. support a 
M-form structure of their own, e.g. the Fine Fare chain. 
J. BIBBY AND SONS 
Because of a profit crisis in the late 1960's a new 
organization was needed at Bibby. Previously, the response 
to changed conditions was slow, and decision-maki~g laborious 
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because of the over-involvement in day to day decision-making 
. 
by , central management. (see A.R. 1971). 
The new structure started to take 'shape in 1970.. ' 
," 
M-form 
BROOKE BOND 
Brooke Bond, perhaps due to its "family-controlled" 
nature, had a highly centralized and autocratic decision-
making process, (see Times November 1971) during the'sixtins 
and early 'seventies. This continued even after the merger 
with Liebig, which was controlled in a similar bureaucratic 
manner, until 1971, when there were signs of change. 
J. LYONS 
M-form. (For the nature of decision-making 
at Brooke Bond and Brooke Bond-
Liebig since M.T. 1970.) 
As early as 1963 Lyons had a divisionalized structure 
but the divisions did not have much real authority until 1967. 
"This (decentralization) has speeded up the decision-
making processes, which in the past tended to be held up 
because the board involved itself in comparatively minor 
executive decisions." 
(Sunday Times 1970) 
Because the divisionalized structure was already there 
I .. 
the switch from M-·fo·rm to M-form did not take ' very long. 
RANK HOVIS McDOUGALL 
The present management structure, initia~ed in the early 
1960's is characterized by fairly autonomous divisions and a 
quick efficient auditing process (see Laurie Milbank). 
The ·company has all the hallmarks of an' M-io'rm enterprise 
including very quick assimilation into the divisional structure 
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of new subsidiaries. 
SPILLERS 
It was a McKinsey rep'ort 'on the compan,Y that initiated 
its chang~ to a profit centre divisional basis. Although 
the reorganization was started in 1967/8 it was not until 
1972 that it w~s possible to puSh the ' reorg~nization right 
down through the company. 
M-form 
UN I GATE 
Unigate has gone through a pattern familiar for British 
companies. Formed in 1959, until the reorganization of 1967/8 
the separate constituent companies continued to operate 
independently. All strategic controls were lax, but those in 
the externality field were particularly so. 
Since 1967/8 the firm has divisionalized along product 
lines and an M-form has been taking shape. 
M'-form 
UNILEVER 
In the 1950's the control procedure emphasized the firm's 
constituent companies as independent entities. However the 
presence of U.S.A. competition meant that change was needed, 
and this began in 1959, when the control and co-ordinati0n 
machinery were improved. Indicative of this was the expansion 
of the central service departments. 
In the early 1960's the divisionalization was on a geogra-
phical basis, however in 1966 there was a switch in certain 
areas to a product line approach: this is a problem of optimal 
divisionalization. 
Unilever is very strong on its emphasis of p'r 'o'flt;a'c'co·unt- · 
ability; central controls have b!3en strong for over a decade 
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now, within a framework of delegated responsibility. 
M-form 
UNITED BISCUITS 
Prior to 1965 the constituent companies in this group 
were as interested iQcompeting agaiQst themselves as against 
anybody else ~ccording to Lawrence, Keen and Gardner. 
Additionally, they did not take advantage of economies of scale 
in marketing and sales. 
The reorganization of 1966 bound the company into a whole 
by the formation of a centrally managed, divisionalized 
organization. However in 1972, the short-comings of the 
central organized company were recognized and there was talk 
of delegating responsibility. 
M-form 
NORTHERN DAIRIES 
Expansion in the 1960's and early 1970's led this company 
from its original product base of milk-distribution to such 
products as food and brewing. 
Like many companies which grow by d'iversification, 
Northern Dairies found itself by 1965 with an inadequate struc-
ture; directors were delegating too little responsibility. 
Hence a divisional structure was instituted. 
The process of organizational change may be a lo~g one, 
and although there was a minor re-organization in 1972, a 
classification of MLform from 1965-70 and M-form post-1970 is 
appropriate. 
CADBURY SVHWEPPES (CADBURY) 
Both the two constituent companies of Cadbury-Schweppes 
were using the M-form structure,' 8.1 though 'in a state of change, ' 
before the merg~r. Hence 1 t was not surprising that their, 
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separate identities were submerged into five product divisions, 
all with profit reponsibility and decision-making powers (see 
A.R. 1969). ' Howe'ver the merger' did increase 'the' time necessary 
for the organizational structure to become stable. 
M'-form 
ROWNTREE MACKINTOSH 
A divisionalization along M-form lines was put into 
practice as soon as the old Rowntree company expanded by the 
absorption of Mackintosh. The combination of M-form character-
istics found was similar to that in use at Rowntrees before 
the merger. However the change involved in getting the new 
structure must be taken into account. Hence classified M'-form. 
(see LSE 1973). 
_", ' BRITISH SUGAR CORPORATION 
This one product company was found, not surprisingly, 
to have a U-form structure during the period of this study. 
TATE & LYLE 
"The Tate & Lyle group today is a collection of operating 
companies or divisions each of which is accountable for its 
results." 
(A.R. 1969) 
Control of the divisions is in the hands of a small head-
quarters group and the executive committee. The latter is an 
internal audit department. 
Although the structure is quite stable now, there were 
doubts about the exact nature of the lines of control. Most of 
the board members hold positions of responsibility at the 
divisional level and the vertically integrated nature of the 
company may mean that central co-ordination is still inadequate .. 
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This company is classified M' after the middle 1969, and 
H-form beforehand. Therefore for the purposes of the study 
it is sub~optimal . 
. ~ 
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STORES 
ALLIED SUPPLIERS·· 
Prior to 1969 Allied Suppliers traded through a series 
... 
of subsidiaries which were not under unified management. The 
disadvantages of this approach were that there was no corpor-
ate identity and the central control of the group was 
inadequate for the requirements of the retail trade. The 
latter, of course " require 'considerable centralization of 
certain functions. 
Since late 1969, as well as the establishment of a single 
corporate identify th~re has been a divisionalization on a 
territorial basis and a strengthening of central control. 
The effects of this are not clear. 
Classified H-form 
BURTONS 
' ''The change (of name) recognized the new primary function 
of the Holding Company to determine and co-ordinate the over-
all strategy and policy of. the group's range of activities ... 
These have now been reorganized into divisions under managing 
directors and divisional boards." A.R. 1965 
Gradually, the group executj.ve at the centre and the group 
services were strengthened. At the same time the distance 
relationship and capacity property of the group executive were 
improved by members being relieved gradually of any divisional 
responsibilities. However there seemed still to be considerable 
change during the period of the study. 
I 
This company is an M-form 
BRITISH HOME STORES 
This company is a functionally organized from the centre 
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by a management committee. Some changes were started in 1972 
but it is too early to evaluate them yet. 
U-"form 
DEBENHAMS'" 
In the 1950's and 1960's Debenham was, like many firms in 
the departmental store business, organized along holding 
company lines emphasizing the individuality and autonomy of 
the individual units. However slnce late 1969 there has been 
considerable centralization and an ending of the system whereby 
the central board was made up almost entirely of representa-
tives of the member stores. 
However even with this movement towards the M-form in 
the 1970's (see A.R. 1971) for this study it is classified 
H-form. 
GREAT UNIVERSAL STORES 
There is no evidence of change in management philosophy 
since this piece was written (L.S.E. 1954/5) "Great Universal 
stores comprises a family of many different companies with 
interests in most fields of trade, commerce and industry. 
All our companies have their own managements, and co-ordin~tion 
is the main function of the parent board, which avoids inter-
ference with the day to day operations of self-contained 
individual' units. 
The parent board maintain the over-riding control through 
a system of weekly returns which are collected and concentrated 
by the London Office (the returns involve a large range of 
performance indicators). 
The total composite picture is therefore built up for 
frequent regular review enabling the board to set" course "for 
the entire ship, as it were, by 'compass direction." 
M-form 
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HOUSE OF FRAZER 
This company is only just starting on a process of 
increasing central functions (see George Henderson). House 
of Fraser ... has a~ways specialized in individual stores with 
considerable independence often with their own buying depart-
ments ' and "corporate" identity. Relative to the needs of 
the retail trade, the company's central functions have not 
been powerful enough to realize the economies of scale that 
are present and co-ordinate the firm in an optimal way. 
H-form 
KINLOCH 
This smallish company is divisionalized by product, 
and within product areas, geographically. This would seem a 
rational response to the operation of a warehousing and ~ash 
and carry business. 
The head control office of this company seems to be small, ," 
by the standards of the retailing sector, but nevertheless, 
strategic controls are sufficient for an M-form classification 
(since at least 1967). 
MARKS AND SPENCER 
Information about management practices is missing from 
the annual reports of this company. However information is 
available from 'Graham Turner's book "Business in Britain" (99). 
He reports that while like Sainsbury's and Tesco, buying is 
highly centralized at Marks and Spencer, selling is highly 
decentralized and the responsibility of the individual store 
managers. Under these conditions store managers will have an 
optimal mix of discretion and control. 
M-~form 
- 146 -
MENZIES 
While until 1969 there appears to have been insufficient 
control within this company, the response was one of over-
centralization. 
;' For management control purposes wholly-owned subsidiaries 
are being merged into one operating company which has been 
organized into six divisions: each under the control of a main 
board director. The subsidiary, companies' separate boards 
have been disbanded. 
The main purpose was to produce clear unbroken lines of 
authority to cover all aspects and levels of the business. 
Until late 1969 H-form, then M-form., Hence the majority 
of our four years are covered by ' the H-form classification. 
MORRIS AND DAVID JONES 
This highly decentralized company allows the responsibility 
;. .: 
for subsidiaries to lie with their respective managements. 
Even ordering is delegated to the subsidiary, and even depot 
, 
level (see Laing & Cruickshank 1973) . This is unsatisfactory 
'from an organizational point of view; especially in retailing 
where there are economies of scale in purchasing etc. 
H-form 
J. SAINSBURY 
Salnsbury's use the departmental rather than divisional 
approach, 1. e. it is a U-form. 
Functionalism may suit this company well because of its 
lack of diversification. 
S & K HOLDINGS 
Prior to 1969 the company was' lacking in controls. Indeed 
in 1965 there were only two executive directors on the main 
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board. 
The A.R. 1969 summarises that situation well. 
"Each of the subsidiary companies was managed as a 
separate 'unit. By reason of the growth of the group internally 
and by acquisition this is not the most effective way of con-
trolling our affairs, so we have recently divided the group 
into five divisions and formed an executive council 
H-form UI? t 'o' and' inclUding' 1969 
W. H. SMITH 
" 
M. T. 1972 reports that W.H. Smith has been in the 
process of change for the last ten years and it has not really 
stopped. Up until 1969 the chairman of tpis family controlled 
firm was also in charge of a W. H. Smith subsidiary. Now top 
management is devoting more time to long-term planning and 
following the profit centre idea. 
The A.R. 1971/2 reports the splitting of the company into 
divisions, instead of subsidiary companies. 
M-form 
TESCO 
Tesco is split into three divisions all of which have 
substantially the same structure - retail directors over area 
controllers over inspectors over store managers. The idea of 
profit responsibility runs strongly through Tesco's; indeed 
promotion is ' the direct result of good profit performance. 
Internal audits, cash flow allocation and externality control 
are also in evidence. 
This company is an M-form. However there is one problem 
that is discernible: it may be that central management will be 
unable to resist being involved in all the company's activities 
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because ,of the essentially family nature of the company and 
the tradition for personal leadership and control. 
The 'company's structure 'has been the :same "for a consider-
able period. 
U.D.S. 
In 1973 (92) it was noted that although this company 
had superior strategic controls than (say) the House of 
Fraser, it was difficult to decide upon whether H or M-form 
was the correct classification because of the still considerable 
autonomy afforded to individual units. 
Although it remains true that some difficulty was 
encountered in the submergence of family interests within the 
subsidiaries into the corporate whole, in view of Graham 
Turner's article on the retail trade in "Business in Britain" 
(99) a classification of M-form is afforded to U.D.S. . 
INTERNATIONAL STORES 
This is essentially a centrally organized firm, with a 
seemingly continuous line relation from the board downwards. 
'The departments are functional in character. 
U-form 
ASSOCIATED DAIRIES 
This company which is associated with the A.S.D.A. super-
stores in the North of England, has concentrated on using 
decentralized methods of decision-making and responsibility 
since the early 1960's. However this has not stopped the 
provision of several centrally-provided services where consi-
derable economies of scale are present. (see M.T. March 1974) 
M-form 
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FITCH LOVELL 
The lack of divisionalization and the numerous 
subsidiary companies, all over-lapping in terms of product 
and geographical area means that an H-form classification 
is allocated to this company before 1974. 
MOORES STORES 
Examination of the annual reports allows little doubt 
that this company had insufficient strategic controls, or 
provision of common services (for the retail trade), to have 
any other classification than H-form. Att.empts at change 
as late as 1971 had little effect. 
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ALCOHOLIC DRINK 
ALLIED BREWERIES 
The result of the me~ger of thtee regional breweries 
. ~ 
in 1961 - Ind Coope, Tet1eys and Anse1ls - this company for 
the first few years made little attempt to co-ordinate the 
activities of the constituent companies, which carried on 
in the same way as before the merger. This, however, was not 
too serious because the territories of the separate. companies 
did not overlap very much. 
However in mid-1960's the company started to change so 
that the A.R. 1969 could report that the company was no longer 
a group of individual companies working on their own but an 
integrated whole. Part of the reason why this change was 
needed was undoubtedly the considerable diversification of 
the period. 
' By 1969 it would seem that Allied Breweries justified an 
M-form classification. 
For period .of study - M-form 
BASS CHARRINGTON 
Ever since this merger was consummated the divisional-
ization of the company, with appropriated controls, has been 
given top priority. No chance was given for a holding company 
set up to develop. 
Even though central control is strong, the autonomy of 
action of subsidiaries whether in production, distribution or 
marketing is considerable. Obviously an M-form organization 
is being built in this company, but at the moment because of 
the lack of very recent information and the feeling that the 
system cannot be completely stable until production rationali-
zation is fully completed, an M'classtfication must be allocated. 
- 151 -
COURAGE 
Courage has been gradually divisionalized for at least 
ten years now' 'and was in fact ' rel"ativel"y quick "in subrrier'ging 
the ident~ties of the firms that were part of the original 
merger. The A.R. 1972 remarks that "our policy is to operate 
on a decentralized basis of management with authority and 
responsibility delegated as far as possible down the line". 
Each of the divisions at Courage, has a separate board 
and these board-members are unlikely to be on the main board. 
It seems unlikely therefore that central over-involvement is 
present. 
M-form" 
DISTILLERS 
Distillers is mainly concerned with the whisky trade, and 
this concentration was increased with the selling of its 
chemical operations to B.P. Incidentally, this chemical deal 
highlights one of the problems of subsidiaries with split 
control. Two chemical subsidiaries were left out of the deal 
because D.C.L's partners would not agree. D.C.L. is keen on 
split ownership of companies. 
Although there is a divisional structure, D.C.L. is 
probably essentially a holding company not least because of 
the traditional independence of many of the distilleries which 
form the basis of the company. 
"D.C.L. because of its extreme decentralization and 
specialization has not built a managerial group of experts in 
corporate planning (etc.) •.. at the centre". Director 1969. 
There is no evidence that any of the other D.C.L's activities 
is under any different type of control than the whisky trade, 
so precluding an X-form classification. 
H-form 
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GUINNESS · 
Guinness is a strange compan~ in that its two operating 
companies in the stout field, Park Royal and Dublin, are to a 
large extent autonomous: yet conflict is resolved by the 
agreement which set them up, under which they both take strictly 
controlled areas of operation. It can therefore be concluded 
that competitive behaviour between the two parts of the company 
is minimal. 
Although co-ordination is adequate at Guinness it is likely 
that the company does not pass the cash flow criteria of the 
M-form; central management only involves itself in cash alloca-
tion problems when subsidiary company resources are inadequate. 
The analysis above is not really changed by the company's 
diversification over the last few years, and is encouraged by 
the company's like of partial ownership of subsidiaries. 
This is one of the holding companies which is on the 
borders of M-form classification. 
H-form 
SCOTTISH AND NEWCASTLE 
Scottish and Newcastle is less diversified or vertically 
integrated than most of the big brewers. It has of course, 
got tied houses and hotels, but 65% of its sales come from the 
free sector of the market. This has allowed the company to 
organize itself along essentially functional lines. 
U-form 
WATNEYS 
Watneys has tended to be the odd man out op the brewery 
trade as this quote would ind~cate: 
"The administrative reorganization was completed during 
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the year; it (the company) is now organized on a functional 
basis for overall planning and control in production, marketing 
and tied estatedevelopmentj ... with the boards of the 
regional companies being responsible for the profitable imple-
mentation of these plans." (A.R. 1969) 
Watney has always been slow to get rid of the regional 
brewers' identities, something that contrasts strongly with 
the practice of most of the major companies in the industry. 
Indeed, the directors of these companies have, over the years, 
been the mainstay of the Watney board. 
The reorganization of 1967 might be best viewed as that 
occurring fn a company trying to overcome the independence of 
its subsidiaries, resulting in over-involvement (i.e. M-form). 
The choice between ~ and U was difficult, but essentially 
due to its history the role of the subsidiaries would seem 
such .that a classification emphasizing the role of sub-units 
was selected. 
M-form 
WHITBREAD 
Whitbread for a long time was a holding company. for 
defensive reasons. The Whitbread "umbrella" was formed to stop 
aggressive moves by other breweries towards a large number of 
small independents. All these "independents" have been, or 
will be quite soon, taken over by Whitbread to form an integrated 
group. However the job of rationalizing capacity is a long one. 
All the A.R. 1968-72 have reports of changes in the struc-
ture of the company, so obviously the full extent of the 
reorganiza~ion has not been seen yet. 
M'-form 
• holding company in the sense that it had considerable resources 
in trade investmerits . . 
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MECHANICAL ENGINEERING 
ASSOCIATED ENGINEERING ; 
"The .. groupts central management today is relatively 
small consisting of a finance team, a systems team, a corporate 
planning section under the group economist and a technical 
service group ... The group has a fairly decentralized manage-
ment structure which has not been subjected to any radical 
changes recently. However it has been tightened up now by more 
stringent financial controls, thus refining the corporate profit . 
ceritres~ (Greenwell). 
"Each of the divisions is to a large degree autonomous 
and centred around its major subsidiary - these subsidiaries 
provide the management structure for the whole of their parti-
cular division." 
M-form 
AUTOMOTIVE PRODUCTS 
While lines of control were somewhat blurred this company 
until (at least) 1972 was ·structured in an essentially 
functional manner. This is revealed by the nature of director-
ship responsibilities and the promotion procedures. (see A.Rts) 
However the size and limited range of products, may make 
a U-form structure optimal. 
BABCOCK AND WILCOX 
Babcock and Wilson (U.S.) owns 12% of the equity of this 
company but according to de Zoete Bevan the control exercised 
over the G.B. Babcock is "similar to the loose control 
exercised by the G.B. company over its continental associates". 
Up to 1971 B & W was undoubtedly a holding company but 
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perhaps its. U. K'. subsidiaries were under much closer control 
than its overseas associates. However a new divisiona1ized 
form of organization was introduced but it is doubtful at this 
moment that it has really fully integrated under central 
control the various B & W activities. This 1s particularly so 
since certain subsidiaries were not involved in the divisiona1i-
zation. 
H-form 
BIRMID QUAL CAST 
Formed in 1967, this company underwent rapid rationaliza-
tion to eliminate competition between the two constituent 
parts - the old Birmid and Qualcast companies. While the 1969 
A.R. indicates a structure a10ng'multidivisiona1 lines, a 
classification of M'form would seem appropriate for the years 
up to 1970. 
M'-form 
JOHN BROWN 
This company seems to eschew divisiona1ization and lets 
the individual subsidiary companies carry on with little effort 
to integrate them technically or commercially. 
Evidence from the annual reports from 1960-1970 gives the 
impression that the centres of control are at the subsidiary 
board level; indeed there is little central staff capacity 
either functional or managerial. 
H-form 
DAVY-ASHMORE 
In 1973 (A.R.) it was reported that 'a divisionalized 
structure with profit accountability had been introduced at 
Davy-Ashniore, as the 'res'u1 t of a major contract problem in 
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1968/9. However these reorganizational moves continued 
throughout the early 1970's (see A.R. 1973) and the result as 
yet cannot be justified as an M-form • 
. ~ H-form 
DUPORT 
This company is in the process of extended change possibly 
resulting in the end in an M-form managerial structure. 
However at the moment the main board seems to have too little 
manpower or back-up services adequately to monitor the divisions. 
In addition the process of co-ordinating the various parts of 
the company has only just started. 
H-form 
GLYNWED 
The company started its policy of divisionalization and 
decentralization in 1967 and the divisions were made responsible 
for profit performance. 
The merger with Allied Ironfounders in 1969 has placed a 
considerable burden on the process of change, and it is this 
fact, coupled with a hint of over-involvement that necessitates 
an M'-classification even though the management structure seems 
to have been stable recently. 
M'-form until 1971 
G.K.N. 
By the early 1960's it was obvious that G.K.N. was a group 
of largely autonomous companies, the product range of each 
being determined largely by historical factors. Central control 
was very weak. (see Simon Coates. 1970) 
The regrouping of the firm into sub-groups took at least 
a decade. However even then the company had not · fully finished 
its reorganization; the A.R . . 1971 mentions the "excessive burden" 
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on top man~gement which was the result of "expansion" and 
the persistence of the historic pattern of major sub~group 
representatives on the board. This it was felt would lead 
"in the f-uture" to a board of excessive proportions and 
considerable biases. 
While evidence points to an M-form structure after 1971 
for this study an V-classification is used due to the comments 
in 1971 A.R. (above). 
HAWKER SIDDELEY 
Channon (17) has classified this company H C (holding 
company) for 1969. While it is agreed that up until 1965 
there were ' few strategic controls, after that date the 
situation seems to have recitified, by the introduction of 
profit responsibility for sUb-units and elimination of product 
overlap. Therefore for the period of this study, an M'-form 
classification has been allocated to Hawker Siddeley. (see 
Rowe Sw ann 1972, and Graham Turner (99).) 
LAIRD GROUP 
M'-form to 1970 
M-form afterwards 
The historical development of this group made it certain 
that it was an assortment of individual subsidiaries with 
little co-ordination or control to bind them t~gether (see L.S.E. 
No. 238). The government intervention of 1970 inevitably caused ·· 
change. The first move, understandably under the circumstances, 
was the introduction of very tight budgetary controls and a 
lot of centralization. 
H-form until 1971 
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RE NOLD 
Prior to 1968, Renold opera~ed on a functional basis, but 
expansion and diversifica'tion ' (although 'to' related products), 
made a n~w management structure necessary. The four years 
1968-72 were a period of transition to the M-form structure, 
with the formation of headquarters specialist groups, and 
the delegation of responsibility. Controls were adequate. 
M' -form ' 
STONE-PLATT 
Until 1966 no attempt was made to integrate the original 
constituent companies - Stone and P1att. 
However in 1968", a di visiona1ized structure was put into 
operation. However while the annuai report 1968 would 
indicate an emerging M-form, thfs company it would seem 
remained an H-form until (at least) 1972. This is because 
although the reorganization reduced product overlap, the 
divisional responsibilities of top-level management (see A.R's) 
makes unbiased decision-making unlikely. 
H-form 
STAVELEY 
In 1963 Stave1ey Industries was a company comprising 
twenty-two subsidiaries which were run independently of one 
another. (A.R. 1968). What the company did in 1963 was to 
group the subsidiaries into four divisions each under a chair-
man and board of directors, who attempted to increase 
efficiency in general and rationalize production in particular. 
However this approach does not seem to have eliminated 
the independent nature of the company's sub-units and more 
reorganization was nee'ded in the late 1960 'sand early 1970's 
to bring the group under tighter financial control. The 
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divisions ,of 1963, may have co-ordinated the. firms. under 
their control in a superior way, but there is little evidence 
that the control and co-ordination of the' divisions themselves 
was adequate. 
H-form 
TUBE INVESTMENTS 
Tube Investments prior to 1962 was a holding company 
which M.T. 1967 described as having "extreme decentralization" 
and "expensive competition" between constituent companies. 
Even capital spending approval was not formalized. 
The remedy of the management at the time was a resort 
to, divisional principles, but as so often happens, extreme 
decentralization was replaced by over-involvement. The effects 
of this excessive centralization are well reported by A.R.1970. 
Delegation of responsibility was needed bo~to encourage the 
performance of middle management and to remove the burden on 
top management. 
M-form 
VICKERS 
Vickers was another British company whose structure was 
more due to its history than deliberate policy. Prior to 
1967 Vickers had a holding company structure, but one which 
over the years had become liable to more and more central 
interference, in a very haphazard, unsystematic way. 
The new divisionalized structure began to take shape in 
1967 and the Financial Times was able to comment that for the 
first time "Vickers has a top executive who will be able to 
direct most of its time to planning future development". This 
reconstruction of the 'company has emphasized the' 'profit respon-
sibility of the divisions, whose actions are checked by 
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monitori~g of performance relative to ta!gets. Funds are to 
. 
be allocated according to performance. 
THOMAS W~RD 
As Greenwe11 report Thos. Ward was for a long time a 
loose-knit federation of a large number of operating subsid-
iaries. Gradually management control became more difficult, 
and some subsidiaries were lagging behind the rest in 
efficiency and profitability. Also the difference between 
theparent and subsidiary company responsibilities became 
blurred. 
Therefore the firm has taken steps to implement an 
M-form organization, delegating. responsibilities and yet 
keeping tight control from the centre. Also there has been 
a realignment of the subsidiary company product range; so as 
to ease co-ordination problems, and a more active elimination 
of unprofitable areas of the organization. However this did 
not occur until after 1969. 
H-form 
WEIR GROUP 
The Weir group divisionalized about 1966 but it was not 
until 1970 that strengthening of the central organization led 
to better central control, particularly in the area of product 
interdependency. 
(see Hoare& Company 1971) 
H-form until 1970 
RICHARD JOHNSON AND NEPHEW 
Near the end of the period of our study, Jessel Securities 
had built up a controlling interest in the . st·ock of this company. 
A reorganization resulted (in 1972) which introduced the profit 
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centre approach, with financial control from the . . centre. 
Previously the organizational structure is believed to be 
holding company type,· with managers taking theTr divisional 
responsibilities with them to board meetings. Therefore this 
firm is classified H-form. 
A. HERBERT 
There is little doubt that before 1968, this was a 
holding company of a particularly extreme form. Organizational 
influence was concentrated at the subsidiary board level. 
While a reorganization in 1968/9 (see A.R.) created seven 
product divisions and four service divisions, there seems to 
be little "evidence that multidivisional type controls were 
initiated. 
From 1968 to 1974, there wereatterripts (seeA.R.'s) to 
centralize the company, but the classification must still be 
H-form. 
OOWTY 
While individual subsidiaries have long been accountable 
for performance in terms 'of sales and capital and some 
services, like publicity and data processing, have been 
provided centrally to obtain economies of scale, the lack of 
executive directors, and more important, the product overlap 
between the subsidiaries, mean that on balance an H-form 
classification is appropriate. However this must be consid-
ered marginal. The organizational structure has been stable 
since the sixties. 
B.S.A. 
When divisiona1ization was attempted in this firm, it 
failed to overcome the ·powe·r and prestJ.ge 'of the" individual 
subsidiaries. This was particularly so in the motor bicycle 
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di~sion, which dominate .the whole company and led to its 
eventual bankruptcy . 
. n"';'forin' . 
GEORGE COHEN 600 
L.S.E. 1970, reports the introduction of a new structure 
at Cohen's. While this seemed to be on M-form principles, it 
did involve efforts to increase co-ordination between the 
constituent companies, and incre~se centralized buying. 
Hence anji-form classification is allocated for our study 
period. 
MATHER AND PLATT 
A divisiona1ized structure on the basis of product or 
location .has been used at Mather and Platt since 1965. Since 
Cape1 and Co. reports this company to be highly integrated, 
there is little possibility that it is an holding-type company 
like so many others in mechanical engineering. While lacking 
conclusive evidence to eliminate the M-form, an M-form 
classification is allocated. 
SIMON ENGINEERING 
Founded in 1960 this company until 1968 had few central 
office controls or services. From 1960 to 1964 the separate 
subsidiaries were operating in a manner little different to 
the pre-merger days, while from 1964-68 they each divisiona-
lized. 
Since 1968, the tightening of central control and a group 
reorganization resulting in much reduced product overlap means 
an M'-form classification. 
WHESSOE 
Until the 1970's, while . split into product divisions ,. 
Whessoe also superimposed upon these the functional 
- 163 -
responsibilities of the executive directors. However using 
the Wi11iamson classification, this type of hybrid structure, 
., .. ~ ..... ....... '.' - . -. 
must be classified as M-form, refTecting celltra1 interference 
with day~to day decision-making in the subsidiaries. 
(In these cases, the decision between M and U-formis 
always difficult and must be one of emphaSis.) 
DELTA METAL 
Delta Metal which has extensive interests in the metal 
industries grew up as a mass of loosely connected quasi-
independent subsidiaries. Each retained almost as much free-
dom as a fully independent company. 
Seeing the modern trend towards divisiona1ization manage-
ment decided in 1967 to group the activities of the company 
into six divisions, each under an executive chairman. This 
would account for Channon's (17) classification of mu1ti-
divisional form until 1969. However Management Today (1974) 
reports that until 1972, the new structure did not affect the 
business very much; power remained at the subsidiary level. 
Therefore a classification of H-form seems appropriate. 
CLARKE CHAPMAN 
The change to a divisiona1ized structure came late in the 
1960's at ~larke Chapman. The management phi1osophywas to 
delegate responsibility, provide a satisfactory control system 
from the centre, and to provide some centralized services (see 
A.R. 1971). The process of change would probably have finished 
by 1970, had it not been for the merger with J. Thompson. 
M'-form 
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APPENDIX :'B' " - " A "CL"ASSI FICAT"I ON" OF" a6: CONGLOMERATE: COMPANIES 
FOR THE PERIOD 1963 - 71 
A.V.P. 
" ~ 
A.V.P. is not a company that has undergone significant 
organizational change in the last fifteen years. It is an 
industrial holding company that emphasizes management rather 
than asset possibilities. 
Operations are "grouped by area and central management 
although modest in size has through financial targets ensured 
that the subsidiaries did not get out of control. (Investors 
Chroniqle July 1966). Product overlap between the subsidiaries 
is minimal. 
M-form" 
BAIRD 
This company has specialized in creating semi-autonomous 
subsidiaries, which it was intended to build up and then float 
off as separate entities. (see A.R. 1971/2) 
As early as 1966 the" company had been arranged so that 
the individual parts, could borrow "according to their needs" 
\ and achieve their own quotation. (A. R. 1967). While this 
procedure may be profitable, the company did not operate as 
an M-form, "for which tighter financial control and regulation 
of intra-firm competition would havebee"Ii necessary . 
H-form 
B.E.T. 
As a conglomerate-type company, B.E.T. was founded upon 
the proceeds of the sale of its bus interests, but unlike 
Thomas Tilling, it has tended to act rather like a mutual-fund 
specializing in a loosely controlled group of partially-owned 
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subsidiaries. This quote . from A.R. 1969 will illustrate the 
group's philosophy. 
"During the year policy· in relation to the· ·group' s 
p~rtfolio of general investments was reviewed - it was 
decided to concentrate more on income than capital apprecia-
tion and opportunities were taken to switch out of low-
yielding investments into first class equities affording a 
high return." (A.R. 1969) 
H-form 
COPE ALLMAN 
Cope-Allman was a wheeler-dealer operation in the early 
1~60's: the management system was not very sophisticated and 
the. group was crudely divided by geography into "north" and 
"south". Efforts were made to control capital expenditure 
and monitor profit performance but inadequate knowledge about 
the industries in which the subsidiaries operated and the 
predominance of interest in acquisitions and disposal made 
these targets impossible (see M.T. 1972). 
Rationalization and · deve10p~ent of the corporate struc-
ture started in 1965 and by 1968 a well-developed divisional 
organization had resulted with the normal M-form pre-
requisites .of control and autonomy. 
CHARTERHOUSE 
pre-1965 H-·form 
1965 - 68 M' -form 
1968 onwards M-form 
In the 1960's the company, although having substanti~l 
interests, took very little effective part in controlling 
them. The limit of involvement was the ·apPoihtmentof 
- 166 -
directors; . and their job more to advise .than direct. 
From early 1969, changes we~e adopted which, coupled 
with managerial style of deceIltralization, increased central 
controls' and shortened the lines of communication (see F.T. 
8.1.74). 
DE LA RUE 
H-form up to 1969 
1969 - 74 M'-form 
This company is an illustrative case. The company 
divisionalized in 1959, but by 1964 it was realized that 
inadequate central control had led to over-extension of the 
company's ·resources (L. S. E. 1969). However the result of 
this discovery was a centralization of control which could 
only be described as excessive. The Deputy Chairman and 
Chief Executive became responsible for the day to day running 
of the group; committees of control multiplied. Not 
surprisingly this situation was found to be unsatisfactory 
and a further reconstruction of management was tried in 1971, 
but the results were disappointing and the chief executive 
was removed. Further organizational changes were promised. 
1959 - 64 H-form 
1964 - 71 ll-forrn 
DEVELOPMENT SECURITIES 
Although information on this company owned and run by 
the McAlpines is sparse, it would seem that the activities 
of central management are very limited; during much of the 
period of study there was only one full-time executive 
director. While.large-sized head-offices are not generally 
required by conglomer·ates·, thfs company is just an umbrella 
for several la:rgely autonomous subSidiaries. It is really an 
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investment company, possibly providing tax advant~ges for 
the McAlpine family as compared with direct investment in 
the 'companies' concel"nad. 
, ~ H-form 
ELECTRICAL AND INDUSTRIAL SECURITIES 
This company prefers to minimize centralization instead 
linking its semi-autonomous subsidiaries with the very slight-
est of financial controls. 
There was considerable product overlap between the three 
major subsidiaries during the period of the study and this 
potentially competitive situation coupled with the lack of 
fi~ancial control (see A.R. 1970) or H.Q. managerial capacity 
means that an H-form classification is appropriate. 
FRANCIS 
Examination of the annual reports for 1969 and before, 
shows a divisionalized structure for the period of the 1960's. 
However these divisions existed in name only, since power 
remained at the subsidiary board level. In 1969, each division 
provided one executive for the main board; this is likely to 
cause conflict and bias in decision-making. 
Financial control seems also to have been lax; a manage-
ment report , of £105,000 profit turned out to be a substantial 
loss (A.R~ 1970). A.R. 1971 makes the pOint that there is 
a need for detailed budgets for each subsidiary. 
H-form 
GILTSPUR 
While the philosophy of operation of this company has not 
changed over the past thirteen years, the organizational 
structure underwent superfici'alchangein 1969 .. ' In that .year, 
due to rapid growth by acquisi t,ion, a new divisional structure 
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was needed to rationalize control .. Therefore a new level of 
management was inserted between the individual subsidiaries 
and the board. However' thfs did not alter theM-form 
. ", 
structure, which had the same tight financial and product 
control as used by Gi1tspur's Chairman, Sir Max Joseph, at 
Grand Metropolitan Hotels. 
M-form 
GRAMPIAN 
The "unco-ordinated expansion" (see A.R. 1970) of the 
1960's had led to considerable difficulties. That there had 
been too little co-ordination in a company with very few 
executive directors and no chief executive, is unsurprising. 
Some of the changes to be introduced in 1970 were, a 
strengthening of management, a review and adjustment of the 
control systems for capital development throughout the group, 
and' an increase in central co-ordination (see A.R. 1970). 
H-form up to late 1970 
M'-form af~erwards 
GROVEWOOD SECURITIES 
Grovewood securities is a holding company specializing 
in taking over successful companies where there are problems 
of succession (A.R. 1973). While the autonomy allowed to 
new subsidiaries was never in any doubt, careful control of 
new financial projects is applied, so that even with some 
(minor) product overlap, M-form is the appropriate choice. 
There was no change in structure over the period of the 
study. 
HANSON TRUST 
Since the mid 1960 "s, thfs company has operated a decen-
tralized operation ,. keeping the parent board as an auditing 
- 160 - . 
and co-ordinational body for the separate trading subsidiaries. 
Financial control from the centre in the form of month to 
month ~rofit reports, erisure 'th~t sufficierit financial control 
," 
is present (see A.R. 1967; 1968). 
M-form 
HARGREAVES 
The company has long been characterised by separate boards 
for its subsidiaries, but the A.R. 1971 recognizes the lack 
of delegation of responsibility and states that the structure 
will be appropriately amended; in future top management will 
concen~rate on corporate planning, policy and financial 
control, and divisions will be formed. 
M-form 
HARRIS AND SHELDON 
While Harris and"She'ld9n did divide its operations into 
three groups in thee1rly 1960's, this was on a very crude 
basis. The activities of the three groups "A", "B" and "C" 
seemed to have very littl~ in common. Therefore little 
organizational significance is attached to this division of 
the company's activities. 
However the emergence of new management in 1968, led to 
a streamlining of the group's operation, an improvement in 
organizational structure, and a tightening of financial 
control. 
One result of this was a greater willingness to dispose 
of loss-making assets. 
H-form to end 1967 
M'-form from early 1968 onwards 
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JESSEL 
Oliver Jessel's brainchild was the same type of take-
over specialist as Slater Walker. Jessel was always involved 
in the management of the subsidiaries, so the company's 
rather loose structure disguised close personal control. 
Less was delegated than at Slater Walker. 
Much of the company's early success and subsequent 
failure resulted not from organizational aspects but from the 
degree to which existence of under-valued assets, and market 
conditions could be foreseen. 
The Williamson classification (103, 109) is not wholly 
relevant to this company; its stable environment assumptions 
may not be fulfilled due to the' rapid turnover in subsidiaries. 
While similar to SlaterWalker in many aspects, it was consi-
dered that an M-form classification was not fully appropriate; 
the rather close personal control of Jessel was crucial here. 
Sub-optimal 
L.C.P. 
Use in the early 1960's of a centralized structure was 
modified by organizational change between 1968 and 1970. (see 
Inv. Chr. 31/7/70) 
Coupled with decentralization, a divisional structure 
was put into operation, along M-form lines. This organizational 
structure corresponded with considerable expansion and diversi-
fication. 
LAMS ON 
M-form pre 1968 
M'-form 1968 onwards 
"Early this year it was decided to reorganize the 
operation of the group along divisional lines, each divisional 
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head assuming worldwide responsibility for the promotion of 
the product of his division. 
"Additionally we are in the course of creating a service 
section·to support all divisional activities in so far as 
these can be handled on a centralized basis. 
"Our object is to increase profitability by knitting the 
group into a more cohesive entity ... rather than encouraging 
the ~ndependent development of s~parate quasi-autonomous 
companies." (A.R. 1968) 
A,group executive division was set up in 1969/70 with 
responsibility for finance, monitoring and corporate plan~ing. 
pre 1968 H-form 
1968 onwards M'-form 
LINDUSTRIES 
Prior to the 'seventies Lindustries was not aggressive 
either in its acquisition po1ic~ or in elimination of lo~s­
makers. (Inv. Chr. 10/1/69). This stemmed from the weak 
central management of the company, which had insufficient 
full-time executives tQ force the control ot head office over 
the subsidiaries. 
Corporate planning was started in 1972 in an effort to 
revitalize ,the company. It would seem that more organizational 
changes are planned. 
H-form 
LONDON AND MIDLAND 
This company. was a rag-bag of autonomous sub-units with 
little financial control. Indeed it was not until 1973 that 
a full-time Financial Director was appointed (see A.R. 1973) 
as part of a company-wide process to strengthen controls. 
H-form 
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LONOON AND MERCHANT SECURITIES . 
This conglomerate specializes in part-ownership of 
companies. Although the percentage held is usually above 
~ 50% and this allows complete voting control of the company 
if so desired, such control is rarely exercised; the company 
preferring to play the role of an investment trust. 
Sub-optimal 
MELBRAY 
Melbray developed as a holding company with comparatively 
little co-ordination or control from the centre. Rationaliza-
tion of product responsibilities was also weak. 
After recognizing the problems (in 1967), a divisional 
management team was introduced to rectify the faults (in 1968). 
Howeverthe reorganization of corporate structure seems to 
have proved to be more difficult than expected, and remained 
very much a corporate priority in the early 1970's. 
H-form to 1968 
M'-form after that date 
NEVILLE 
Neville is a highly streamlined company emphasizing 
financial control in its organizational structure, which 
particularly specializes in the buying and selling of firms 
in order to make profits on their assets. 
However, at the same time, subsidiaries are run with an 
eye to steady-state efficiency, and the autonomy afforded to 
subsidiary management, coupled with tight financial control 
leads to an M-form classification. (see A.R's) 
M-form 
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NORCROS: : 
At Norcros managers receive "full autonomy" and high 
rewards, but are subject to the strongest financial control 
" ~ 
from head office. (see A.R. 1974). This M-form type 
structure was introduced in 1966 (see A.R.), at which time 
managers, although having sufficient discretion in decision-
making, were subject to insufficient budgetary control. 
Also in 1966, it was noted that the company was having 
problems associated with "over" diversification and this led 
to a deliberate restriction of the company's scope to three 
product areas. 
U-form 
PORTALS 
Portals was an H-form prior to 1968, with individual 
subsidiaries having excessive autonomy. This was remedied by 
the formation of a "central office" committee responsible 
for overall group policy and the strengthening of financial 
control. (see A.R. 1968). While the period 1968-71 is 
allocated an M'-classification, evidence of the success of 
the reorganization is sparse. 
H-form up to 1968 
Ut-form 1968 - 71 
POWELL DUFFRYN 
It was in 1968, that Powell Duffryn set about developing 
its central services and pin-pointing areas of responsibility 
and accountability. This, the A.R. reports, made it easier 
to allocate funds to areas of highest yield. Previously the 
company's holding company nature had made this difficult. 
Up to 1968 -" H-'fo"rm " 
1968 - 72 - M'-form 
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RECKITT AND 'COLEMAN ' 
This company, formed in 1953, was organized along hold-
ing company lines until 1969. ' By and large 'until that date 
, ~ 
the constituent companies carried on in a way similar to the 
pre-merger days. This was also true of new acquisitions 
that entered the group. 
After 1969, there has been a reconstruction, as Laurie 
Milbank report. Although initially there may have been slight 
over-centralization, this was quickly rectified so justifying 
an M'form classification. 
SCOTCROS 
Up to 1969 H-form 
Post-1969 M'-form 
Realizing the lack of cohesiveness in the group in the 
1960's (see A.R. 1970) management embarked on a programme of 
increasing control from the centre. Specialist central organi-
zations were set up, capital control procedures were revised 
and strengthened, a wides~read corporate planning programme 
instigated, and subsidiaries with low profitability sold: 
(between 1971-4 seven out of thirteen subsidiaries were sold). 
H-form up to 1971 
SCOTTISH AND UNIVERSAL 
The company has always received a large proportion of its 
profit from investments (e.g. in the House of Fraser)j but the 
holding is usually less than 50% of the share capital. This 
makes organizational control impossible over a large amount of 
its invested capital. 
However even in those cases where a majority of the share 
capi tal is held, there 'see'nis to have bee'n' 11 ttle 'effort to 
control. 
H-form 
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SEARS: : ! 
Sears has long been associated with Charles Clore and is 
characterized by a modest headquarters staff and a system 
. ~ 
that encourages managerial independence. 
Since 1960 the company has had closely connected groups 
of trading companies enjoying "the advantages both of autono-
mous management and group co-operation" (A.R. 1960). The A.R. 
continues "we have avoided the c.!"eation of the large and costly 
central office organization which is normally essential to. 
service and hold together a large number of more or less 
diverse industries." This statement was made in a period when 
centralized control was still common. 
There has been little change since 1960. 
M-form 
NOTE: Channon (17) has classified both this company and 
Thomas Tilling as holding companies. There is no doubt that 
both companies maintain a rather small headquarters, but it is 
considered here that control is sufficient to justify an M-form 
classification especially when both groups seem to have 
organized their subsidiaries' activities into non-conflicting 
areas. 
SPARK 
Reorganization at Spark Holdings occurred early in 1966, 
with the formation of divisions. This reorganization was 
required by the poor profitability of the company in the years 
prior to 1965 (see lnv. Chr. 29/11/65). 
Later problems, in 1972, resulted in no structural change, 
but a change of the incumbent management . 
. H-'fo'rin up to 1966 
M' or M-form 1966 onwards 
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SLATER-WALKER SECURITIES 
Slater Walker Securities has gone through three distinct 
phases since Its clImb to predominance in 1964; first it was 
an industrial conglomerate, secondly it emphasized banking and 
finance, and thirdly, banking, insurance and property invest-
ment. 
Much of its early success came from the identification 
of undervalued asset positions and growth areas in the economy. 
Both of these are the result of entrepreneurial insight rather 
than organizational structure. 
However it would seem that the group was forward-looking 
in organizational aspects as well. Unlike some "entre-
preneurs" who want to control everything themselves, Slater 
was willing to delegate responsibility, within the framework 
of tight central control. (see Laing and Cruickshank 1972). 
Such control consisted of strategic planning, financial control, 
and a special team used to back up new subsidiaries when 
first purchased. 
M-form throughout the period 
THOMAS TILLING 
The high degree of managerial independence at the sub-
sidiary lev.el coupled with strong central controls (see Laurie 
Milbank) means that this group is an M-form. 
The company according to the A.R. 1968, has had the same 
form since its inception as an industrial holding company, but 
to what extent this was true in the 1950's has not been 
established. (Tilling's became a conglomerate on the proceeds 
of the sale of its bus interests in the late 1940's.) 
M-form ' 
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NOTE: Channon (17) ·classifiedthis company an· H-:fo'rm; see 
"Sears" above for further discussion. 
WOOD HALL TRUST 
.~ 
Until 1968 when product groupings were established, 
subsidiaries of the Wood Hall Trust were semi-autonomous. 
Then central financial and product controls were gradually 
increased, leading to a movement of power from the subsidiary 
to main-board level. 
WINN 
Up to 1968 H-form 
1968 - 70 M'-form 
1970 onwards M-form 
The advantages, in the form of better co-ordination, 
in grouping together subsidiaries making similar products were 
recognized at Winn in 1970. (A.R.). So the company was divi-
siona1ized. At the same time financial control was strengthened 
in order to improve the utilization of resources. 
There is little dou~t this company had a sub-optimal 
organizational structure up until 1970; whether the company did 
in fact move to an M-form structure after that date can only 
be verified by additional information. 
Up to 1970 H-form 
WHITECROFT 
Until 1970, central decisions were made on the basis of 
committee decision, the composition of which emphasized 
management's executive position within the subsidiaries. Hence 
it is expected that not only was central control weak because 
of the non-existence of executive head-office staff, but also 
that decision-making was biased by th~diffeient vested intei-
ests of "central" management (see A.F.. 1970),. 
- l7S -
1970 saW the strengthening of the central management 
including the appointment of (more) executive directors and 
a chief executive. 
prior to 1970 H-form 
post 1970 M'-form 
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